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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers various interactions between law, conscience, and religion in three 
countries: Germany, the United States, and Australia. Looking in detail at recent controversies, 
including those over headscarves and crucifixes, and sometimes exploring philosophical and 
theological themes, this thesis makes comparisons across these countries based on case law, 
existing legislation, and constitutional provisions, as well as proposed legislative reform. The 
thesis also considers debates that occur inside religious traditions and reflects upon how such 
discussions impact the well-established sincerity test, which prohibits courts from taking 
positions on theological questions. Understanding a foreign solution to a familiar problem often 
leads to a more precise grasp of one’s own law. This thesis applies this axiom to inform debate 
in the future work of Australian federal and state Parliaments as they attempt to protect freedom 
of conscience and religion in a complex social milieu. 
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Conscience is ubiquitous in our law, but it is usually unexamined, functioning as a 
presumed shared starting point within every citizen’s cognitive grasp from which the law 
can do its work.1 
This thesis explores legal complications associated with conscience protection and religious 
freedom in three countries—Germany, Australia, and the United States. It does so by 
examining selected recent cases, legislation, and constitutional provisions in a broad 
comparative context while also aiming to unearth shared presumptions and potential portable 
solutions that may form the basis of future law reform in Australia. 
There can be no doubt that law, authority, and religion are now interacting with increasing 
frequency and greater variation around the world.2 Leading Western democracies, including 
those mentioned above, are at the vanguard of a wave of legal reforms, which are attempting 
to keep pace with a mass of underlying social and cultural change, religious tension, and 
prudent accommodation where possible.3 Questions of conscience protection are also 
becoming caught up in these changes, and attracting further attention in their own right, quite 
1 ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON
AND STATE 15 (2010). 
2 Report of the Pew Research Center on Religion and Public Life, A Closer Look at How Religious 
Restrictions Have Risen Around the World (July 15, 2019). https://www.pewforum.org/2019/07/15/a-closer-
look-at-how-religious-restrictions-have-risen-around-the-world/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2020). This report has 
appeared for ten consecutive years and notes that “Over the decade from 2007 to 2017, government restrictions 
on religion – laws, policies and actions by state officials that restrict religious beliefs and practices – increased 
markedly around the world. And social hostilities involving religion – including violence and harassment by 
private individuals, organizations or groups – also have risen since 2007, the year Pew Research Center began 
tracking the issue.” 
3 These include Australia’s efforts in reforming discrimination laws through the Religious Discrimination 
Bill 2019 (Cth) and the associated legislative package, including the Religious Discrimination (Consequential 
Amendments) Bill 2019 (Cth), and the Human Rights Legislation Amendment (Freedom of Religion) Bill 2019 
(Cth). In the United States, high profile cases such as Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius (2013) and Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014) continue to come before the highest courts. In Germany, an influx of immigrants has 
fueled contentious debates about religious clothing, freedom of speech, and related issues of “integration.” For 
an overview of ethically motivated disobedience to the law in Germany from 1949 to 1989 see Tobias Schieder, 
ETHISCH MOTIVIERTER RECHTSUNGEHORSAM: RECHTSDEBATTEN ZU WIDERSTANDSRECHT, GEWISSENSFREIHEIT
UND ZIVILEM UNGEHORSAM IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, 1949-1989 [Ethically motivated 
disobedience to the law: Legal debates surrounding the right to resistance, freedom of conscience, and civil 
disobedience in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-1989] (2018). 
apart from religious considerations.4 
In December 2018, the Australian Government published the Religious Freedom Review, 
thereby drawing attention to a “limited understanding in the [Australian] community about the 
human right to religious freedom, its application, and how it interacts with other human 
rights.”5 New Australian cases dealing with perennial issues such as those surrounding 
religious clothing are also coming before the courts with regularity.6 Earlier in the decade, the 
Supreme Court of the United States handed down decisions in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius (2013) 
and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), which fueled a long debate centered upon the extent of 
the pivotal “sincerity test” in First Amendment jurisprudence of the United States 
Constitution.7 Meanwhile, in continental Europe, and Germany in particular, a polarizing 
immigration debate was developing with religious aspects of democratic pluralism at the 
forefront.8 While Germany had already encountered many of the issues that were arising for 
the first time in Australia, problems continued to appear in both countries in new and unusual 
forms.9 
4 In the United States, for example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et 
seq. (2010) gave rise to large amounts of litigation responding to conscientious objections arising from 
mandated contraceptive/abortifacient coverage. In Germany, the consciences of teachers and civil servants were 
brought under pressure when German States (Länder) such as Bavaria forbade the wearing of religious clothing 
while on duty. In the United Kingdom, David Oderberg’s 2018 book-length consideration of conscientious 
objection discussed the UK and US situations in great detail; see DAVID S. ODERBERG, OPTING OUT: 
CONSCIENCE AND COOPERATION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY (2018). 
5 Ruddock, Philip, Religious Freedom Review: Report to the Australian Prime Minister of the Expert Panel 
(2018), https://www.pmc.gov.au/domestic-policy/religious-freedom-review (last visited JAN. 8, 2020). 
6 For example, the case of Elzahed v State of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 103 in the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal (where the subject refused to give evidence in court other than with a fully covered face) 
and in the Supreme Court of Victoria case of The Queen v Chaarani [2018] VSC 387 (where the wife of an 
accused husband wished to attend court wearing a full face covering). 
7 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (Tenth Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Hobby Lobby (10th 
Cir.)] was subsequently decided in the US Supreme Court; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 574 
U.S. (2014) [hereinafter Hobby Lobby (SC)]. 
8 For a recent work on pluralism see MAX CZOLLEK, DESINTEGRIERT EUCH [DE-INTEGRATE YOURSELVES] 
(2018) where, according to Safronova, he argues that “Germany, eager to shed its past, isn’t reckoning with the 
rise of anti-Semitism, xenophobia and racism. And with the book’s title, he is calling on people who have been 
ostracized or singled out to stop trying to fit in and embrace their “otherness” so Germany can become a truly 
multicultural, pluralistic society.” Valeriya Safronova, In Germany, a Jewish Millennial Argues That the Past 
Isn’t Past, N.Y. TIMES, JAN. 16, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/16/books/max-czollek-germany-
desintegriert-euch.html (last visited JAN 17, 2020). 
9 The First and Second Headscarf decisions in Germany (BVERFG), 2 BVR 1436/02, 2003, (GER.), and 
BVERFG, 1 BVR 471/10, Jan. 27, 2015, (GER.), respectively) led to legislative responses in the various States 
Important philosophical and theological themes emerge as the thesis progresses. In the first 
article, The Undefined Remains Unprotected,10 the problems of political pluralism and their 
interactions with the individual conscience are discussed, along with Professor Isensee’s 
rejection of the solutions offered by Hegel.11 The significant issues of how to define conscience 
together with the dangers that can arise when it expands too far, are introduced in this section, 
and outer limits are considered. This sets up an interplay between secular and religious versions 
of conscience which Germany’s highest court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, has been called 
upon to adjudicate. The Basic Rights, which inhere in the German Constitution 
(Grundgesetz),12 provide a formidable example of rights protection inter privatos, which 
allows the Federal Constitutional Court to intervene in creative ways when, for example, claims 
based on conscience overrun the rights of others. 
The German Constitutional Court has devised a series of useful partial-exemptions, which 
are illustrated in cases such as the Oath Case,13 which provided a partial exemption to a Pastor 
who was unwilling to swear an oath, while at the same time protecting the validity of rules of 
general applicability requiring that oaths be administered. 
As Isensee explains, when operating inside this somewhat uncertain border zone: 
the state is well advised not to ask so much what it must constitutionally guarantee for 
the sake of freedom of conscience by way of dispensation, as what it can guarantee 
across Germany. Recent unusual iterations in this saga include the case of a trainee lawyer in Bavaria, who 
wished to wear a head scarf in court—a request denied by the judge and now legislatively forbidden—and the 
similar situation in relation to judges and prosecutors; see Alexander Pearson, German Court Allows Courtroom 
Headscarf Ban, DEUTSCHE WELLE, MAR. 7, 2018, permalink: https://p.dw.com/p/2tpEW (last visited Jan. 11, 
2020); see also Germany: Bavarian Court Upholds Headscarf Ban for Judges, Prosecutors, DEUTSCHE WELLE 
(MAR. 18, 2019), permalink: https://p.dw.com/p/3FElI (last visited Jan. 11, 2020). 
10 Patrick Quirk, The Undefined Remains Unprotected: Tensions between Conscience and the Law in 
Germany by Way of Joseph Isensee, 27 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 55 (2018). 
11Id. at 68. 
12 In English, the BASIC LAW, Germany’s Constitution of 1949 with Amendments through 2012, 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/German_Federal_Republic_2012.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2020). 
13 BVerfG, (1972) 2 BvR 75/71, 33, 23 (Ger.) (Oath Refusal Case). 
without contradicting the constitution.14 
This emphasis on what can be guaranteed, as opposed to what must be guaranteed, is taken up 
in more practical terms in the second article of this thesis, Protecting Religious Freedom and 
Conscience, which considers recent German and Australian jurisprudence, especially in high 
profile cases dealing with religious clothing and crucifixes on classroom walls.15 Without 
repeating the cases in detail here, some broad patterns of fact and law emerge from them, 
regardless of where they arise. The principal difference between Germany and Australia, which 
the article highlights, lies in the legal tools available for superior courts in Australia and 
Germany to deal with these intricate issues. Germany, it is argued, is much better equipped, 
because of its lengthy experience with this kind of litigation, and, at a more theoretical level, 
the riches of its Professorenrecht,16 especially of the kind outlined in The Undefined Remains 
Unprotected. 
The third and fourth articles, When My Opt Out Is Your Trigger17 and Josef Pieper18 
respectively, place more emphasis on moral philosophy and eventually enter the realm where 
theology and the law must meet and do business. Thus, When My Opt Out Is Your Trigger 
considers the moral-philosophical problem of cooperation in evil, a difficulty that lies at the 
heart of many conscience claims.19 Such cooperation, even when initially considered from the 
moral standpoint, soon reaches a point of delicate conflict with the state when citizens believe 
that, from a theological standpoint, they are cooperating in evil, even if others – including the 
14 Quirk, supra note 10, at 89. 
15 Patrick T. Quirk, Protecting Religious Freedom and Conscience: What Australia Might Learn from 
Germany, 43 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 163 (2019). 
16 Literally the “law of the Professors,” a phenomenon of the civil law. This emphasis on Professorial 
pronouncements and commentaries in countries like Germany, as opposed to the weight given to judge-made 
law in common law jurisdictions, is a profound and useful difference that can be exploited to the benefit of 
understanding both systems. 
17 Patrick Quirk, When My Opt Out Is Your Trigger: Oderberg’s Argument with the Religious Freedom 
Sincerity Test, FAULKNER L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
18 Patrick Quirk, Josef Pieper: A Lawyer’s Guide to the Apocalypse (submitted for publication, 2020). 
19 See generally GERMAIN GRISEZ, DIFFICULT MORAL QUESTIONS (1997). 
state itself – might disagree and so see those same citizens’ actions as merely neutral, or even 
as the opposite of cooperation. 
Specifically, this difficulty is explored in When My Opt Out Is Your Trigger, when it 
explores in detail what happens when “my opt out” becomes “your trigger” in the context of 
US the sincerity test as developed by the US Supreme Court. Using examples taken from cases 
litigated in the wake of the US Affordable Care Act, I consider the Little Sisters of the Poor, 
who, true to their vocation as Catholic nuns, sought to avoid any involvement with 
contraception or abortifacient drugs (especially for their employees) by refusing to sign what 
they saw as a “trigger” document which would allow someone else to supply the requisite 
insurance cover for those same drugs. The government saw this quite differently by arguing 
that the document was not a trigger at all, but in fact, an “opt out” absolving the sisters of any 
moral complicity. The thesis resolves this impasse by agreeing with David S. Oderberg20 and 
Hadley Arkes,21 who opine that in a legal context strictly rational principles of cooperation 
should outweigh any contrary theological principles, even if that means a slight narrowing of 
the sincerity test in the short term. This conclusion is not reached lightly, but instead appears 
to be necessary to preserve the widest possible space for rational, and thus common, arguments 
about what does and does not amount to cooperation in evil. This approach, it is argued, 
preserves and even enhances the common good while still respecting core theological 
principles.22 
The final article, Joseph Pieper, steps into a more abstract space by recounting Pieper’s 
philosophical approach to the Apocalypse.23 This provides useful counterpoint to some of the 
20 See, e.g., Oderberg, supra note 5. 
21 See, e.g., Hadley Arkes, Backing into Relativism, FIRST THINGS (JUNE 2019),
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2019/06/backing-into-relativism (last visited JAN. 7, 2020). 
22 This is not to argue for strictly rational solutions in all cases. In the words of Thomas Gilby, “Human truth 
lies in a balance: on the one side a science, and certainly a philosophical science, should always be severely 
reasonable; and on the other it should be rooted in the bowels of the earth. Every argument must appeal to rational 
evidence and yet, and this appears notably in politics, to impose a plan that does not allow for non-rational motives 
is bound to fail.” THOMAS GILBY, PHOENIX AND TURTLE, THE UNITY OF KNOWING AND BEING (1950). 
23 Quirk, supra note 18. 
more common examples of emergency-based extravagances of conscience, while still giving 
full play to notions of the end of time and ultimate judgments. The main point of this final part 
of the thesis is not to argue for a particular theological stance, but to provide a solid example 
of well-argued limitations on conscience. 
Before leaving this Introduction, I wish to note that the key terms “religious freedom” and 
“conscience protection” are part of the terminology used to frame the debates and so are used 
frequently throughout the thesis discussion. The differences between them are, however, 
respected in terms of each legal system’s definitional case law and legislative history. 
B. LESSONS FOR LAW REFORM
This thesis also suggests possible lessons for law reformers. This aspect is especially relevant 
for Australia, which is about to embark on a significant and arguably sweeping national 
legislative initiative in the area of religious freedom and anti-discrimination law.24 Australian 
expertise in comparative law, with a focus on religion, is growing stronger, but lags 
significantly behind that of Germany and the United States as evinced by the number of 
relevant courses offered in law schools,25 the type and number of cases brought before courts,26 
as well as other factors, such as the German and US constitutional provisions, which bear 
directly on religion and conscience.27 
24 See the Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth) and the associated legislative package, including the 
Religious Discrimination (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2019 (Cth), and the Human Rights Legislation 
Amendment (Freedom of Religion) Bill 2019 (Cth). 
25 For a survey of the type and number of such courses available in the United States see John Witte, The 
Study of Law and Religion in the United States: An Interim Report, 14 ECC. L.J. 327–354 (2012). 
26 See the particular examples in articles two and three of the thesis. 
27 For example, the celebrated First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States (U.S. CONST. 
amend. I.), and various articles of the GERMAN BASIC LAW (Grundgesetz), including art. 4 (Freedom of Faith, 
Conscience, and Creed); art. 12a (Compulsory Military or Alternative Service); and art. 38 (Elections: Elected 
Members of the Bundestag are to be “representatives of the whole people, not bound by orders or instructions, 
and responsible only to their conscience”); translation available at https:// www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
en/chancellor/basic-law-470510 [https://perma.cc/A53C-K7PG]. (last visited Jan. 15, 2020). 
This thesis does not pretend to traverse the entire realm of religious freedom, nor of 
conscience protection, in any one of the subject countries, let alone all of them. Instead, by 
delving deep into some key questions and grappling with some recent hard problems, it will 
open paths for discussion and legal development. Those paths include the direct borrowing of 
legal solutions, modified borrowing, or rejection for something better suited to the local 
conditions. 
In all of these cases, the process of comparison that offers the critical insight or 
modification is most useful. For example, the extensive use of federal models in the German 
approach to religious clothing conflicts, or the stepwise approach of the US sincerity test, 
neither of which might ever be adopted in whole cloth by Australia, still illuminate the way 
and reassure law reformers that hard problems will admit of solutions, even if it takes a long 
time. 
Whilst not suggesting that solutions may be easily “borrowed” or applied across 
jurisdictions, this thesis also identifies some key principles, pressure points, and lines of 
demarcation, which will remain relevant and important as long as citizens continue to attempt, 
in good faith, to peacefully sort out the ways in which religion and law interact. Examples 
include the German Constitutional Court’s respect for religious sensibilities in the 1973 
Courtroom Crucifix case,28 and the careful attention paid to the rights of parents in making 
subsequent decisions about classroom crucifixes.29 
Thus, the thesis should inform debate in the future work of Australian federal and state 
Parliaments as they attempt to better protect freedom of conscience and religion within the 
boundaries of the Commonwealth. This thesis offers no radical suggestions in this regard, but 
through painstaking comparison and thoughtful distillation, it has added to the corpus of 
2835 BVerfGE [Federal Constitutional Court] 366 (1973). (Deciding that crucifix in a Düsseldorf 
Administrative Court should be taken down out of respect for a Jewish litigant in the instant case, while 
preserving a general rule about the placement of crucifixes in courts.) 
29 See Quirk, supra note 15, at 177–178. 
knowledge upon which protections can be based. Such additions to knowledge are always 
worth the effort. 
C. MAJOR THEMES OF THIS THESIS: DEFINING THE PROBLEM
The question of conscience protection is often dogged by problems of definition. Hence, the 
profound insight in Professor Isensee’s observation that “the undefined remains unprotected”30 
invites discussion regarding where relevant protective lines should be drawn, or in some cases, 
redrawn. This demarcation process is a vital characteristic of the thesis and provides a 
suggested touchstone for readers who wish to make useful comparisons. 
As this thesis is not presented in the form of a traditional dissertation, but rather as a series 
of articles, readers are invited to follow numerous arguments in specific areas of foreign law. 
Several additional themes can be appreciated throughout. First, the thesis concerns itself with 
the relationship between conscience (whether religious or otherwise) and the law. These lines 
of demarcation are considered in Protecting Religious Freedom and Conscience31 which shows 
Germany’s response to the generous human rights provisions of the Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic, as developed since the time of the Weimar Republic (1919–1933). Germany is also 
constitutionally unique in the way it provides a form of protection for those objecting to 
military service.32 In the United States, as outlined in When My Opt Out Is Your Trigger,33 the 
lines are considered in the context of a judicial reluctance to decide upon the substantive 
content of religious belief and instead rely on a broad “sincerity” test which is being tested 
anew in recent Supreme Court cases. In Australia, the lines of demarcation are only slowly 
30 Quirk, supra note 10, at 55. 
31 Quirk, supra, note 15. 
32 Id. Article 12a (2) of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) provides that “Any person who, on grounds 
of conscience, refuses to render military service involving the use of arms may be required to perform 
alternative service.” 
33 Quirk, supra, note 17. 
become apparent in the wake of a debate surrounding the Religious Discrimination Bill34 and 
associated legislation mentioned above. 
The second major theme relates to the amount of legal material each jurisdiction has 
available (or, in the case of Australia, does not have available) and which grapples with issues 
of religious freedom and conscience protection. As demonstrated in the first three articles, both 
Germany and the United States have vast experience and readily available high-level case law 
upon which to draw when considering newer demands and tensions calling for judicial 
adjudication: principles have been distilled and old problems reformulated for more 
straightforward resolution over time. Australia, by contrast, is somewhat poverty-stricken in 
this area and so will benefit from the work of this thesis and, hopefully, other work which will 
flow from it. 
The third major theme pursued chiefly in article four, Josef Pieper,35 but also present 
innately in the other articles, considers conscience in the context of apocalyptic claims and 
offers some insights from the Judeo-Christian tradition in particular. While conscience is often 
seen as a form of “self-revelation,”36 it is also, at least in the more practical world of 
“conscientious objection,” very tightly connected with external events, prophecies, and 
prognoses – even scientific ones, such as those related to climate change. These personal and 
group revelations can prompt citizens to act on the edge of or even outside the boundaries of 
the law, thus requiring executive and judicial intervention.37 Joseph Pieper’s approach to this 
34 See supra, note 3. 
35 See supra note 18. 
36 “The claim of conscience as self-revelation is familiar territory in our society, where the recognition of 
overarching moral absolutes has long since given way to the acknowledgment of deeply personal conceptions of 
moral truth. But while the personal dimension of conscience may be common knowledge, the content of that 
dimension is not.” VISCHER, supra note 2, at 48. 
37 For a recent consideration of the scope of the executive power in a time of crisis see, Ryan Alford, Is an 
Inviolable Constitution a Suicide Pact? Historical Perspectives on Executive Power to Protect the Salus Populi, 
58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 355 (2014). 
is classical, restrained, and invitingly lucid, and so deserves a detailed consideration in the 
literature on this topic. 
A final theme, especially relevant for law reformers, arises from the philosophical 
standpoint as it manifests by means of legal argument and disputation. Both Germany and the 
United States readily resort to highly reflective and quasi-philosophical styles of 
argumentation, thereby more easily unearthing the organic structures of the disputes about line-
drawing or re-drawing. Australia may now be entering into this stage of development and, it is 
submitted, can only benefit from exposure to and comparison with other legal systems and 
solutions. 
D. PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND FIELDS OF KNOWLEDGE
This thesis fills a gap in the research literature in four ways. In the first instance, the thesis 
provides original translation of some German material, which, until this point, has been 
unavailable in English, as well as many aspects of comparison between the three systems. 
Second, the extraordinary wealth of material has forced a focus on those cases that best 
exemplify the rights under discussion. By opening up this new material, along with 
several associated fronts for examination, the thesis shows various routes into the 
principles and technicalities of relevant and recent foreign law. 
Third, various sub rosa understandings, conventions, matters of legal etiquette, and 
sometimes lopsided nuances of the legal systems concerned will also become apparent to the 
reader.38 In the words of F.H. Lawson, “to understand a foreign solution to a familiar problem 
is often rewarded with a clearer grasp of one’s own law.”39  
38 This list is derived, in part, from C. GRANT ROBERTSON, SELECT STATUTES CASES AND DOCUMENTS TO
ILLUSTRATE ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1660–1832, xi (1904). 
39 F. H. Lawson, The Field of Comparative Law, 61 JURID. REV. 16 (1949). 
Fourth, in the case of Australia, there is, more often than not, no solution on offer at all, 
and the law is only now being debated and written. This makes the work all the more pertinent 
in the light of current political and legal discussions over these issues. 
The fields of knowledge explored in this thesis include comparative law, international law, 
and the domestic laws of Germany, the United States, and Australia. When considering various 
local rules, the thesis is most often concerned with the core principles of constitutional law. 
Those principles include the rule of law, the proper separation of powers, and fundamental 
human rights discussed in all four articles. 
Alongside the aforementioned fields, there are frequent interactions with other realms of 
the internal legal landscape of each country, such as anti-discrimination laws, criminal laws, 
free speech jurisprudence, the laws of education, the laws of evidence, and aspects of medicine 
and law, to name a few. These varied interactions all point to the fact that conscience issues 
can arise in many varied ways and hopefully adds to the general appeal and usefulness of the 
work completed. 
E. PROBLEMS AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
The translation of material for article one required considerable effort because of the composite 
legal and philosophical arguments advanced by Professor Isensee. Other more standard 
obstacles in the field of comparative law included the need for explanations and 
approximations when discussing foreign legal concepts that have no precise equivalent in the 
system under consideration. Such difficulties in translation and understanding can arise equally 
for systems that already share a common language and legal heritage (Australia and United 
States)40 as for those which do not (Australia/United States and Germany).41 For this reason, I 
have sought to avoid any unmediated or merely blunt comparisons of the legal concepts 
discussed. Legal notions must be met on their own terms, doing their own work, in their own 
system, and not as half-translated concepts from far-off places.42 
Further directions for research are both diverse and numerous. A great deal more of 
Isensee’s material lies available for profitable translation and reflection. In particular, his 2009 
collection of essays, Recht als Grenze, Grenze des Rechts —Texte 1979–2009 [Law as Limit, 
The Limits of Law—A Collection of Texts Covering the Years 1979–2009].43 
Likewise, the work of Josef Pieper warrants further attention from a legal perspective, 
especially in the rapidly developing areas of human rights, free speech, terrorism law, and even 
the law of festivity.44 
Oderberg’s work also continues to add to the debates in the area of medical law and 
conscientious objection, and this material will demand consideration in common law 
jurisdictions such as Australia.45 
40 Both common law systems. 
41 Common law and civil law systems, respectively. 
42 See the copious and interesting commentary on this topic over several decades, starting in the 1950s in F. 
F. Stone, The End to be Served by Comparative Law, 25 TUL. L. REV. 325 (1951); Roscoe Pound, Comparative 
Law in Space and Time, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 70 (1955); Max Rheinstein, Comparative Law - Its Functions, 
Methods and Usages, 22 ARK. L. REV. 415 (1968); Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking 
Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L. J. 457 (1985); Basil Markesinis, The Destructive and Constructive Role of 
the Comparative Lawyer, 57 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 
438 (1993).
43 JOSEF ISENSEE, RECHT ALS GRENZE, GRENZE DES RECHTS —TEXTE 1979–2009 [LAW AS LIMIT, THE
LIMITS OF LAW—A COLLECTION OF TEXTS COVERING THE YEARS 1979–2009](Bon Bouvier, 2009). 
44 Josef Pieper has written a book-length defense of festivity and leisure; see JOSEF PIEPER, LEISURE, THE 
BASIS OF CULTURE (1952/1963). His work on the cardinal virtues is also significant for lawyers: JOSEF PIEPER, 
THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES (1966). 
45 See, for example, the 2019 debates in the state of New South Wales concerning conscientious objection 
by registered health practitioners in the context of abortion law reform in Howe, J., & Le Mire, S., Medical 
Referral for Abortion and Freedom of Conscience in Australian Law, 34 JOURNAL OF LAW AND RELIGION, 85 
(2019). doi:10.1017/jlr.2019.14. (making secular, democratic, arguments in favour of freedom of conscience). 
The ABORTION LAW REFORM ACT (2019) No 11 (NSW) passed in 2019. 
F. CONCLUSION
The protracted business of writing a thesis occasionally leads to the words getting in the 
way of the ideas. I hope that I have avoided this as far as possible. In sum, the significant ideas 
I wanted to convey are these three: First, if we pay careful attention to the detail of foreign 
laws, we will understand our own rules much better. The increase in understanding will be in 
proportion to the attention paid. For this reason, and second in my conclusion, we can hope 
with some confidence that solutions can be found for almost all the conceivable problems 
that religious freedom and conscience protection can throw up. This confidence is, in 
fact, critical to preserving our courage to pursue them. Finally, such pursuit is 
predicated on patient and cautious scholarship, which has been my aim from the very 
beginning of this project. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most English-speaking lawyers are unfamiliar with the work of
Joseph Isensee,1 an eminent jurist and sometime contender with Jtirgen
Habermas,2 as well as a leading writer on the law of the German
Constitution. Isensee's Handbook of German Constitutional Law has
been a leading text for many years,3 and his various interventions over
1. Isensee is well known in the field of constitutional law of the Federal Republic of
Germany and the author, inter alia, of HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK (J.
Isensee & P. Kirchhof eds., 2014), now in thirteen volumes. According to Jo Eric Khushal
Murkens, "the statistics are mindboggling. [The Handbuch] has involved 132 authors (roughly a
third of all constitutional scholars in Germany) in ten volumes (eight are in their third edition)
with almost 12,000 pages. It contains the biggest discussion by far of the state." See Jo ERIC
KUSHAL MURKENS, FROM EMPIRE TO UNION: CONCEPTIONS OF GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SINCE 1871, at 81 (2013).
As well, his name appears in English databases quite frequently-for example, there are 125
references under "secondary sources" of the Westlaw legal database. The most recent include the
following: Stephan Jaggi, Revolutionary Constitutional Lawmaking in Germany-Rediscovering
the German 1989 Revolution, 17 GERMAN L. J. 579, 581 (2016); Michael Lysander Fremuth,
Patchwork Constitutionalism, Constitutionalism, and Constitutional Litigation in Germany and
Beyond the Nation State-A European Perspective, 49 DuQ. L. REv. 339, 340 (2011). David
Currie of Chicago Law School was, according to Peter E. Quint, known to be fond of citing
Isensee's Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. See Peter E. Quint,
David Currie and German Constitutional Law, 9 GERMAN L.J. 2081, 2094 (2008).
2. See MATrHEW G. SPECTER, HABERMAS: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 159-60, 164,
187 (2010) (contrasting Isensee's views with those of Habermas). Habermas's role as a public
intellectual includes the following on religious pluralism: Jirgen Habermas, Religious Tolerance:
The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights, 79 PHILOSOPHY 5, 5-18 (2004).
3. See HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK, supra note 1; MURKENS,
supra note 1; Fremuth, supra note 1; Jaggi, supra note 1; Quint, supra note 1.
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time have led to a number of significant awards, including the Ring of
Honour of the Gorres-Gesellschaft in 2013.
The aim of this Article is to translate5 and comment upon some of
Isensee's work and the arguments surrounding conscience protection
under the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz).
Debates in Germany over conscience-protection can take many
forms and concern many perennial issues. By way of example,
Germany's longest-serving Chancellor,6 Angela Merkel, has often
expressed concern about immigration and the increasing strains placed
upon the German Basic Law by competing visions of the democratic
state.7 The recent German federal election of 2017, with its blurred result
and half-built coalitions, has only exacerbated these tensions.8
4. Awarded yearly since 1977 to "deserving personalities of scientific and public life."
Other recipients include philosopher Josef Pieper (1990) and theologian Walter Cardinal Kasper
(2008). Bearers of the Ring of Honor Since 1977, GORRES GESELLSCHAFT, https://www.
goerres-gesellschaftLde/gesellschaft/ehrening.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2018).
5. According to David Bellos, "The variability of translations is incontrovertible
evidence of the limitless flexibility of human minds." DAVID BELLOS, Is THAT A FISH IN YOUR
EAR?: TRANSLATION AND THE MEANING OF EVERYTHING 9, (2011). Within reason, I hold with
this flexibility.
6. Technically, the noun denoting a female Chancellor is "Bundeskanzlerin." Judith
Vonberg, Angela Merkel Sworn in for Fourth Term as German Chancellor, CNN EUR. (Mar. 14,
2018), https://edition.cnn.com/20 18/03/1 4/europe/merkel-chancellor-fourth-term-germany-intU/
index.html.
7. Philip Oltermann, Angela Merkel Pledges to Cut German Immigration Figures but
Rejects Limit, GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/14/
Angela-merkel-pledge-cut-german-immigration-figures.
8. No party won an outright majority and, as at the time of writing, negotiations over
government formation were ongoing. The rise of the previously unrepresented party known as
Alternativ fur Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) has also complicated matters. Article
21(2) of the Basic Law protects the German constitution and allows for the banning of political
parties:
21 (2) Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek to
undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of
the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional
Court shall rule on the question of unconstitutionality.
Such attempts were successful in 1952 and 1956 (against neo-Nazi and Socialist groups
respectively). GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 21 § 2 (Ger.), translation at https://www.
btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/802OlOOO.pdf, see Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A
Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 854 (1991). In 2017, the Federal Constitutional Court
declined to take action against the National Democratic Party (NDP): "Although the National
Democratic Party 'pursues aims contrary to the Constitution,' there was a lack of 'concrete
supporting evidence' that the neo-Nazi party would be able to successfully achieve its goals and
to pose a genuine threat, said Andreas Vosskuhle, the president of the court." Melissa Eddy,
German Court Rejects Effort to Ban Neo-Nazi Party, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/01/17/world/europe/german-court-far-right.html.
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The idea of welcoming immigrants out of compassion-and
perhaps at the same time with an eye to continuing economic security-
has, for the past fifteen or more years, been tempered with the concept of
a Leitkultur (dominant culture), in which German-ness plays a central
role in binding the country together during stressful or centripetal times.9
This sets up a debate imbued with a heady mix of law, economics,
religion, and fundamental rights.'° German constitutional cases centered
upon Islamic headscarves," witness's oaths,2 Christian crucifixes on
Bavarian classroom walls, 3  ritual slaughter,4  ceremonies of
circumcision,15 and blood transfusions6 have all contributed to the legal
framework within which the broader debate over Leitkultur takes place.'7
9. The debate over Leitkultur has resurfaced in recent years:
The concept of a Leitkultur-a guiding, dominant or leading culture-is back after the
debate had died down somewhat for a while. This controversial term, which has been
haunting Germany since the start of the millennium, is now experiencing a renaissance
in view of the sharp rise in refugee numbers. Everything revolves around one
fundamental question: what is the basis for Germany society?
Pascal Beucker, Integration Debate: The Leitkultur Renaissance, GOETHE INST1TUT (Chris Cave,
trans., Mar. 2016), https://www.goethe.de/en/kul/ges/20721837.html. The debate became more
impassioned following an amendment to German citizenships laws in 2000, in which the jus
sanguinis principle overtook the principle ofjus soli.
10. Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, The German HeadscarfDebate, 2 BYU L. REv. 665,
665 (2004); Press Release, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Constitutional Court Rules a General Ban
on Headscarves for Teachers at State Schools Is Not Compatible with the Constitution (Mar. 13,
2015), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2015/bvgl
5-014.html.
11. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 2015, 1 BvR
471/10, 1 BvR 1181/10, paras. 1-31 (Ger.) ("The protection afforded by the freedom of faith and
the freedom to profess a belief (Basic Law art. 4 secs. 1 and 2) guarantees educational staff at
interdenominational state schools the freedom to cover their head in compliance with a rule
perceived as imperative for religious reasons. This can be the case for an Islamic headscarf.");
see von Campenhausen, supra note 10.
12. BVerfG 1972, 2 BvR 75/71 (23, 33) (Ger.) (holding that the German Constitution
should accommodate a Priest who refused to swear an oath because of a prohibition against oath-
taking).
13. BVerfG 1987, 11 BvR 1087/91 (Ger.) ("The affixation of a cross or crucifix in the
classrooms of a State compulsory school that is not a denominational school infringes art. 4(1)
Basic Law.").
14. BVerfG 2002, 1 BvR 1783/99, paras. 1-61 (Ger.) (holding that ritual slaughter is an
allowable exception under Article 4 of the Basic Law).
15. See Marianne Heimbach-Steins, Religious Freedom and the German Circumcision
Debate 1-16 (European Univ. Inst., Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, EUI Working
Paper RSCAS 2013/18), http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/26335 (discussing a controversial
court ruling in May 2012, which decided that the circumcision of boys was equal to grevious
bodily harm; after wide debate, including amongst the Jewish and Muslim communities in
Germany, the law was changed to protect the practice on religious grounds).
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Often, the United States also focuses on such matters, especially
recently, when a new Justice was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court.8
So too, in England,9 Northern Ireland,2 ° the European Union (EU),2'
Australia,22 and in other nations,3 the strains of accommodating
conscience and religious identity are becoming more apparent.24
Parts I and II of this Article will introduce and describe the problem
in the context of recent German history on the topic. Parts Ill-IX will
outline Isensee's thought, as set out in his 1993 essay, Gewissen im
Recht: Gilt das allgemeine Gesetz nur nach Mafigabe des individuellen
16. BVerfG 1971, 1 BvR 387/65 (Ger.) (holding that under Article 4 of the Basic Law,
the criminal law of Germany must yield to the right to refuse blood transfusions on the basis of
religious belief).
17. For a quick overview of the case law until 2004, see Edward J. Eberle, Free Exercise
of Religion in Germany and the United States, 78 TuL. L. REv. 1023, 1030 (2004).
18. See Tara Helfinan, Patriotic Gorsuch, COMMENTARY (Feb. 2017), https://www.
commentarymagazine.com/articles/patriotic-gorsuch/ ("In Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, [nominated
Justice] Gorsuch sided with the majority of the Tenth Circuit in holding that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act exempted closely held corporations from providing coverage for
contraceptives that they viewed as abortifacients on the ground that doing so would violate
sincerely held religious beliefs. And in Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell [794 F. 3d 1151, 1151
(2015)], Gorsuch joined in a blistering dissent that took the majority to task for denying the
plaintiffs' appeal from HIS certification requirements for contraceptive coverage."). At the time
of writing this article, upcoming cases to be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court include National
Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Xavier Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 464 (Nov. 13, 2017), cert.
granted (on whether the California Reproductive FACT Act violates of the First Amendment)
and Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (June 26,
2017), cert. granted (on whether Colorado's public accommodations can compel the creation of
expression that may violate sincerely held religious beliefs).
19. Bull v. Hall [2013] UKSC 73 (Eng.) (holding that hotel owners had discriminated
against a civilly married couple of the same sex).
20. Lee v. Ashers Baking Co. Ltd. [2015] NICty 2 (N. Jr.) (holding that a baking
company had unlawfully discriminated against the Plaintiff on the basis of sexual orientation).
Upheld on appeal in Lee v. McArthur & Ors [2016] NICA 39 (N. Ir.).
21. Genov v. Bulgaria, 40524/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. 275 (2017) (E.U.) (holding that Bulgaria
had violated Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms by refusing to register the 'The International Society for Krishna Consciousness
(ISKCON)-Sofia, Nadezhda"). Bulgaria has been a member of the EU since 2007.
22. See for example, the case of Moutia Elzahed, who refused to stand for a judge in the
New South Wales District Court in 2016 and has been charged with "disrespectful behaviour in
court." See Ursula Malone, Islamic State Recruiter's Wife Moutia Elzahed Charged for Refusing
to Stand in Court, ABC NEWS (May 8, 2017), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-08/isis
recruiters-wife-charged-for-refusing-to-stand-incourt/8508332; see also Daniel Pietrowski,
EXCLUSIVE. Burqa-Wearing Muslim Wife of Terrorist Recruiter Must Cough up $250,000 for
Failed Lawsuit-and Faces Jailfor "Refusing to Stand for a Judge Because She Only Stands for
Allah," DAILY MAIL (June 30, 2017), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4652992/Moutia
Elzahed-ordered-pay-polie-250k-legalcosts.html#ixzz54rqmZnHr.
23. For example, France.
24. REINHOLD Z1PPELIUS, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE: POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT 198-201
(17th ed. 2017).
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Gewissens? (Law and Conscience.- Does the General Law Apply Only
According to the Measure of Individual Conscience?).25 These Parts will
emphasize rendering the original work in English as accurately as
possible, while providing ease of understanding for non-German
speakers and non-lawyers alike. Where appropriate, complexities will be
explained and concepts expanded.
Part X will offer some brief suggestions for further investigation.
II. THE PROBLEMS OF PLURALISM
The problems of pluralism (Pluralismus) are much discussed in
German legal culture. Particular expression of the concept is found in
the foundational texts on politics and law. Thus, we find Reinhold
Zippelius, in his much cited and widely translated Allgemeine Staatslehre
(General Political Science),2 6 devoting considerable space to the idea of
Der pluralistische Staat (the pluralist state) and the various
"opportunities for influence" inside democracy. Zippelius notes at the
outset that "pluralism is disruptive"27 and that Thomas Hobbes was a
decisive opponent of associations within the state-which act like
"worms in the entrails of a natural man."28 The solution to this weakness
for conflict is centralized power.29
But the German Basic Law has pluralism as one of its "constitutive
structural principles,"3 and this means that other solutions must be
found. Zippelius notes: "In contrast to [Hobbes], and according to the
current understanding of democracy, social and political groupings
express influence on the state's decision-making process via the [public]
assertion of their interests and opinions."31
This expression then leads to a search for "consensual
compromises"32 and a form of "open competition of interests and
25. Josef Isensee, Gewissen im Recht; Gilt das allgemeine Gesetz nur nach MaJlgabe des
individuellen Gewissens? [Conscience in Law; Does the General Law Only Apply in Accordance
with the Individual Conscience?], in DER STRE1T UM DAS GEWISSEN 41, 41 (Gerhard Hi6ver ed.,
1993) [hereinafter Isensee, Conscience in Law].
26. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 24. The work has been translated into Portuguese, Spanish,
Latvian, and, in 2011, Chinese.
27. Id. at 198.
28. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR, THE MATTER FORME AND POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL ch. 29 (eBooks@Adelaide ed., 2016) (ebook).
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opinions"'" as well as the formation of coalitions.34  The ultimate
compromise is found at the ballot box.
This multiplicity of views and ideas provides a defense against
totalitarianism states and adds to the "trial and error" nature of the
democratic process.35 There are, however, a number of acknowledged
disadvantages to this system, including the short-term nature of agreed
upon compromises, their potential lack of philosophical coherence, and
excessive bureaucracy. Such disadvantages are seen as the price to be
paid for keeping totalitarianism at bay.36 They also allow for a wide
range of folkish, economic, religious, and ideological factors to become
politically engaged, which is only achievable when citizens are prepared
to dispose of their own preferences for an ideal state in favor of "the
legitimation of a multi-perspective viewpoint."37  Zippelius quotes
Krtger, his intellectual predecessor,38 to drive home his point:
Thus the citizen must forego the [fantasy] state that reflects only his own
cherished ideals and accept that state power will enforce, even violently,
ideas quite contrary to his own. Rather, such a citizen can be sure that the
same "fate" will not be extended to others as he originally had in mind for
them.
39
This is not to deny that the admission of such serious divergences can
only safely take place within the context of a larger and more
fundamental constitutional consensus (Grundkonsenses). The first and
fundamental "rule of the game" of an open society, however, is that the
equal participation and dignity of each is to be constantly respected and
maintained.4" Such equal participation belongs to each individual
33. Id. at 200.
34. Id. at 202.
35. Id. at 199-201 (mentioning this "trial and error" process [using those English words]
multiple times in his exegesis).
36. Id. at 200.
37. Id. at 119,201.
38. Kruger is the author of an earlier text on the same theme as Zippelius's. See Wilhelm
Henke, Allgemeine Staatslehre. 3. neubearb. Aufl. by Reinhold Zippelius, 11 DER STAAT 561,
561-63 (1972).
39. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 24, at 201 (quoting HERBERT KRUGER, ALLGEMEINE
STAATSLEHRE 184 (2d ed. 1964)).
40. Id. at 201. There are obvious echoes of KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS
ENEMIES (1954). Popper is, indeed, acknowledged in the beginning of this section along with
others such as JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, KAPITALISMUS, SozIAuSMuS UND DEMOKRATIE (engl.
1942); JAKOBUS WOSSNER, DIE ORDNUNGPOLITISCHE BEDEUTUNG DES VERBANDESWESENS
(1961); and KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (3d ed. 1966). Popper
had a serious influence on post-war Germany. See LAN CHARLES JARVIE & SANDRA PRALONG,
POPPER'S OPEN SOCIETY AFTER FIFTY YEARS: THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF KARL POPPER
(1999).
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regarding their contributions towards the building up of public opinion
(dffentliche Meinung) in the political process.4 Zippelius then ties this
into specific provisions of the Basic Law in Articles 1, 18, 20, 21, and
79, sentence 3.42
A. The Problem in the Context of the Law of German Military Service
The case of German compulsory military service sharply illustrates
tensions that can exist between conscience and an individual's duties to
the state during times of major conflict or even threats to its existence.
Decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional
Court) since World War I13 are particularly noteworthy' owing to two
important sections of the Germany Constitution (Basic Law).
In the first place, one considers freedom of faith, conscience, and
creed, which are guaranteed by Article 4 of the Basic Law:
(1) Freedom of faith and of conscience and freedom to profess a
religious or philosophical creed shall be inviolable.
(2) The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed.
(3) No person shall be compelled against his conscience to render
military service involving the use of arms. Details shall be regulated
by a federal law.45
41. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 24, at 201.
42. The Basic Law guarantees human dignity and contains the well-known statement,
"Human Dignity shall be inviolable" (Die Wirde des Menschen ist unantastbar). GG art. 1
(Ger.). These words famously appear on the wall of the Landgericht in Frankfurt am Main.
Article 18 threatens a forfeiture of the basic rights set out in earlier Articles for those who work
against the "free democratic basic order." Id. art. 18. The Basic Law derives all state authority
from the people and gives Germans "the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this
constitutional order, if no other remedy is available." Id. art. 20. It acknowledges political parties
but brands as unconstitutional those who "by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their
adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the
existence of the Federal Republic of Germany." Id. art. 21. Sentence 3 provides, "Amendments
to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Lander, their participation on
principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be
inadmissible." Id. art. 79.
43. The Court was established in 1951. Taylor Cole, The West German Federal
Constitutional Court: An Evaluation After Six Years, 20 SOUTHERN POL. Sci. Ass'N 278, 278
(1958).
44. See Josef Isensee, Bundesverfassungsgericht quo vadis?, 51 JURISTENZEITUNG 1085,
1085-93 (1996).
45. Translation taken from the website of the German Federal Government, GG art. 4
(Ger.), translated at https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf. This section was
drafted within the historical context of Section III (comprising Articles 135-141) of the Weimar
Constitution, which dealt with religious freedom). See also Jan Ginter Deutsch, Some Problems
of Church and State in the Weimar Constitution, 72 YALE L.J. 457 (1963). See generally Gerhard
Robbers, Religious Freedom in Germany, 2001 BYU L. REV. 643 (2001).
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In the second place, there exists a distinctive aspect of the German
Constitution, by which citizens may object to participating in a form of
national conscription known as Wehrpflicht,46 under which males of a
specified age were constitutionally required to participate in military
service. Placed in abeyance in 2011,"7 the Basic Law retains Article
12(a)(1) under which: "Men who have attained the age of eighteen may
be required to serve in the Armed Forces, in the Federal Border Police, or
in a civil defense organization."'48
This provision is modified by Article 12(a)(2), which provides in
part: "Any person who, on grounds of conscience, refuses to render
military service involving the use of arms may be required to perform
alternative service."49
Both of these provisions use the noun "conscience" and so
necessitate some judicial consideration of the term.
B. Conscientious Objection-The Case Law
In deciding upon the validity of the wording of the modification in
Article 12(a), the judges of the German Federal Constitutional Court in
the Second Conscientious Objection Judgment of 1985 (BVerfGE 69, 1)
recognized directly what was at stake:
Constitutionally mandated equality as regards civic duty in the form of
universal military service ... gives rise to the duty of the legislature to
ensure that only those persons are exempted from military service who
have decided to refuse to render military service involving the use of arms
on grounds of conscience under Article 4.3 sentence 1 of the Basic Law;
this duty represents an obligation of high order towards the community.
This means on the one hand that the state, which gives precedence to
decisions to refuse to render military service involving the use of arms
even in the event of a threat to its existence, must be protected against
abusive invocation of this fundamental right. On the other hand, it is also
46. See Wehrpflichtgesetz [WPflG] [Conscription Act], July 21, 1956 (Ger.).
47. See, e.g., Lauren Tucker, The End of the Wehrpflicht: An Exploration of Germany's
Delayed Embrace of an All-Volunteer Force (2011) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file with the Carolina Digital Repository), https://cdr.lib.
unc.edu/record/uuid:361d39al-71ec-4381-94cb-d5bc383e201f. There have been recent calls for
its reintroduction. See Timo Frasch, Die Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht war ein Fehler [Suspension
of Military Service Was a Mistake], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINER ZEITUNG (May 11, 2017),
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/iniand/afd-politikeruwe-junge-im-gespraech-ueber-die-bundes
wehr- 15010648.html.
48. GG art. 12(a)(1) (Ger.).
49. Id. at art. 12(a)(2).
TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 27
necessary to protect the freedom of conscience itself, which is threatened
precisely when it can be used to avoid fulfillment of general civic duties.5°
Drawing the line of demarcation between the fundamental freedom of
conscience and the state's right to call upon citizens to bear arms in its
defense is fraught with uncertainty, as leading authors have only recently
attested.5 The Conscientious Objection Judgment i self was also seen as
controversial since (as it has been argued) the case was illogically
decided.52
Questions of gender discrimination in the area of compulsory
military service have also been the subject of debate but lie beyond the
scope of this Article, as does the issue of overrepresentation of former
East-Germans in the military.
53
In 1993,"4 Isensee considered the question of conscience, including
the Wehrpflicht conscience clause, in a discussion that appeared in a
book of essays entitled Der Streit um das Gewissen (the Conscience in
Controversy).55
Isensee observed that the major issues at stake here include:
50. Translation by Donna Elliott of the Second Conscientious Objection Judgment-
Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court (Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts-
BVerfGE 69, 1), 60 YEARS GERMAN BASIC LAW: THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION AND ITS COURT
LANDMARK DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF GERMANY IN THE AREA OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 269 (Juirgen Br6hmer et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
51. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Individual Conscience and How It Should Be Treated, 31
J.L. & RELIGION 306, 306-20 (2016).
52. See JUSTIN COLLINGS, DEMOCRACY'S GUARDIANS: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 1951-2001, at 211-12 (2015) (outlining the case and its
contested reasoning that would "redden the cheeks of proverbial Jesuit"). The controversy
centered on the court's finding that a twenty-month "alternative" to military service-in
opposition to a fifteen-month military service-was not contrary to the exact wording of Article
12 of the Basic Law, which stated that "the duration of the alternative service may not exceed the
duration of military service." Justices BOckenforde and Mahrenholz offered strong dissents and
Der Spiegel responded with a scathing headline, 20= 15, on April 29, 1985.
53. Karen Raible, Compulsory Military Service and Equal Treatment of Men and
Women-Recent Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of
Justice (Alexander Dory v. Germany), 4 GERMAN L.J. 299 (2003); Alan Cowell, The Draft Ends
in Germany but Questions of Identity Remain, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2011), https://www.nytimes.
com/2011/07/01/world/europe/Olgermany.html ("[G]ender seems to be less of an issue in the
German debate than the origin of those who do volunteer.... [W]hile only 16 percent of the
German population of 82 million lives in the former East Germany, easterners make up 30
percent of military personnel.").
54. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25.
55. My own translation. A more literal translation might be "the dispute(s) surrounding
the (legal concept of) conscience" or, more loosely, "conscience in dispute."
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" The inherent tensions between individual conscience and the
state,56
* The diminution of any potential conflict between conscience and
the state by employment of a concept of state neutrality,57
* Conflicts in the so-calledforum externum,58 and
* The juridical problems inherent in declaring a legal definition of
conscience.59
We turn now to his explication of these issues.
III. THE INHERENT TENSIONS BETWEEN CONSCIENCE AND THE STATE
A. The Tension Defined
Like other scholars in the area,6" Isensee acknowledges the ever-
present tension between a law of general application and "the law"
inherent in the conscience of the individual human person.61 In German
jurisprudence, this is often expressed as the relationship between a
"subjective" conscience and an "objective" law.6"
Isensee notes that the constitutional lawyer and the moral
theologian both stand before these diverging concepts and both must
attempt to build a satisfactory intellectual bridge between them.63 On the
one hand, conscience represents a subjective law "inside of me" (in mir)
while, on the other hand, there exists an acknowledged external or
objective parameter that is drawn from both morality' (Sittlichkeit) and
from the publically promulgated law, and which presents itself to the
individual as a preexisting measure or boundary of action.65




60. As one example, see Martha C. Nussbaum, who states, "[i]n the tradition we hear a
lot of talk about 'liberty of conscience,' 'equal liberty of conscience,' and so on. I shall argue that
the argument for religious liberty and equality in the tradition begins from a special respect for
the faculty in human beings with which they search for life's ultimate meaning." See, e.g.,
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION OF
RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 19 (2009); see also JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM
AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE (2011).
61. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25, at 41.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See HANS REINER, DIE GRUNDLAGEN DER SITTLICHKEIT (1974).
65. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25, at 41.
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Conscience demands of each individual an absolute moral
authenticity; that is to say, an insight into what is "truly moral,"'66 as well
as into the "inner justice'6 7 of each individual case. Like many
commentators, Isensee analyzes this as an individual "court of
conscience," in which the individual "I" (Ich) functions as both party and
judge.66 Or, in other words, as an individual called upon to act both as an
interpreter of the law and as the one who applies it in each distinct case
(Gesetzesinterpret and Gesetzesanwender, respectively). Notably, the
only role that is foreclosed to this individual is that of the "lawgiver"
(Gesetzgeber).
According to Isensee, this puts the individual conscience in a
unique position: it must, in each case, presuppose the validity of the
(external) law, which it then subsequently interprets.69 However, since
conscience relies upon an (external) moral command, it is not an
arbitrary voice, but rather one of moral necessity7" that, nevertheless,
expresses itself subjectively.
Paradoxically, asserts Isensee, this can give rise to a grave tension
between "law" and "conscience": there can be no guarantee that the
inner-conceived moral command will always coincide with that sourced
from the moral law or the legal system. This conflict between the "inner
voice" and the external law can arise at any time and is a seminal fault
line in their interaction. This fault line can be conveniently named the
"Dilemma of Conscience."
B. The Hegelian Solution
The above analysis is preliminary to Isensee's foray into Hegel's
twofold nomenclature of the Dilemma of Conscience: the distinction
between "authentic" (true) conscience and "formal" conscience.
Hegel recognized the Dilemma of Conscience when he
acknowledged a certain "ambiguity" of conscience and differentiated
between the idea (Idee) of conscience (also called the "authentic"






71. Hegel's work on conscience is notoriously difficult. According to Moyar,
[Hegel's] reference to "true conscience" (§ 137) seems to define anyone's conscience
as no more than the disposition to respond correctly to the objectively fixed ethical
requirements. This appears to make freedom solely a matter of being disposed to
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conscience of a particular individual (called the "formal" conscience,
again using his terminology).
Authentic conscience is the "disposition [or conviction] to desire
what is good, in and of itself. ' 72 This conviction has fixed foundations in
objective rules and duties.73 For Hegel, the "idea" (Idee) of conscience
(i.e., authentic conscience) is sacred, and any interference with it
amounts to a sacrilege.74  This, however, only applies to the idea of
conscience and not necessarily to the conscience of the particular
individual.75  "Whether what is held to be good is in fact good is only
discernible through the content of what is perceived as good"
(Gutseinsollenden).7'6  Thus formal conscience must be measured and
tested against the authentic conscience, which itself represents a rule of
reason and a generally valid mode of acting. Mere reliance on "the self'
(das Selbst) is not sufficient to pass this test.7 7  As the keeper of the
"reality" of morals, the state is built upon the authentic (but not the
behave according to the right norms, and not at all a matter of being self-conscious that
one is following the right norms.
See DEAN MOYAR, HEGEL'S CONSCIENCE 15 (2011). Moyar's recent summary (and defense) of
his own work on Hegel's Conscience (in his book of the same name) is instructive:
We can formulate the main problem of modern freedom as the problem of how to
understand the relation of conscience's authority to the authority of good reasons or
objective ethical content. Does conscience in its full authoritative sense reflect
(objective) rational content, or does it (subjectively) determine the content? If it just
reflects content that is valid on its own, then conscience seems to be a formal
requirement merely tacked on to an already given normative landscape. But if an
individual determines content through the appeal to conscience, the very idea of stable
rational content available to all agents begins to break down. This unpalatable either/or
is met by Hegel with his dynamic account hat I call performative freedom, in which
content is taken up and altered in the very act of expressing it. Conscience is thus
largely a site of combination and synthesis, with the judgments of conscience being
concrete instances of ethical action.
See also Dean Moyar, Summary of Hegel's Consience, 43 OWL MINERVA 101, 101-06 (2011-
2012). Some even question whether Hegel had any coherent body of social thought at all. See,
for example, Allen Wood, who warns against the pitfalls of reading too much into Hegel's ethical
system and the possibility that readers "will humbug [themselves] into thinking there is some
esoteric truth in Hegelian dialectical logic which provides a hidden key to his social thought."
ALLEN W. WOOD, HEGEL' S ETHICAL THOUGHT 7 (1990).
72. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25, at 40.
73. Id.
74. WOOD, supra note 71.
75. Id.
76. See IVAN ALEKSANDROVICH IL'lN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL AS A DOCTRINE OF THE
CONCRETENESS OF GOD AND HUMANITY: THE DOCTRINE OF HUMANITY (Philip T. Grier ed. &
trans., Northwestern U. Press, 2011) (1918).
77. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans. Oxford
Univ. Press 1967) (1952).
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formal) conscience: accordingly, "[T]he state cannot recognize the
conscience as subjective knowledge, any more than science can grant
validity to subjective opinion, dogmatism, or the appeal to a subjective
opinion. "78
In the end, and according to Hegel's theory of the state, the
individual conscience is only compatible with the State when it has
imbibed the objective laws of the state.79  Hegel thus (dis)solves the
Dilemma of Conscience in a one-sided way, and in favour of an
objective rationality, as pronounced by the State.8°
IV. REDUCTION OF CONFLICT POTENTIAL IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
STATE
A. Religious Neutrality-No Access to Morality
At first glance, it would seem as if the constitutional state finds a
solution to this Dilemma in favor of complete subjectivity. The
constitutional state is open to the conscience of the individual, but this is
so only because freedom of conscience, which the state guarantees to
every human being as a fundamental right, is not directed to the authentic
conscience, which exists as an idea on the Hegelian plateau of morality,
but to the unskilled formal conscience of everyone.8'
Thus, from the outset, the possibility of a legal (constitutional)
conflict with an individual's conscience has been reduced to a bare
minimum.82 This is achieved by the particular structural limitations
placed upon state power and places no reliance at all upon the
(recognition of) a fundamental right to freedom of conscience for the
citizen. In this way, the concept of conscience is confined to maintaining
an external framework for the realization of its inner-workings. The
democratic constitutional state is founded not on integral, ultimate truth
but on the practical needs of human coexistence.83 The religious and
moral basis of action lies outside its secular horizon.84 It also follows
78. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25, at 42; see also HEGEL, supra note 77.
79. HEGEL, supra note 77.
80. One possible interpretation of this is that Hegel's theory hereby devours the more
traditional concept of conscience, leaving only a state-defined husk. Id.
81. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25, at 42.
82. WOOD, supra note 71.
83. JOSEF ISENSEE, VOM STIL DER VERFASSUNGOSEF: ENE TYPOLOGISCHE STUDIE ZU
SPRACHE, THEMATIK UND SINN DES VERFASSUNGSGESETZES [ON CONSTITUTIONAL STYLE: A
TYPOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE LANGUAGE, THEMES AND MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION] 13
(2013) [hereinafter ISENSEE, ON CONSTITUTIONAL STYLE].
84. Id.
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that the question of God's existence-either the God of revealed religion
or the god of the philosophers, including even the world-judge and the
moral superego in the internalized tribunal of conscience-lie outside the
secular horizon. The secular state thus holds itself aloof from the field of
religious conflicts.85
The constitutional state also avoids the sphere of moral codes out of
which moral conflicts arise: the conscience. Such a state endows
legality, not morality. It calls for external obedience to legal norms but
never for internal assent. The law is modest in its heteronomic validity
and does not touch the inner motivation of the citizen. The state does not
get involved with conscience. Nor does the state compel the conscience.
In the end, conscience lies outside the constitutional system.86
B. Conscience Enjoys a "Negative Freedom " Against State Power
It follows then that conscience itself is not the foundation stone of
the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat)87  but only the freedom of
conscience.88 Only this freedom can be regarded as a basic right, and it is
only this basic right that the individual enjoys when confronted by state
power. In other words, it forms a defense in the form of a status
negativus8: an area of private self-determination, which is shielded from
state interference. Thus, the basic right protects the integrity of one's
moral personality by limiting the action of the state.9 ° The concept of
85. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25.
86. Id. at 43.
87. This is a variation of "rule of law" with additional aspects of justice-the opposite of
Obrigkeitsstaat (a state with arbitrary use of power).
88. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25, at 40.
89. The concept of status negativus receives considerable space. ZIPPELIUS, supra note
24, at 198. It refers to fundamental rights of the citizen as a defense against the power of the
state. It is compared with status positivus fundamental rights as "performance rights"-where the
citizen can demand something of the state. See GG art. 6 § 4 (which provides, "Every mother
shall be entitled to the protection and care of the community", status activus, fundamental rights
as "participation rights"); id art. 38 § 1, para. 2 (voting rights); id. art. 33 paras. 1-3 (access to
public office); id. art. 4 para. 3, art. 12(a) para. 2 (deciding between military and alternative
service); and status passivus (where someone has only duties and no rights at all, e.g., pure
military service without a right to object to the same). The different classifications are part of
Georg Jellinek's (1851-1911) positivist theory of the Rechtsstaat formulated at the time of
Wilhelm H. See Gustavo Gozzi, Rechtsstaat and Individual Rights in German Constitutional
History, in THE RULE OF LAW 248 (Pietro Costa & Danilo Zolo eds., 2007).
90. ISENSEE, ON CONSTITUTIONAL STYLE, supra note 83.
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freedom, from which the basic right of liberal observance91 originates, is
determined negatively, as an absence of state compulsion.
92
From this, it follows that the state is shut out from the religious or
ethical aspects of any "decisions of conscience."'93 The state is no moral
censor of conscience.94 Nor does the state care whether the individual
conscience makes the (intellectually) correct decisions.95  Rather, it
merely guarantees a "freedom of conscience." Thus, the Basic Law does
not protect any eternal truth but only the individual's exercise of their
subjective moral autonomy (Subjektivitdt des Menschen).96  Again, it
follows, at least from the perspective of basic rights (grundrechtlich
qualifiziert), that nobody has a "bad conscience"-or even a "good
conscience"; there is simply no room for any concept akin to "erroneous
conscience.'  The "sunshine" of the Basic Law sheds its light on the
just and unjust alike, upon the wise and the foolish, the prudent and the
impenitent, together.98
In addition, there is no requirement that the individual meet any
specific criteria to enjoy the benefits of fundamental rights: these rights
are conferred independent of any moral maturity or powers of decision-
making attributable to the particular individual and refer only to the
person as they are in "the here and now.'99  Consequently, this also
excludes any reference to the person as they "should" be or become. It
also follows that the formal conscience (in the Hegelian sense of the
term) need not undertake any inquiry into whatever may be the claims of
the authentic conscience, and there is no requirement that these two
concepts of conscience cohere, or even communicate.°0
This shows the practical consequences of the concept of a "negative
freedom,' ' to which freedom of conscience is bound, as indeed are the
other classical fundamental rights.0 2
91. Isensee uses this phrase (in German, liberaler Observanz) elsewhere in his writings.
Id.
92. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25, at 43.





98. The obvious reference is to Matthew 5:45 "for he makes his sun rise on the evil and
on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust.." Matthew 5:45 (Rev. Std. Version).
99. Hic et nunc (Latin).
100. Matthew, supra note 98.
101. Josef Isensee, Keine Freiheit fir den Irrtum [No Freedom for Error], 104
ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STrtUNG FUR RECHTSGESCHiCHTE 296, 314 (1987) [hereinafter
Isensee, No Freedom for Error].
[Vol. 27
2018] THE UNDEFINED REMAINS UNPROTECTED 71
This concept of "freedom" was condemned by the Popes of the
nineteenth-century, who accepted only "true" freedom, which was
positively defined as freedom to act rightly-"right," that is, from the
objective perspective of the Church's Magisterium.°3 Thus, they
rejected the claims of subjectivity as encountered in freedom of
conscience, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression and teaching.
The Popes defended the "rights of truth" against the enlightened and
liberalized "rights of freedom."' 4  Citing Augustine, they could not
accept freedom for error, since "error has no rights."'
0 5
V. CONFLICT IN THE EXTERNAL FORUM (FORUMEXTERNUM)
The potential for conflict between the subjective order of
conscience and a law of general application would be almost completely
defused if the basic right of freedom of conscience was applied in the
forum internum (internal forum) alone."0 6 That it does so apply is
undisputed.0 7 The right to "freedom of conscience" is, however, of little
practical importance here, since the ability of the state to interfere with
the interior person, for example by way of suggestion, narcoanalysis, 08
hypnosis, brainwashing, etc., is also denied by other fundamental




105. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25, at 44; see also Matthew, supra note 98;
George Weigel, Are Human Rights Still Universal?, COMMETARY, Feb. 1995, at 41 (noting that
the concept was overtaken by the Second Vatican Council). Weigel states,
A bit closer to modem concerns, the contemporary Roman Catholic development
of doctrine on the question of religious freedom nicely illustrates the concept of
"emergent understanding." Prior to the Second Vatican Council, it was frequently
argued in official Catholic circles that there was no such thing as "religious
freedom," because, as the phrase had it, "error has no rights." Vatican II's
Declaration on Religious Freedom transcended this sterile debate by insisting that
persons, whether their religious opinions were erroneous or not, had rights over
against coercive state power; and the Council justified this position by an appeal to
the very traditional Catholic notion that the act of faith must be freely made if it is to
be, in truth, an act of faith.
For earlier formulations, see the German author. See Hans Rommen, Church and State, 12 REV.
POL. 321, 321-40 (1950). He is not to be confused with the Catholic scholar Heinrich Albert
Rommen, 1897-1967.
106. Isensee, No Freedom for Error, supra note 101.
107. Id.
108. E.g., "truth serum" drugs.
109. Including important constitutional rights.
TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 27
However, according to prevailing (judicial) interpretation, freedom
of conscience protects not only the internal decisions of the individual
but also their implementation by way of active (and external) action."'
The right of conscience contains the freedom to act in accordance with
the "commandments" of one's conscience, which commandments are
"inwardly experienced and thereby binding and absolutely
imperative.""' The sphere of protection of a fundamental right extends
to the forum externum (external forum). 12 This leads in turn to the
programming of an inevitable conflict between the conscientious action
of the citizen-actor and the general law of the democratic legal state."3
VI. A LEGAL EXCEPTION: PRIORITY OF CONSCIENCE BEFORE
COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE
In one very special case, a conflict in the forum externum is
governed by the German Basic Law:'"' No one may be forced into
110. Isensee, No Freedom for Error, supra note 101.
111. Quoting from BVerfG 1978, 2 BvF 1, 2, 4, 5/77 127 (163) (Ger.) (the Conscientious
Objector II case). Isensee also refers to Ernst Wolfgang B6ckenffrde, Das Grundrecht der
Gewissensfreiheit, 28 VVDStRL 33, 55 (1970). Ernst Wolfgang Bockenforde was "a Catholic
associated with the so-called Ritter School in Munster, who [was] a social democratic judge and
legal theorist best known for his attempts to liberalize without wholly abandoning the political-
theological insights of Carl Schmitt." Peter E. Gordon, Between Christian Democracy and
Critical Theory: Habermas, BockenJfrde, and the Dialectics of Secularization in Postwar
Germany, 80 Soc. REs. 173, 185 (2013). B6ckenforde left the Court in May 1996.
112. For a discussion of the differences and overlaps between the forum intemum and the
forum extemum in the context of section 18 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), see Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Religion or Belief on Its Thirty First Session, U.N. Doc. A/ HRC/31/18 (2015). On
the question of overlap between the two fora, the Report states,
Forum internum and forum externum should be generally seen as a continuum. Their
conceptual distinction should not be misperceived as a clear-cut separation of different
spheres of life. Just as freedom in theforum internum would be inconceivable without
a person's free interaction with his or her social world, freedom within the forum
externum presupposes respect for the faculty of every individual to come up with new
thoughts and ideas and to develop personal convictions, including dissident and
provocative positions. While providing unconditional protection to the inner nucleus
of each individual against coercion and interference, the legally enhanced status of the
forum internum at the same time improves the prospects of free communication and
manifestation within the forum externum. In other words, it strengthens freedom of
religion or belief and freedom of opinion and expression in all their dimensions, both
internal and external.
113. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25, at 44.
114. Sondertatbestand. This may also be translated as delictum sui generis.
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military service ("with the use of arms": Kriegsdienst mit der Waffe)
against their conscience."5
This guarantee of conscience is granted to the individual even in
situations of very serious conflict, including those in which the state asks
its citizens to secure the state's continued existence." 1
6
The protection provided by the Basic Law is anything but self-
evident for constitutional states with highly developed culture of "basic
rights" (Grundrechtskultur).' For the democratic constitutional state
sacrifices a thing of considerable substance (Substanz) when it relieves
the individual, who appeals to conscience, from the general obligations
of citizenship and defense of the state."8  In essence, we see here a
rupture of the ethical boundaries between protection by the state and
obedience to the state, the connection between justice and duty."9 The
duty to perform military service:
is justified by virtue of the fact that that the state, which recognizes and
protects human dignity, life, liberty, and property as fundamental rights,
can meet this constitutional protection obligation in favor its citizens only
with the help of these citizens and their commitment to the existence of the
Federal Republic. In other words, the individual rights claim to protection
and the community-related duty of citizens of a democratically constituted
state to contribute to the safeguarding of this constitutional order
correspond to each other.
120
Thus, the substance (essential kernel) of democracy is contained in the
duty to bear arms to protect the state.'2 ' For in it, the "legitimate child of
democracy,"'2 2 that is to say, the military assertion of the state, becomes a
matter for the people themselves.23 The army is "incorporated into" the
citizenry, and the danger of political alienation (or disengagement) of the
citizenry is removed.124 Put more plainly, compulsory military service is
115. Article 4: [Freedom of faith and conscience] ... (3) "No person shall be compelled
against his conscience to render military service involving the use of arms. Details shall be
regulated by a federal law." GG art. 4 (Ger.).
116. BVerfG, 2 BvF at 163 (1978) (Ger.).
117. GG art. 4 (Ger.).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. BVerfG, 2 BvF at 161 (1978) (Ger.).
121. Id.
122. Here Isensee adopts the wording from THEODOR HEUSS, Rede vor dem
Parlamentarischen Rat, in DIE GROBEN REDEN: DER STAATSMANN 72, 72-87 (1965); J6R n. F. 1,
S. 77.
123. BVerfG, 2 BvF at 163 (1978) (Ger.).
124. Id
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baseline "democratic normality."'125 Thus, in any refusal of universal
compulsory military service, the "equal burden" rightly borne by the
citizenry-the burden on which the democratic constitutional state is
founded-is also at stake.'26  It is, therefore, appropriate that this
"inequality" be compensated by the replacement civilian service
(Ersatzdienst) for conscientious objectors as a "heavy alternative.'27
Nevertheless, and at the same time, rejection of military service
may be well justified by subjective conscience, because military service
includes the possibility of killing in case of an emergency, or of at least
engaging in potentially deadly actions.'28 No other duty imposed by a
democratic constitutional state on the citizen is comparable to this.'29
The spiritual plight of one who is conscience-bound to avoid killing
under any circumstances can go beyond the bounds of the reasonable
demands on the citizen. The conflict is typical.3 ' A general normative
rule to cope with such cases is, therefore, both practical and reasonable.
VII. CONSCIENCE AS A PROBLEM OF JURIDICAL DEFINITION
A. What Is "Conscience"?
Even in the face of the fundamental right to freedom of conscience,
the fulfillment of military service remains the rule while relief from the
obligation is the exception.'3' Such relief, of course, presupposes that the
military service in question conflicts with the conscience of the objector.
Whether this prerequisite is satisfied can only be ascertained if the
meaning of "conscience" is subject to clear definition, at least in the
sense of it being a fundamental right. Thus, for quite practical legal
reasons, the concept of "the conscience" becomes an important subject
for legal consideration and for definition.
"Conscience," however, is not a general concept in the law.'32 In
terms of the history of constitutions, as well as that of the various
declarations of human rights, the concept derives from the thesaurus of
the Christian religion as well as the general philosophy of the West.'33
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Bockenf6rde, supra note 111, at 61, 77, 84, 86.





133. B~ckenf6rde, supra note 111, at 55.
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Despite several thousand years of discourse, neither theology nor
philosophy have achieved a consensus on the meaning and conceptual
contours of conscience. 
134
The constitution of any neutral state (that includes religious
neutrality as a fundamental right) is simply not capable of engaging in
the battle of ideas with theologians and philosophers.3 5 The state is
incapable of deciding these issues, nor does it wish to do so.136 What the
state can do is to embrace a uniform understanding of conscience, which
is valid for all citizens regardless of their beliefs or views of the world
(Weltanschaungen). 137 These realities reveal the underlying dilemma, for
here, we encounter a genuinely extra-legal concept with no firm
conceptual identity or outline. Thus, "conscience" urgently needs a legal
definition.'38
The temptation is to leave conscience as a simply indefinable
concept (definiens indefinibilis), which presumes that it is too vague or
complex for precise definition. Unfortunately, such sidestepping is not
satisfactory for anyone required to interpret a constitution. It is only
possible for a norm to obtain practical validity when its underlying
concepts can be precisely defined and generally applied.
B. The Problem of the Expansion of "Conscience"
The Federal Constitutional Court professes to have found a valid
definition for the idea of conscience taken from "common language
usage."'39 According to Isensee, this is not the case.40 Everyday usage
is diffuse and inconsistent. '4 1 In present times, citizens' reliance on a
"broad conscience argument" is swift, easy, and all too frequent.142 Such
inflationary use of the term means that conscience has become a cheap




135. GG art. 4 (Ger.).
136. Bockenfbrde, supra note 111.
137. BVerfG, 1 BvL 21/60 45 (1960) (Ger.); see also' Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra
note 25, at 46 n.13.
138. GG art. 4 (Ger.).
139. BVerfG, 1 BvL 21/60 45 (Ger.)
140. GG art. 4 (Ger.).
141. Id.
142. Bockenfdrde, supra note 111.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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By way of example, public discussion of unquestioning availability
of abortion in all cases is supported by the argument that it is a "decision
of conscience" of the mother.45 This produces a rhetorical effect such
that abortion based on the grounds of conscience is drawn into a taboo-
zone of subjective morals and is raised to a type of public justification.
146
In the end, questioning the legal and moral permissibility of abortion has
become no longer permitted.147 Indeed, this is so not only in individual
cases, but also quite generally. 
48
C. The Analogy with Art
The extended concept of art to be found in the sense used by Joseph
Beuys49 -- who famously shouted, "[E]verything under the sun is art!"-
also finds its parallel in today's public popular ethical touchstone:
"Everything is conscience."'5 °
For lawyers and those who must find a workable jurisprudence,
however, such an expanded terminology is infeasible per se, because the
conceptual borders of conscience have now melted away and the
differences between conscience and mere "subjective arbitrariness" have
been lost.5'
The further this tendency infringes upon the interpretation of basic
norms (basic rights), the closer the concept of freedom of conscience
comes to a general and unfettered freedom of action and, thus, a "free
right" to act out (ad libitum) whatever is not formally forbidden through
a validly enacted state law.
The general freedom to develop one's personality'52 is the widest of
all the freedom rights, at least in terms of its thematic reach, but it is also
the most easily curtailed by legal regulation.'53
145. BVerfG 1993, 2 BvF 2/90 (Ger.).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25, at 47. The issues surrounding abortion
and conscience have been recently debated in the United Kingdom. See Abortion Act 1967 § 44,
1 (Eng.) (Section 4 (1) (The Conscience Clause and the role of conscience in healthcare)).
149. Beuys (1921-1986) was a controversial and influential "performance artist" who co-
founded the Green Party in Germany in 1980. See generally ALLAN ANTLIFF, JOSEPH BEuYs
(2014). For a critique of Beuys's work, see Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, Beuys: The Twilight of the
Idol, 5 ARTFORUM 51 (1980). In 2017, Beuys was the subject of a documentary film entitled
Beuys, under the direction ofAndres Veicl. BEUYS (Zero One Films 2017).
150. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25, at 47.
151. B6ckenfdrde, supra note 111.
152. Article 2 1 of the Basic Law provides,
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Freedom of conscience is, by contrast, unreservedly guaranteed by
the Constitution (Basic Law).'54 It is resistant to restriction by law.'55
These circumstances show that conscience is restricted by its own
nature-that necessary boundaries can only lie within the concept of
conscience itself.
156
D. Who Gets to Define the Concept of Conscience?
A way out of the dilemma created by any attempt to define
"conscience"-as set out in Article 4(1) of the Basic Law-seems to
arise when the definition of the basic legal status is left to the respective
rights-holder and the latter decides, by way of self-understanding,
exactly what conscience is."'
This subjective approach is clearly expressed in the special vote of a
judge of the Federal Constitutional Court: Freedom of conscience is not
subject to a state reservation.'58 The power to define conscience lies with
the conscientious objector and not with an authority outside their
individual conscience. The exercise of the right to basic rights should
not be placed under a "cognitive reserve of others."'59
At first blush, this seems to be the solution to the precarious
problem of defmition-a solution both practical and liberating. By it, the
possessor of the fundamental freedom also decides on the kind of
constitutional right this freedom affords, and the extent to which it is
(1) Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as
he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the
moral law.
(2) Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the
person shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law.
GG art. 2 (Ger.).
153. Bockenforde, supra note 111.
154. GG art. 2 (Ger.).
155. Id.
156. B6ckenf6rde, supra note 111.
157. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25, at 48. German courts may not resort to
contested U.S. doctrines uch as "original intent," which "plays no significant role in German
constitutional interpretation." Kommers also notes that while "it might seem that the 'aims and
objects' approach of teleological inquiry [denoting a German focus on 'the unity of the text as a
whole from whence judges are to ascertain the aims and objects'] differs little from the
determination of original intent... the German judicial mind distinguishes sharply between these
methods." Kommers, supra note 8, at 845.
158. Bockenforde, supra note 111.
159. See BVerfG 1978, 2 BvF 1, 2, 4, 5/77 127 (185, 188, 192) (Ger.); see also JOSEPH
ISENSEE, WER DEFINIERT DIE FREIHEITSRECHTE? [WHO DEFINES THE LIBERTIES?] 7, 12 (1980)
[hereinafter ISENSEE, WHO DEFINES THE LIBERTIES?].
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available.6 ° The self-determination of the individual seems to be an
ultimate purposive end;'6' that individual cannot only exercise freedom
of conscience within the given normative framework but can also make a
binding decision about the extent of this normative framework.
Once a fundamental right becomes dependent on the self-
understanding of the rights bearer, it loses its fundamental ability to
measure individual's freedom'62-not to mention its ability to measure
the limits of state power. Thereafter, it is up to the individual
conscientious objectors to decide whether their objection to military
service is merely an opinion or a matter of conscience. In the case of
mere opinion, the duty to serve remains; in matters of conscience, refusal
becomes a matter of invoking a fundamental right. The adoption of such
a "subjectivizing" approach means that the area protected by the
"fundamental right" varies from person to person according to each's
self-understanding. The basic right no longer guarantees the "freedom of
equals," since the measure of individual freedom (as protected by
fundamental rights) is now determined by the individual's dexterity in
articulating their interests. 1
63
As such, any conflict of fundamental rights becomes totally
insoluble if the self-understanding of these pretenders to fundamental
rights (Grundrechtspratendenten) is contrary to-and thus incompatible
with-the exercise of the freedom of conscience of another or others. In
a battle between subjectivities, only general objective criteria can solve
the conflict between the two subjective claims. Thus, the right to
freedom of conscience, like the other freedom-based rights, can only
exist under the framework conditions supplied by the (legal) state.
Subsequently, such a state then has the task of coordinating the freedom
of its citizens. In Kantian terms, this can be formulated as follows: the
state ensures that the freedom of one can exist with the liberty of the
other according to a general law." The law, however, can only be
guaranteed by the state, which itself is not partaking in freedom, and not
a party in the conflict of interests, and which itself is exclusively




164. For an objective interpretation of "conscience," see Hans Bethge in HANDBUCH DES
STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK, supra note 1, § 137, at 7; see also J. ISENSEE, WER
DEFITNIERT DIE FREIHEITSRECHTE? 26 (1980). See generally Grundrechtsvoraussetzungen und
Verfassungserwartungen a  die Grundrechtsausubung, in HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLK, supra note 1, §§ 115, 117.
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committed to the freedom-determined social welfare and thus capable of
determining the scope of basic rights in the event of a conflict. The task
of definition power by the state is unavoidable. For what the state cannot
define, cannot be protected. 
165
E. The Problem of Quis Iudicabit?
In view of a constitutionally defined concept of conscience,
Hobbes's question of sovereignty comes immediately to the fore: quis
iudicabit?'66 (Who is to judge?) The answer is: the state.167 Thus, while
dispensing with some of the authoritarian contours of the Hobbesian
state, the formal basic structures of the modem state as a unit of decision
and as a legal unit are retained.1 68 This necessarily includes the uniting
"interpretative" arm.169  In the realm of fundamental rights, areas of
private self-determination are removed from the state's access and their
actions are subject to prescribed legal norms. But the state remains
sovereign by interpreting the limits of its actions.7' Therefore, it has no
interpretative monopoly.'7' The interpretation of the concepts of
fundamental rights is open to everyone under the conditions of freedom
of expression and the freedom of scholarship. Despite all this, however,
the state has the right to issue a binding final decision, without which
legal unity and legal peace are impossible. '72 The basic right to "freedom
of conscience" has a "pre-state" (anterior) foundation as a human right,
and as a constituent of constitutional law it is a state right, oriented to the
state as an indispensable guarantor, and also as its potential adversary.'73
It is molded by the structures of the modem state. 1
74
165. See Adolf Arndt, Die Kunst im Recht, 1-2 NJW (NEUE JURJSTISCHE WOCHENSCHRFT)
25, 28 (1966).
166. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY H: THE MYTH OF THE CLOSURE OF ANY







173. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25.
174. Id. at 49. This fits with the objective hierarchy of values in the Basic Law: Kommers
notes, in its search for constitutional first principles, the Constitutional Court has seen fit, as
noted earlier, to interpret the Basic Law in terms of its overall structural unity. Perhaps
"ideological" unity would be the more accurate term here, for the Constitutional Court envisions
the Basic Law as a unified structure of substantive values. Kommers, supra note 8, at 858-59.
The centerpiece of this interpretive strategy is the concept of an "objective order of values," a
concept that derives from the gloss the Federal Constitutional Court has put on the text of the
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F The Secular Concept of Basic Rights of Conscience
Thus, there remains the difficulty of defining the term "conscience"
within the realm of fundamental constitutional rights. This difficulty has
been exacerbated by the fact that, according to more recent doctrine, the
basic right of freedom of conscience has emancipated itself from the
fundamental right of freedom of religion, which was always an integral
part of it.'75 In the same context, the Weimar Reich's Constitution (1919-
1933) ensured "full freedom of belief and conscience".76 In the Basic
Law of 1949, freedom of conscience is framed by religious guarantees:
"Freedom of faith, conscience, and freedom of religious and ideological
confession are inviolable".'77 In its origin, freedom of conscience is a
derivative of religious freedom.'78 Prototypical is the conflict between
the external law of the state and the inner commandment of God, as
exemplified by the Christian martyrs through the ages, from the Apostles
to St. Thomas More and beyond.'79 The "collision norm" of Christianity
Basic Law. According to this concept, the Constitution incorporates the "basic value
decisions" of the founding fathers, the most basic of which is their choice of a free
democratic basic order; i.e., a liberal, representative, federal, parliamentary democracy-
buttressed and reinforced by basic rights and liberties. These basic values are objective
because they are said to have an independent reality under the Constitution, imposing upon
all organs of government an affirmative duty to see that they are realized in practice.
Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25.
175. There has been much discussion in international law circles regarding the link
between religious rights and rights of (military) conscientious objection. See Leonard
Hammer, who states, "Focus on the view that the capacity for military conscientious
objection in the international human rights system derives from the right to freedom of
religion and conscience." Leonard Hammer, Selective Conscientious Objection and
International Human Rights, 36 ISR. L. REv. 145, 145 (2002).
176. Article 135 states, "All Reich inhabitants enjoy full freedom of liberty and
conscience. Undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed by the constitution and is placed
under the protection of the state. General state laws are not affected hereby." DIE
VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS [CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN REICH] art. 135, Aug
11, 1919, translation at http://lawcollections.library.comell.edu/nuremberg/catalog/nur:01840
(Weimar Constitution).
177. GG art. 4 (Ger.).
178. Ulrich Scheuner, Die verfassungsmafiige Verbiirgung der Gewissensfreiheit
[The Constitutional Recognition of Freedom of Conscience], in SCHRiFFEN ZUM
STAATSKIRCHENRECHT 65, 68, 77 (Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, Christoph Link & Jorg
Winter eds., 1970).
179. The author notes a current iconic display in the Basilica of San Bartolomeo
all'Isola (St. Bartholomew on the Island) in Rome, commemorating recent Martyrs. See
Vatican Radio, Testimonies of Families and Friends of the "New Martyrs, " ST. JOSEPH
ROMAN CATH. CHURCH (Apr. 22, 2017), https://stjoerayne.org/2017/04/22/testimonies-of-
family-and-friends-of-the-new-martyrs/.
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is the New Testament clausula Petri: "We must obey God rather than
men."
180
When, in conscience, the voice of God is heard, the decision of
conscience preserves its unconditionality, with which character stands
and falls, according to the sacred earnest by which it is obeyed.'8'
It is easy for one who, for the sake of conscience, refers to
objectivized religious foundations-for example in the Scriptures,
doctrines, and the traditions of a community of faith-to simply make it
clear to others that this is the fundamental basis of their decision. This
also makes their decision of conscience plausible to others. Such a
presupposition cannot apply if the conscience is cut away from its
religious roots, as is the case with the current understanding. Thus, the
objective specification, which binds even the religious dissenter, is
removed. The "religious neutrality" of the constitutional state does not
compel this development. For it is not a matter of whether the state
identifies itself with religious statements, but whether freedom of
conscience-a secular fundamental right-is a component of the
freedom of religion, an equally secular fundamental right, or stands
independently beside it.
Henceforth, it will become more difficult for the interpreter of
fundamental rights to make use of the conscience as an essential egal
feature (Tatbestandsmerkmal) 'S alongside other fundamental principles
such as freedom of expression or freedom of action.8 3 Above all else, in
praxis, it will become more precarious for relevant state officials to
qualify (and prove) that any cognitive act, whether word or deed, is in
fact based in conscience, let alone-and for legal purposes--demonstrate
conscience-based motivation.'84
G Definition via the Federal Constitutional Court
The Federal Constitutional Court has had a lot of trouble in
attempting to legally construe the concept of conscience.'85 It describes
"conscience" as "a [however justified, yet always] truly experienced
180. Acts 5:29 (Rev. Std. Version).
181. Gregory Sullivan, The Legal and Moral Genius of St. Thomas More, CATH. WORLD
REP. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.catholicworldreport.com/2018/03/27/the-legal-and-moral-
genius-of-st-thomas-more/.
182. The Tatabestande are, in approximate common law terms, the material facts of a case
upon which its outcome depends.
183. See Scheuner, supra note 178.
184. Id.
185. BVerfG 1988,2BvR701/86(Ger.).
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spiritual phenomenon" whose "demands, admonitions, and warnings for
the one [person] in question are immediately evident commandments of
absolute imperative."' 6 The decree of conscience, which under Article
4(3) of the Basic Law justifies the refusal of military service, will be
heard by the individual as a "purely moral and unconditionally binding
determination on the behavior required of him."'8 7  Decisions to be
categorized as decrees of conscience are those which are "serious,
morally oriented decision[s] (i.e., [those] that [are] oriented towards the
categories of "good" and "evil") which the individual, when in a
particular situation, experiences as inwardly binding and absolutely
obligatory, such that they cannot act against [it] without precipitating a
grave crisis of conscience."'88
The tautology created by defining a "determination of conscience"
by using the definitional "crisis of conscience" shows the aporia
(impasse) in which the judicial interpretation of the conscience is
currently mired. 1
89
Nevertheless, the legal definition of conscience, even when
translated into a form that is no longer religiously determined, still
clearly displays the formal characteristics of religious conscience:
necessity, gravity, unconditionality, and moral obligation.
Since the forum internum of the human person is impermeable to
the constitutional state-not least because of the freedom of
conscience-it remains to be seen whether a decision of conscience
exists in any particular case.9° This can be made clearer using a parallel
metaphor, that being the treatment of electricity in teaching physics,
which, in times past at least, meant that while it was impossible to
explain what electricity is, it was, nevertheless, possible to say how
electricity actually works. Similarly, conscience can be recognized by its
effects.'9' The effect of a serious, unconditional, moral decision, in
which the identity of the agent's moral personality is at stake, is the
corollary of action.192 The willingness to bear annoying consequences is
186. BVerfG, I BvL 21/60 45 (138) (Ger.); BVerfG, 2 BvR 701/86 at 395.
187. Bockenforde, supra note 111, at 55.
188. BVerfG, 1 BvL 21/60 at 55; ZPPELIUS, supra note 24, at 51.
189. Bockenforde, supra note 111; BVerfG, 2 BvR 701/86 at 184.
190. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25.
191. Compare similar comments with respect to beauty. For example, "Beauty is more
easily described by its effects than by its components." See THOMAS GILBY, BARBARA
CELARENT: A DESCRIPTION OF SCHOLASTIC DIALECTIC 160 (1949) (paraphrasing Aquinas).
192. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25.
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indicative of such a decision.'93 Thus, willingness to perform non-
military substitute service (Zivildienst) is a sign of the authenticity of the
grounds of conscience advanced.'94 A presupposition, however, is that
the burden of the replacement service is generally no lighter than that of
the military service; thus, the temporal apportionment of the substitute
service has the special function of indicating the conscientious nature of
the refusal of a regular civic duty.'9 5 This function would be even more
pronounced if the substitute service were moderate but noticeably longer
than the regular service.'96 This variation, however, is denied by the
Basic Law, which stipulates that the duration of the substitute service
must not exceed that of the military service.'9 7
VIII. FROM FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AS A SELF-EMPOWERMENT TO
DENUNCIATION (DESTRUCTION) OF OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW?
A. The Phenomenon of an Expanding Concept of Conscience
In the Federal Republic of Germany, it has become almost a matter
of fashion for individuals or groups, spontaneously organized, to
renounce the right of legal obedience by citing conscience and "freedom
of conscience."'98 Intermittently such groups also rely on this claim to
refuse to comply with statutory or other contractual obligations.'99 This
inflated appeal to the conscience can be partly explained by the
Vergangenheitsbewdltigungssyndrom (coping with the past) of the
German people.00 This phenomenon is based on a national need to
cleanse the country of the national "original sin" by means of a form of
"retrospective resistance" and to dispense it from the ominous obligation
of "duty" into the inherently good position of the (noble) "deserter."''
The moralism that corresponds with this state of mind finds a trite
vehicle in the arguments associated with freedom of conscience.0 2
193. See Ernst Wolfgang B6ckenf6rde (Arun. 4), In Niklas Luhmann, Die
Gewissensfreiheit und das Gewissen, 90 A6R 257, 283-86 (1965); see also BVerfl 1985,
BvF 2, 3 4/83 (Ger.) (the decision of Judge Mahrenholz and Judge Bocken6rde).
194. See B6ckenf6rde, supra note 193, at 283-86.
195. It is, in some sense, "advertising" that this is a conscience-based refusal to participate
in military service. Id.
196. See BVerfGE 69 57, 74 (Ger.) (the decision of Judge Mahrenholz and Judge
B6cken6rde); see also BVerfG 1985, BvF 2, 3, 4/83 and 2/84 (Ger.).
197. GG art. 21 § 2 (Ger.).




202. Isensee, Conscience in Law, supra note 25.
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In practice, one also finds a variety of occasions during which the
individual makes use of freedom of conscience as a form of self-
empowerment and as a means of dispensing oneself of otherwise valid
legal obligations. Three variations of this denial of duty, relying on
grounds of conscience, can be distinguished:
* where the obligation to perform absolutely contradicts the conscience of
the objector, such as the obligation to assist at an abortion, or the
statutory duty to take an oath as a witness, or to imbibe an oral
vaccination; °3
0 where the questioned obligation indirectly promotes actions that the
conscience deplores, for example the payment of charges for electricity
from nuclear power plants, health fund contributions which could be
used for the financing of "abortions by insurance," or taxes that could be
used for armament expenditures;2
°4
* where the broken law as such has no relation to the (real or supposed)
wrong against which the protest of the conscience is directed; rather the
violation of the law is only a means in the struggle against the real or
supposed injustice, for example, the blockade of road traffic as a form of
civilian or militant resistance to a threat to peace or the environment.
205
The third case type belongs to the associated field of the "resistance
fighter."" °6 The first and, in a somewhat weakened sense, the second are,
in some respects, comparable with the refusal of military service.2 7
B. The Exceptions Clause ofArticle 4 Sentence 3 Basic Law Taken as
a General Rule?
To extend the express conscience xception of Article 4(3) (i.e., to
refuse military service) to all legal obligations would seem to be
logical.20 8 Whether this interpretation is possible depends on whether the
fact of the refusal of the military service is a declared subset of the
general freedom of conscience or whether it constitutively expands it. It
is submitted that the second interpretation is more appropriate. The right
of avoiding military service opens a loophole in the case of a crisis of
203. For example, in the case of a polio vaccination, see Naveen Thacker & Niranjan
Shendumikar, Controversies in Polio Immunization, 70 INDIAN J. PEDIATRICS 567, 567-71
(2003).




208. GG art. 21 § 2 (Ger.).
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conscience, which is not generalizable.°9  Only in the case of
compulsory military service does the Basic Law provide for the
possibility of a substitute service.1 ° Whoever denies military service
cannot refuse, likewise for conscience, any substitute service.21' The
right to refuse to comply with Article 4(3) Basic Law regulates
exclusively the effects of freedom of conscience in the field of
compulsory military service.2 12 The solution to this dilemma can only be
sought within the framework of the general fundamental right of
conscience.2 13
C. State Structures as Immanent Limits of Freedom of Conscience
The basic right to freedom of conscience prevails within the
framework of the essential structures of the modem state as a monopoly
of power and decision making.21 4 Its foundations are obedience to the
law, which the citizen owes to the Constitution, and to individual acts of
administration and exercises of judicial power. The fundamental right of
freedom of conscience presupposes obedience to the law. It does not put
it in question.215 The law of the democratic state-based on the rule of
law-sets the preconditions for the possibility of effective freedom and
equality of all citizens.216 If freedom of conscience were to give anyone
the power to refuse to accept constitutional and objectively valid norms,
for merely subjective reasons, it would amount to an anarchical
explosion that could destroy the peaceful unity of the nation and its
decision-making processes, as well as majority democracy.
Arguably, a monarchy or a feudally constituted state could more
generously circumvent the law.2 17 It is easier for such a state to make
arrangements with outsiders about their duty status than it is for a
democracy, which is based on the rule of law, and on foundational
principles of universality and equality.218 To avoid jeopardizing their
209. Id.
210. BVerfG 1965, 1 BvR 112/63 135 (139) (Ger.); BVerfG 1968 1 BvR 579/67 127
(132) (Ger.).
211. BverfG, 1 BvR 679/67 at 132.
212. BVerfGE 1 BvR 112/63 at 139.
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legitimacy, democratic states must insist on the enforcement of the law
universally.
219
This does not mean, however, that the fundamental right to freedom
of conscience shrinks before any normative obligation whatsoever. This
fundamental right is not relativized by its legal limitations, as it may
happen, for example, to freedom of expression or freedom to work. The
freedom of conscience is, as a fundamental right without exception,
limited by conflicting rules and legal objectives at the level of the
constitution itself, by the other so-called "intrinsic" fundamental rights
which, from the outset, reduce the thematic scope of guaranteed
freedoms.22  These limitations include the existence and basic structures
of the constitutional state as an integral unity of liberties, and as a
guarantor of security both internally and externally. The state's
monopoly of force forms an a priori frontier of freedom of conscience.
This basic right can only be realized within the framework of the state-
pacified polity. It does not provide any right to the private individual to
apply physical violence to others or indeed to threaten them. An
additional immanent barrier is contained in the commandment alterum
non laedere (injure nobody).22' The freedom of conscience, like other
fundamental rights, provides a right to defend but not a right to actively
attack.
If individuals violate the constitutionally protected legal rights of
others, such as the right to life, health, freedom, or property, they trigger
the fundamental protection obligation of the state, which must guarantee
the integrity of the fundamental rights inter privatos. No person can
invoke the right to freedom of conscience in cases of interference with
the legal rights of others, for example in case of killing or assault, or in
cases of willful damage to property.22  Blocking road traffic, for
example, as an act of civil disobedience cannot be based upon the
freedom of conscience of those who created the blockade, regardless
how ethically pure their aim,223 because the blockade encroaches directly
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Alternatively expressed, "injure no one." An edict most recognized in the law of
torts. This is arguably the legal equivalent of the ancient medical principle of"do no harm."
222. COLLINGS, supra note 52, at 214-15.
223. For citation of numerous German works on the topic of civil disobedience, see
ZiPPELrUS, supra note 24, at 55 n.37. The "blockade cases" refer to Sitzblockade ("sit-ins") in
protest against military expansion of missile sites. Protesters eventually won their right to
blockade based on Article 103(2) of the Basic Law. GG art. 103 § 2 (Ger.) (a ban on
retroactivity). For more detail, see COLLINGS, supra note 52, at 214.
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upon others' basic freedom of movement and, incidentally, its negative
concomitant right to freedom of speech.224 Such an action is also
incompatible with the prohibition against violence.225 Indeed, in such a
case, the (Kantian) categorical imperative would be turned upside down;
in so doing, the maxim of one's own action is raised to the maxim of
general action and then imposed on the general public.
Here the ambition of a minority takes effect in there being a
conscience, in order to relieve themselves of the burden of having to
have a conscience, which is the only relevant constitutional point.2 26 The
result is that actions of civilian or militant disobedience, of nonviolent or
violent resistance, lie outside the thematic range of fundamental rights.227
In the context of state-generated normalcy, there is no room for actions
that violate the basic obligations of civility, the duty not to engage in
industrial action, or the duty to obey.228 They can only be justified, if at
all, by the right to resist, but this is only enlivened when the basic rules
of the normalcy guaranteed by the state are suspended.229 This appeal to
the basic right of freedom of conscience-apart from the right to
resistance-is neither necessary nor possible in the context of this
"exceptional" exception.230
Freedom of conscience as a basic right means only self-
determination.23' It does not encompass determination of the interests of
others.232 Thus, freedom of conscience does not provide any justification
for abortion, for example, because it is not a matter solely of the self-
determination of the pregnant woman but also, essentially, concerns the
right to life of the unborn child, which is independent of the protection of
the fundamental rights of the mother.
Nor does freedom of conscience provide access to the concerns of
the general public.233 Thus, a member of a statutory health insurance
fund, who considers the use of the contribution to finance "abortion on
medical insurance" as fundamentally unlawful, cannot derive from their
own basic right any claim to a general omission of the use of funds.
224. Id at215.
225. Id. at 214.
226. Id. at 215.
227. Joseph Isensee, Ein Grundrecht auf Ungehorsam? [A Right to Disobedience?], in




231. See COLLINGS, supra note 52, at 153.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 254.
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They cannot demand that "their firm belief is made the measure of the
validity of general legal norms or their application."234  Similarly, a
utilities consumer, whose conscience condemns particular types of power
stations (for example, nuclear), cannot refuse to pay their electricity bills
by invoking Article 4 of the Basic Law. By their own self-determination,
they could abstain from the consumption of nuclear power but not from
paying the charges incurred on consumption. They cannot, by virtue of
the freedom of conscience, prevent a definite form of energy production.
The freedom of conscience does not contain any authority to refuse to
surrender taxes. A taxpayer could not even make plausible the basic
legal relationship between the tax liability and the conscience of
"government spending," of which they disapprove, because the tax
liability is free of countermeasures and is not linked to a specific output.
The necessary (if not also sufficient) condition for an exemption from a
general legal duty to even be discussed is that the pretender claimant can
make the impairment of their conscience plausible.
D. Conflict Resolution through Partial Exemption
In the literature, a "system of tolerances and partial exemptions" has
been called for in order to resolve conflicts of conscience.235 An example
is the case of an evangelical Priest who, as a witness in court, and
appealing to his understanding of the Bible,236 refuses to swear the
prescribed witness oath, despite the fact that the oath in question does not
involve an obligatory, religiously formulated affirmation. The Federal
Constitutional Court sees the fundamental right of Article 4(1) of Basic
Law as a thematic infringement and interprets it as a refusal based on a
"valid legal reason," in its conformity with the relevant standard of the
procedural law.
237
The exemption from the statutory obligation to swear an oath in a
particular case does not imply the general validity of the obligation-based
standard. The state, in its enforcement of the guarantee of the
234. BVerfG 1974, BvF 1, 36 (Ger.); BVerfG 1974, 1 BvF 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6/74 (Ger.).
235. See Adolf Arndt, I Das Gewissen in der oberlandesgerichtlichen Rechtsprechung,
2204,2204-05 NJW (NEUE JURISTISCHEWOCHENSCHRIF) (1986).
236. Matthew 5:33-37 (Rev. Std. Version) (" 33'Again you have heard that it was said to the
men of old, "You shall not swear falsely, but shall perform to the Lord what you have sworn."
'But I say to you, Do not swear at all, either by heaven, for it is the throne of God, 35or by the
earth, for it is his footstool, or by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. 36And do not
swear by your head, for you cannot make one hair white or black. 37Let what you say be simply
"Yes" or "No"; anything more than this comes from evil . .
237. GG art. 4 § 1 (70) (Ger.).
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fundamental right, is merely proffering an exception "to resolve an
inevitable conflict between the state's commandment and the doctrine of
faith that affects the person concerned in his intellectual and moral
existence.,238 In order to satisfy the public interest in having functional
administration of justice-which the witness's oath is designed to
serve-there could be entered an equivalent duty, with the same penalties
for abuse, which does not contain any religious affiliation or
corresponding associations.239 The state would simply surrender to the
individual conflict of conscience without harming the state's ability to
administer justice.2" Thus runs the argument of the Federal
Constitutional Court.24'
However, the democratic constitutional state cannot measure very
legal obligation against the "burdensome alternative" in order to counter
possible conflicts with the freedom of conscience. This would involve
examination of the seriousness of the decision, the ability to preserve the
equality of burden imposed, and to prevent the appeal to conscience as a
pretext for the "shirker.2 42 For practical reasons, these limits have to be
imposed.243 Thus, the state need not develop a second-degree alternative
to the alternative obligation, with the result that the fundamental right
caused aprogressus in infinitum (infinite progression).24
It is only within a certain range of its obligations that the democratic
constitutional state can react flexibly to individual conflicts of
conscience, to offer up possibilities of compromise, to activate
administrative measures that protect basic rights-such as removing the
discretionary powers principle in administrative law and the laws
governing police-and to manipulate the means of dispensation in
individual cases.245
In the uncertain legal border zone, the state is well advised not to
ask so much what it must constitutionally guarantee for the sake of
freedom of conscience by way of dispensation, as what it can guarantee
238. See Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, VATICAN, http://www.
vatican.va/roman curia/pontifical councils/justpeace/documentsrcpcjustpeace doc_2006052
6_compendio-dott-socen.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
239. BVerfG 1972, 2 BvR 75/71 (23, 33) (Ger.).
240. Id. at 32. On the issue of freedom of belief, see also ISENSEE, supra note 164, at 7, 12
(on the issue of freedom of belief).
241. BVerfG,2BvR75/71 at 23, 33.
242. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood,
trans. & eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1781).
243. Id.
244. Infinite progression. A term used inter alia in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Id.
245. Bockenforde, supra note 111.
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without contradicting the constitution. The fundamental rights holder is
well advised not to become overly excited by the legal standpoint and,
where such a standpoint is indeed found, to be content with goodwill
where it is to be found.
However, the democratic state based on the rule of law cannot
withdraw its norms if rights of third parties or essential interests of the
public could potentially be harmed.246 It is only thus that the one acting
on the basis of his "conscience" is prevented from standing free of any
possible sanction.247
The Federal Constitutional Court derives from the freedom of
conscience-not in its function as a defensive right but rather as an
evaluative normative principle-a "commandment of good will" with
regard to those who claim to be acting on the basis of conscience.248
However, the same court holds the consequences of that
"commandment" to be in abeyance and dependent upon the
circumstances of the individual case, according-on the one hand-to
the importance to be placed upon the necessary right of the state to inflict
punishment in order to ensure the proper ordering of that state and the
authority of the settled law and--on the other hand-the strength of the
pressure of the conscience and the state of conflict that is thereby
created.249
The motive of conscience need not always result in a moderating
effect upon the assessment. It can be shown in individual cases that
the force of moral motivation derived from a perverted conscience-
such as in cases of terrorism--can increase the level of danger as well as
the degree of contradiction to the legal order when compared against
regular, self-interested criminality.
251
Generally, the democratic constitutional state must ensure that
citizens' readiness to adhere to the law and their trust in legal institutions
are not destroyed by an imprudent indulgence of or abusive appeals to
conscience.212  However, respect for this fundamental right lends




247. KANT, supra note 242.
248. Id.
249. Bdckenfbrde, supra note 111.
250. KANT, supra note 242.
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IX. RECONCILIATION OF FORMAL AND AUTHENTIC CONSCIENCES IN
EVERYDAY LIFE
The proposed ways out of the dilemma of law and conscience do
not provide a consistent and integrated solution, which could satisfy the
basic dogmatic constitutional as well as practical requirements.
Certainly, the community based on freedom of conscience is independent
of the moral high plains at which this freedom is realized. As a whole, it
is impossible to rule out undesirable constitutional developments. As put
by Ernest-Wolfgang Bockenforde, "[I]t is part of the structure of the
liberal state that it lives on prerequisites which it itself cannot guarantee
without questioning its own freedom."'254
This shows that the two interpretations of the conscience that Hegel
gives cannot stand inconsequentially alongside one another in the
constitutional state, as it may prima facie appear.255 It is true that the
basic right, as a defense law, is based on the formal conscience, as it stirs
within the individual.256 Yet the true common good is only established
when the conscience in everyday life is predominantly actualized
"correctly," in a societal ethos beneficial to the common good, or at least
compatible with it." 7
The formal conscience must in some way approach the authentic
one.
In this, however, there is no enforceable legal obligation but only a
meta-legal constitutional expectation.258 The state is denied jurisdiction
here. Nevertheless, it is not condemned to resignation.
Rather, the state has had to work outside the realm of command
(Befehi) and compulsion (Zwang) to work towards the citizens'
fulfillment of what can be constitutionally expected of them. Its means
are the academic education of the young, exemplary role models offered
by state officials, and the co-operation with the forces of society-at
least those not subjected to the neutrality and distance obligations of the
constitutional state-which a holistic ethos can mediate.25 9
Here, expectations are raised of the Church, whose very raison
d'etre is not the "freedom of belief' protected by the state, but faith itself,
254. Id.; ERNST WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE, DER STAAT ALS SITTLICHER STAAT [THE STATE
AS MORAL STATE] 36 (1978).
255. B6ckenforde, supra note 111.
256. KANT, supra note 242.
257. ISENSEE, supra note 164, at 7, 12.
258. In addition, see id. § 115, at 163, 233.
259. Bdckenforde, supra note 111.
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not "freedom of conscience," but the doctrine of the proper use of
conscience.
The Church would deprive the secular constitutional state of an
essential service if she were to expend herself out of respect for the
freedom of conscience; that is, if she were to remain static on the
standpoint of the formal conscience.
That which signifies the inner necessity of the constitutional state
would, for the Church, be a waste of its mission; what is a constitutional
virtue for the state is permissiveness for the Church.
The Church ought principally to align with the authentic
conscience, "authentic" not in the statist Hegelian sense, but in a
Christian sense, which is compatible with the meaning of the
constitutional state.
The role of the Church is to train and sharpen the conscience of the
individual in the truth of Christianity.26 ° In doing so, it is not necessarily
its intention to strengthen the functional requirements of the modem
legal state.26' Yet this effect can be the objective incidental-benefit of its
service to humankind.262 At this point, of course, the constitutionalist can
refer the mandate on the matter of conscience to the moral theologian.
X. FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS
Isensee's rich exegesis on conscience and law strikes a number of
targets, which few other analyses have attempted.2 63 In the first place, it
gives breathing room to state and non-state institutions in a way that
preserves the dignity of both.2 64  Second, it provides serious
counterweight to the Hegelian analysis, which labors under difficult
contradictions.65 Third, it highlights the problems inherent in separating
the concept of conscience from its religious roots.266 Finally, it indirectly
raises the extraordinary "B ckenf6rde dilemma" for constitutional
analysis.267 These matters deserve further exploration.
260. Id.
261. Id
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recently published Australian Government’s Religious 
Freedom Review,1 of December 2018, drew attention to a perceived 
“limited understanding in the general [Australian] community about 
the human right to religious freedom, its application, and how it 
interacts with other human rights.”2 This is particularly apparent in the 
understanding of, and legal implications surrounding, conscience 
protection.3 Countries other than Australia have wrestled with this 
problem over extended periods and under diverse circumstances.4 
Australia’s founding fathers borrowed heavily from the United 
States in drafting the Australian Constitution.5 The constitutions of 
other countries also have much to offer as Australia now considers how 
to protect freedom of conscience and religious practice in a globalized 
world.6 One such country is the Federal Republic of Germany. 
1. THE HON. PHILIP RUDDOCK (EXPERT PANEL CHAIR), RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REVIEW:
REPORT OF THE EXPERT PANEL (2018), https://www.pmc.gov.au/domestic-policy/religious-
freedom-review [https://perma.cc/627X-34KD] [hereinafter Ruddock Review]. 
2. Id. ¶ 1.410.
3. The meanings and history of “freedom of conscience” are much-disputed. For example,
Nehal Bhuta argues, “its contemporary meanings are an unstable mixture of values and 
preoccupations derived from distinct political problems—the management of sectarian strife and 
the constitution of sovereign power, the bourgeois revolt against the absolutist Polizeistaat, and 
finally, a postwar attempt to refound Western European political culture on a politics of human 
dignity. This unstable mixture is the foundation for the European Court’s circumstantial 
casuistry in the headscarf cases.” See Nehal Bhuta, Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the 
European Court of Human Rights, 113 SOUTH ATLANTIC QUARTERLY 9, 11 (2014). 
4. See, for example, the reports published by the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom and the materials available at the Pew Research Center 




5. This intellectual plundering was, as a rule, quite carefully done. In the words of Clifford 
L. Pannam, it was a “very discriminating” exercise; at other times, slavish or even “completely
senseless copying” was arguably the order of the day. Pannam, Travelling Section 116 with a
U.S. Roadmap, 4 MELB. U. L. REV. 41, 41 (1963).
6. For a brief history of conscientious objection at the constitutional level across many
countries, including Germany, see Hon. José de Sousa e Brito, Political Minorities and the Right 
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Germany is a leading candidate for comparison because it has a 
comprehensive and detailed constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
conscience inside a federal structure. In contrast, Australia has 
(effectively) no such guarantee and this absence is becoming starker 
under the glaring lamps of legal opinion and ensuing legislative 
activity.7 The lack of unity in Australian law has left academics 
scratching their heads and has left the Australian polity in an awkward 
situation of legal and conceptual disunity. This Article outlines further 
reasons for comparison based on the work already done in the realm of 
German-American comparison conducted by Edward Eberle. 
Thus, this Article explores recent cases regarding conscience and 
religious liberty in the German and Australian legal systems and offers 
commentary on the context of those cases and the possible implications 
for both countries. This Article also follows from this author’s prior 
discussion of the approach to conscience protection in Germany taken 
by leading constitutional scholar Josef Isensee, as discussed in his 
seminal article, “Conscience in Law: Does the General Law Only 
Apply in Accordance with the Individual Conscience?”8 In this and 
other work, Isensee highlights, inter alia, the difficulties associated 
with a legal definition of conscience in a secular context, the religious 
roots of the concept, the difficulties of ever-expanding protection, the 
to Tolerance: The Development of a Right to Conscientious Objection in Constitutional Law, 
BYU L. REV. 607, 611–16 (1999). (Brito was a Justice of the Constitutional Court of Portugal 
from 1989–2002. He perceptively notes, “conscientious objection represents the transformation 
of the principle of tolerance, previous to the constitutional state in a human right,” at 608). 
7. On August 29, 2019, Christian Porter, the Australian Attorney-General, released an
“exposure draft” Religious Discrimination Bill together with two associated Bills for 
consultation and discussion. While the Bill “would make it unlawful to discriminate on the basis 
of religious belief or activity in key areas of public life…[t]he Bill does not create a positive 
right to freedom of religion.” See Media Release, Thursday, August 29, 2019, Morrison 
Government delivers on religious reforms, available at 
https://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Media/Pages/morrison-government-delivers-on-religious-
reforms-29-august-2019.aspx [https://perma.cc/BPW4-CH7W]. This Bill contains 68 sections 
in nine parts and seeks to implement many of the recommendation of the Ruddock Report. A 
complete consideration of the Bill remains beyond the scope of this Article.  
8. Josef Isensee, Gewissen im Recht; Gilt das allgemeine Gesetz nur nach Maßgabe des
individuellen Gewissens? [Conscience in Law; Does the General Law Only Apply in Accordance 
with the Individual Conscience?], in DER STREIT UM DAS GEWISSEN [THE DISPUTE OVER 
CONSCIENCE] 41, 41 (Gerhard Höver ed., 1993), discussed in Patrick Quirk’s, The Undefined 
Remains Unprotected: Tensions between Conscience and the Law in Germany by Way of Joseph 
Isensee, 27 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 55, 92 (2018). 
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problem of quis iudicabit? [who decides?] and conflict resolution 
through partial exemptions.9 
The concept of conscience also has a critical role to play in the 
formation of a common culture (Leitkultur). Recent German 
constitutional cases appear in a variety of contemporary settings, such 
as those related to taking witness oaths,10 wearing religious clothing 
(Islamic headscarves),11 circumcision ceremonies,12 acts of ritual 
slaughter,13 displaying Christian crucifixes in classrooms,14 and refusal 
of blood transfusions based on religious beliefs.15 These significant 
cases have contributed to the legal framework inside which the broader 
debate over Leitkultur takes place.16 To some degree, German identity 
9. See where Isensee discusses “Konfliktlösung durch partielle Entpflichtung” (resolution
of conflict through partial exemptions). 
10. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 33 BVerfGE 26
(1972), 2 BvR 75/71 (23, 33) (Ger.) (deciding that the state should accommodate an evangelical 
pastor who refused to swear an oath in a Düsseldorf criminal case based on an interpretation of 
the Sermon on the Mount Matthew 5:33-37). The dissent of Justice Von Schlabrendorff is 
notable in the way it incorporates the notion of God into the Basic Law: “The preamble of our 
Basic Law states that the German people have chosen a new system in the awareness of their 
responsibility to God and mankind.” See DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: THIRD EDITION, 
REVISED AND EXPANDED 546 (2012) [hereinafter KOMMERS]. Before his elevation to the 
Federal Constitutional Court, Judge von Schlabrendorff was one of those tried before the Nazi 
People’s Court in 1945 for being part of the plot against Hitler. 
11. BVerfGE 2015, 1 BvR 471/10, 1 BvR 1181/10, ¶¶ 1-31 (Ger.) (“The protection
afforded by the freedom of faith and the freedom to profess a belief (Basic Law Article 4, §§1 
and 2) guarantees educational staff at interdenominational state schools the freedom to cover 
their head in compliance with a rule perceived as imperative for religious reasons. This can be 
the case for an Islamic headscarf”); see Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, The German Headscarf 
Debate, 2 BYU L. REV. 665, 66 (2004). 
12. See Marianne Heimbach-Steins (European Univ. Inst., Robert Schuman Ctr. for
Advanced Studies [hereinafter RACAS]), Religious Freedom and the German Circumcision 
Debate 1, 1-16, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2013/18 addressing a court decision in 2012, which 
held that the circumcision of boys amounted to grievous bodily harm; following wide discussion 
in Germany, including amongst the Muslim and Jewish groups, the relevant law was updated to 
afford the practice protection on religious grounds. 
13. BVerfGE 2002, 1 BvR 1783/99, ¶¶ 1-61 (holding ritual slaughter to be an exception
under the Basic Law, Article 4). 
14. BVerfGE 1987, 11 BvR 1087/91 (holding, “The affixation of a cross or crucifix in the 
classrooms of a State compulsory school that is not a denominational school infringes art; 4(1) 
Basic Law”). 
15. BVerfGE 1971, 1 BvR 387/65 (deciding that under Article 4 of the Basic Law, blood
transfusions may be refused based on religious belief). 
16. For an overview of the German case law until 2004, see Edward J. Eberle, Free
Exercise of Religion in Germany and the United States, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (2004). For 
a remarkable overview in English—running to 178 pages—of legal provisions affecting religion 
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is arguably played out inside these formative legal frameworks.17 This 
article suggests that a comparative reflection of these issues could 
helpfully inform constitutional debate in Australia and, to some degree, 
Germany at both federal and state levels. 
This Article does not consider all of the available ‘conscience 
cases,’ but focuses on the German constitutional cases dealing with 
headscarves and classroom crucifixes, and two very recent Australian 
cases concerning religious headwear in Australian courtrooms. In 
broad terms, it considers elements of comparative law, constitutional 
law, with the occasional foray into the realm of public reason. Part I 
sets out the case for German-Australian comparison. Part II introduces 
the problem of defining conscience in a legal context and prepares the 
way for a discussion of the law of conscience protection in Germany 
and Australia in two key areas: crucifixes and religious clothing.18 Part 
III outlines the German constitutional guarantee while Part IV looks at 
the pivotal German crucifix and headscarf cases decided by the Federal 
Constitutional Court. Part V will allow for some comparative 
observations while discussing in detail several recent Australian court 
cases and trends in religious conscience protection which these cases 
have presented. In due course, this Article will draw conclusions about 
what each country might learn from the other while highlighting what 
the Commonwealth of Australia might learn from the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
in Germany, see Gerhard Robbers et al., German Legal Provisions Related to Religion in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, UNIVERSITY OF TRIER (Aug. 2002), https://www.uni-
trier.de/fileadmin/fb5/inst/IEVR/Arbeitsmaterialien/Staatskirchenrecht/Deutschland/Religions
normen/German_Legal_Provisions/German_Legal_Provisions_Relating_to_Religion_March_
2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TMS-EHXY]. This study runs a wide range of possible legislative 
norms including those at Federal and State levels, laws on education, assembly, media, 
monuments, burial codes, funding, labor law, data protection, Church-State treaties, and much 
more; see, e.g., herein is found an English translation of the Treaty between the Holy See and 
the Free State of Thuringia (Staatsvertrag zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhl und dem Freistaat 
Thüringen), LAW AND ORDINANCE GAZETTE OF THURINGIA [GVBl] June 11, 1997 at 266 
(Eng.). This Treaty is also available on the Vatican website (Ger.), 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/1997/documents/rc_seg-st_19970611_s-
sede-turingia_ge.html [https://perma.cc/EWN4-ZJ3B] (last visited Apr. 27, 2019). 
17. Culture War Over German Identity: Religious Symbols Take Center Stage, SPIEGEL ONLINE
(May 3, 2018), https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/religious-symbols-at-heart-of-
german-search-for-identity-a-1205572.html [https://perma.cc/64M3-ARXT].
18. Other areas of conflict in the realm of religious freedom and “conscientious objection”
such as cooperation in abortion, euthanasia or any number of other morally charged scenarios 
lie beyond the scope of this article. 
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II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR GERMAN-AUSTRALIAN
COMPARISON 
Edward J. Eberle persuasively argues the benefits of comparing 
the US and German jurisprudence on religion and religious freedom.19 
His arguments, it is submitted, are equally coherent in comparing 
Australia with Germany, at least over the past several decades.20 He 
notes significant developments in the law in recent years, especially in 
the United States, under the guidance of US Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist.21 The brisk pace of these developments has not been 
matched in Australia. The unhurried, or even dawdling development of 
religious freedom laws in Australia supports an inquiry into the reasons 
for the lack of improvement.22 In addition, the few recent but 
significant Australian court cases that have been handed down bear 
serious consideration, including one concerning the issue of religious 
freedom in a corporate context.23 Other comparative studies also merit 
discussion but will not be the focus of this article.24 
Eberle asserts that “German law accords wider scope to individual 
free exercise freedoms than American law.”25 This greater latitude is 
19. Eberle, supra note 16, at 1023.
20. While going back further might allow an opportunity for consideration of larger forces 
at work (e.g., the rise of National Socialism or the fall of the Weimar Republic), doing so is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
21. Eberle, supra note 16, at 1025 (referring generally to the change of emphasis from that 
under Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) to that of Emp’t Division, Department of Human 
Resources. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). 
22. See Denise Meyerson, The Protection of Religious Rights under Australian Law, BYU 
L. REV. 529, 552 (2009) (concluding that there are “significant gaps in the de iure protection 
afforded religion. Legal protection for religious rights in Australia is not only limited but also
affected by arbitrary factors such as where a person lives and whether the religious group to
which he/she belongs can be categorized as an ‘ethnic’ group”).
23. Christian Youth Camps Ltd v. Cobaw Community Health Services Ltd (“Cobaw”) 
(2014) 308 ALR 615, 617 (Court of Appeal) (Austl.) (Victorian Court of Appeal holding, inter 
alia, that a corporation could not claim “personhood” for the purposes of a religious exemption). 
For commentary, see generally Shawn Rajanayagam & Carolyn M., Evans, Corporations and 
Freedom of Religion: Australia and the United States Compared, 37 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW 329 
(2015) (arguing that corporations should not possess a right to religious freedom). This is such 
a large area for discussion that it must be left for another day. 
24. See Iain T. Benson, Religious Liberty in Australia: Some Suggestions and Proposals
for Reframing Traditional Categorisations, 139 ZADOK PERSPECTIVES 10, 17 (2018) (an 
evaluative review of religious freedom laws in Australia, Canada, and South Africa). See 
generally STEPHEN V. MANSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM: 
CHURCH AND STATE IN SIX DEMOCRACIES (2017) [hereafter Mansma & Soper]. 
25. EBERLE, supra note 16, at 1026.
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arguably also the case in any Australia-Germany comparison, 
especially since the so-called ‘religion clause’ in the Australian 
Constitution (section 116) has been narrowly construed by the courts, 
despite its similarity with parts of the US First Amendment.26 Further, 
Eberle views Germany as “a highly developed, industrial, democratic 
society committed to constitutional government and situated within the 
Western cultural tradition.”27 So too may Australia easily lay claim to 
such a description and even assert democratic traditions that antedate 
those of the Weimar Republic.28 Eberle argues, “German freedoms are 
roughly comparable to American freedoms as a matter of text, 
historical understanding, and constitutional design.”29 This claim is 
also worth exploring at various levels of a German-Australian 
comparison, despite the constitutional and historical divergences 
apparent between Australia and Germany.30 
Beyond Eberle’s comparative model, other cogent reasons for 
embarking on a comparison between Germany and Australia exist, 
including the multicultural social environment of both countries, their 
recent, sometimes fraught, immigration histories,31 their activities in 
26. See generally CAROLINE MAREE EVANS, LEGAL PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM IN AUSTRALIA 71 (1st ed. 2012) (on the limited scope of Section 116 of the Australian 
Constitution). For a discussion of section 116 in the context of a proposed Australian Bill of 
Rights, see Paul Babie & Neville Rochow, Feels Like Déjà Vu: An Australian Bill of Rights and 
Religious Freedom, 2010 BYU L. REV. 821, 825 (2010).  
27. Eberle, supra note 16, at 1026.
28. Germany was declared a federal republic at the beginning of the German Revolution
in November 1918. On August 11, 1919, President Friedrich Ebert signed the democratic 
Weimar Constitution. 
29. Eberle, supra note 16, at 1027.
30. Despite a justifiable bias in favor of highlighting the Anglo-centric origins of the
Australian Constitution, German and Swiss ideas, mediated through the work of Johann Caspar 
Bluntschli (1808–1881) and Georg Jellinek (1851–1911), also played a significant role. see 
Nicholas Aroney, The Influence of German State-Theory on the Design of the Australian 
Constitution, 59 (3) INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 669, 669–99 (2010) (drawing attention to a critical but 
neglected story about the dissemination of German and Swiss state-theories among English-
speaking scholars in the second half of the 19th century and the influence of these ideas on those 
who designed and drafted the Australian constitution). 
31. The immigration debate in both countries has been long and sometimes painful. The
German Basic Law is rare amongst world constitutions in that it provides a constitutional right 
to asylum (Article 16a). In 2015, German Minister of State Maria Böhmer stated, “Germany is 
new to acknowledge that it is an immigrant country. . . Australia has a lot of experience in this 
area [of diversity].” See Latika Bourke, Germany Is Looking to Australia’s Success as an 
Immigration Nation, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Dec. 10, 2015) 
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/germany-is-looking-to-australias-success-as-an-
immigration-nation-20151210-gljuhu.html [https://perma.cc/KEZ8-NWBU]. 
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defending religious freedom at the international level, and their 
complex church-state relations in such areas as school funding and 
general welfare provision. 32 One may also consider that even though 
Germany, like England, is perhaps (at least historically) more familiar 
with the idea of a confessional state, Australia shares enough English 
legal history to be considered a distant but legal part of that tradition.33 
Finally, looking into the future, the classical problems of 
conscience, such as those arising in the military and medical contexts, 
are also now being aggravated and even overtaken by advances in 
technology with implications that regularly extend beyond national 
borders. 34 Recent examples of this lie in the questions raised by “moral 
machines,”35 autonomous cars,36 and a remarkable “digital case study,” 
32. For a discussion of Church-State relations and in the areas of welfare and education in 
Australia and Germany in particular, see chapters 5 (Australia) and 7 (Germany) see generally 
MANSMA AND SOPER, supra note 24. 
33. Soper would disagree, assigning Australia to the category of “pragmatic pluralist”
(along with The Netherlands, a “principled pluralist” country); see MANSMA & SOPER, supra 
note 24, at 85ff. Germany and England are each assigned a category closer to that of the 
confessionalized state. 
34. For example, consider the “actions” of autonomous weapons systems across national
borders and the extent to which their activities may be sheeted home to human actors. See 
Duncan B. Hollis, Setting the Stage: Autonomous Legal Reasoning in International 
Humanitarian Law, 30 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 15 (2016) (setting the stage for a symposium 
on the issues surrounding autonomous weapons systems in the context of Saint Thomas 
Aquinas' classic analysis of human acts). In the medico-military context see generally 
Christopher E. Sawin, Creating Super Soldiers for Warfare: A Look into the Laws of War, 17 J. 
HIGH TECH. L. 105 (2016) (arguing that the use of technology to create superior soldiers is not 
currently prohibited under humanitarian laws of war). This raises the question as to whether 
super-soldiers, bred for battle and with genetic or drug-induced limitations on their power to 
empathize, are even human and thus capable of conscientious objection. Other areas of concern 
for conscience in the non-military medical context could include extreme cosmetic surgery, or 
other forms of advanced but unnecessary treatment. 
35. See Mass. Inst. of Tech. (MIT), About Moral Machine, MORAL MACHINE,
http://moralmachine.mit.edu/ [https://perma.cc/T9GQ-8FVG] (last visited Apr. 27, 2019). 
About machine intelligence overtaking human decision making, Iyad Rahwan, Edmond Awad, 
& Sohan Dsouza stated, “[f]rom self-driving cars on public roads to self-piloting reusable 
rockets landing on self-sailing ships, machine intelligence is supporting or entirely taking over 
ever more complex human activities at an ever-increasing pace. The greater autonomy given 
machine intelligence in these roles can result in situations where they have to make autonomous 
choices involving human life and limb. This calls for not just a clearer understanding of how 
humans make such choices, but also a clearer understanding of how humans perceive machine 
intelligence making such choices”). See Ethics of Autonomous Vehicles, WINBROOK, 
http://www.rri-tools.eu:8080/-/moral-machine [https://perma.cc/8HGX-ZT8A]. 
36. Can Autonomous Cars Have a Moral Conscience? Views from DW’s science desk, DW
(Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/can-autonomous-cars-have-a-moral-conscience-
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in which Google engineers claimed conscientious objection against 
participation in software manufacture designed to improve 
international military drone targeting.37 Although these topics are 
beyond the scope of this Article, they demonstrate that the defense of 
conscience, and the associated freedom of religion will remain firmly 
on the social and legal agendas for the foreseeable future. 
III. DEFINING ‘CONSCIENCE’ FOR LEGAL PURPOSES 
Definitions of the notion of conscience usually belong in the 
realms of theology and moral philosophy. Both areas typically draw 
deeply on religious origins, but now also find some forms of secular 
definition. 38 An example of the former is to be discovered in the work 
of John Henry Newman, who speaks of conscience as the voice of 
                                                 
views-from-dws-science-desk/a-46056690 [https://perma.cc/CP5K-LXDU] (last visited Apr. 
26, 2019). 
37. Shane Scott & Wakabayashi Daisuke, ‘The Business of War’: Google Employees 
Protest Work for the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html 
[https://perma.cc/6J83-TT5M] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019) (“Thousands of Google employees, 
including dozens of senior engineers, have signed a letter protesting the company’s involvement 
in a Pentagon program that uses artificial intelligence to interpret video imagery and could be 
used to improve the targeting of drone strikes”). Google reportedly disengaged from this work 
at a later date. See Shane Scott & Wakabayashi Daisuke, Google Will Not Renew Pentagon 
Contract that Upset Employees, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/technology/google-pentagon-project-maven.html 
[https://perma.cc/UB63-4GL7] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019). Google later produced a set of AI 
objectives precluding its use in weapons and human rights violations; see Devin Coldeway, 
Google’s New ‘AI Principles’ Forbid Its Use in Weapons and Human Rights Violations, 
TECHCRUNCH (June 7, 2018) http://social.techcrunch.com/2018/06/07/googles-new-ai-
principles-forbid-its-use-in-weapons-and-human-rights-violations/ [https://perma.cc/3HMY-
8SFX] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019). For Al’s seven objectives, see Sundar Puchai, Al at Google: 
Our Principles, GOOGLE (June 7, 2018), https://www.blog.google/technology/ai/ai-principles/ 
[https://perma.cc/M58Y-STH9] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019). 
38. See JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF 
CONSCIENCE 13 (Jane Marie Todd, trans., 2011) (“Core beliefs and commitments, which we will 
also call ‘convictions of conscience,’ include both deeply held religious and secular beliefs and 
are distinguished from the legitimate but less fundamental ‘preferences’ we display as 
individuals”) [hereafter MACLURE & TAYLOR]. This is an English translation of DOMINIQUE 
LEYDET, LAÏCITÉ ET LIBERTÉ DE CONSCIENCE LES ÉDITIONS DU BORÉAL (2010). For a critical 
review of Maclure and Taylor, see generally Jude P. Dougherty et al., Secularism and Freedom 
of Conscience, 65 REV. OF METAPHYS. 434 (2011). For a review of SORABJI, see Margaret 
Atkins, MORAL CONSCIENCE THROUGH THE AGES by Richard Sorabji, NEW BLACKFRIARS 
736-38 (Oct. 5, 2016), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/nbfr.3_12239 
[https://perma.cc/JT64-G58D]. 
172 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:1 
God.39 The more secular manifestation may be found, for example, in 
the work of Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, where conscience is 
discussed not only on a religious basis but also in the context of deeply 
held secular convictions.40 However, conscience, as defined by 
theologians or philosophers, is not something necessarily (or easily) 
translatable into a legal definition interpretable by citizens and, 
ultimately, by the courts.41 Isensee has labeled this the ultimate legal 
problem of defining conscience (the “definitions problem”);42 this is a 
problem that cannot be avoided by courts or lawyers when the word is 
used in a piece of legislation, or, indeed, in an elemental document like 
a national constitution. The Federal Republic of Germany exemplifies 
just such a case because the foundational document of the Rechtstaat,43 
the German Basic Law (Constitution), uses the word ‘conscience’ five 
times in three different Articles.44 The term must, then, be given a 
meaning that is legally stable and able to be used over time, in cases 
that concern different and diverse facts (Tatbestände). Once 
established, such a definition must also be applied in order to decide 
cases between parties with mixed and often contrary interests. We now 
turn to explore more precisely what the Basic Law guarantees its 
citizens in this area. 
                                                 
39. John Henry Newman asserts, “conscience is the voice of God, whereas it is fashionable 
on all hands now to consider it in one way or another a creation of man”; see Letter from John 
Henry Newman to the Duke of Norfolk, in THE GENIUS OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN: SELECTIONS 
FROM HIS WRITINGS 262-263 (Ian T. Ker ed., 1989). 
40. See generally MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 38. 
41. The discussion surrounding what lawyers and judges actually do when they interpret 
words and the rules that contain them is an interesting one; see generally DAVID MIERS & 
WILLIAM TWINING, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH RULES: A PRIMER OF INTERPRETATION (5th ed. 
2010). This discussion sometimes lapses into a “rivalry of emphasis” between interpretive 
approaches to statute law and common law case law; see Janet S. Lindgren & John Henry 
Schlegel, Review: Thinking about Statutes: Hurst, Calabresi, Twining and Miers, 9 AM. BAR 
FOUND. J. 458, 458-68 (1984). 
42. Isensee, supra note 8, at 46. 
43. In German, this Rechtsstaat is sometimes contrasted with the Polizeistaat (police 
state). For a recent book-length treatment of the concept of the Rechsstaat, see generally 
STEPHAN KRISTE, THE LEGAL DOCTRINES OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LEGAL STATE 
(RECHTSSTAAT) (James R. Silkenat et al. eds., 2014). 
44. See GRUNDGESETZ (GG) [BASIC LAW] and in particular, art. 4 (Freedom of Faith, 
Conscience, and Creed); art. 12a (Compulsory Military or Alternative Service); and art. 38 
(Elections: Elected Members of the Bundestag are to be “representatives of the whole people, 
not bound by orders or instructions, and responsible only to their conscience”); translation 
available at https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/chancellor/basic-law-470510 
[https://perma.cc/A53C-K7PG]. 
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IV. THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE
Freedom of conscience is guaranteed in broad terms by Article 4 
[Freedom of Faith, Conscience, and Creed] of the German Basic Law: 
(1) Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom to profess a
religious or philosophical creed, shall be inviolable.
(2) The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed.
(3) No person shall be compelled against his conscience to render
military service involving the use of arms. Details shall be
regulated by a federal law.45
The guarantees in sections (1) and (2) are notably free from 
qualification or limitation while, due to associated “federal 
regulations,” section (3) is not. Collectively, these serious and 
comprehensive guarantees were forged in the aftermath of World War 
II, as well as in the rooms of the Royal Palace of Herrenchiemsee in 
August of 1948.46 Intended at the time as a merely transitional 
document, the Basic Law was broadly interpreted by the newly-formed 
Federal Constitutional Court during the 1950s as a bulwark of 
fundamental rights. Cases like Elfes47 and Lüth48 and their progeny 
made the Court, and by implication the Constitution, “a moral success 
story to match the economic miracle.”49 The document has shown 
remarkable endurance despite some democratic alterations and updates 
along the way.50 
45. Id. art. 4.
46. On the processes and outcomes of drafting three German Constitutions, including the
successful Basic Law of 1949, see Inga Markovitz, Constitution Making after National 
Catastrophes: Germany in 1949 and 1990, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1307, 1307-46 (2007). 
47. BVerfGE 3, 58. “In Elfes, the Court developed the famous concept of a ‘general’ 
fundamental right, which can be invoked against any act of public authority to vindicate 
freedoms not explicitly guaranteed by the constitutional text.” Florian Meinel, The 
Constitutional Miracle on the Rhine: Towards a History of West German Constitutionalism and 
the Federal Constitutional Court, 14 INT’L J. CONST. LAW 261, 284 (2016). 
48. BVerfGE 7, 198 (extending constitutional oversight even into the area of private law); 
Meinel, supra note 47, at 284. 
49. JUSTIN COLLINGS, DEMOCRACY’S GUARDIANS: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 1951–2001 61 (2015); Meinel, supra note 47, at 261. For a 
discussion in English of the theories of fundamental rights under the German Basic Law, see 
generally KOMMERS, supra note 10. For a less glowing assessment of German moral and 
economic success, see Paul Hockenos, Germany has an Arrogance Problem, FOREIGN POLICY 
(MAY 6, 2019) https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/27/germany-is-getting-too-arrogant-merkel 
[https://perma.cc/M2BZ-2YCP]. 
50. The Basic Law has been updated sixty-two times since 1949.
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The guarantee in Article 4 must be seen in the light of other 
provisions of the Basic Law, which deal with relations between church 
and state more generally. These include Article 140, which sweeps up 
five articles of the Weimar Constitution,51 including a particularly 
German form of the non-establishment clause,52 and incorporates them 
into the Basic Law. These five articles (sixteen paragraphs in total) deal 
generally with religion and religious associations, including such 
matters of “status, powers, and duties of religious associations.”53 
There are also important far-reaching economic ties between churches 
and the German state in the form of the Kirchensteuer (the church tax, 
authorized under the above provisions of the Weimar Constitution),54 
indexed endowment payments (compensation for historical 
confiscations of Church property),55 and other welfare provisions.56 
Other provisions scattered throughout the Basic Law also protect 
religious belief (and thereby conscience) more indirectly. These appear 
                                                 
51. Arts. 136-40. 
52. Article 137(1) provides, somewhat bluntly, “There shall be no state church.” As 
Kommers notes, this is quite different from the US version of non-establishment. “Rather than 
the “separationist approach taken in the United States, Germany’s system may be described as 
cooperative, anticipating a limited partnership between church and state.” KOMMERS, supra note 
10, at 539. As discussed below, when compared to the United States, the situation in Germany 
is far more similar to that of Australia. 
53. KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 538. 
54. Specifically, article 137(6), which provides “Religious societies that are corporations 
under public law shall be entitled to levy taxes on the basis of the civil taxation lists in 
accordance with Land (State) law.” THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN REICH, Aug. 11, 1919, 
art. 137(6). 
55. The 100th anniversary of the decision to cease such payments occurred in 2019. To 
date, these payments continue since—it has been alleged—it would cost the government far too 
much to retire them. Not all states are affected (e.g., Bremen and Hamburg). The Religion News 
Service reports, “[o]fficially, the historical payments known as “endowments,” fork out taxpayer 
funds to compensate the churches for valuable farmlands and buildings that secular rulers have 
taken from them over the centuries. Some were seized by the French after Napoleon annexed 
lands up to the western banks of the Rhine River two centuries ago; other confiscations go back 
to the Reformation.” Tom Heneghan, Germany Continues Payments to Churches a Century after 





56. For example, Caritas, an organization of the Catholic Bishops Conference of Germany, 
has more than half a million staff working in Germany and about half a million volunteers. The 
international department of Caritas Germany is working with a staff of about 100. See Germany, 
https://www.caritas.org/where-caritas-work-europe/germany/ [https://perma.cc/5ND9-RWQ2] 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2019). 
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in provisions on equality,57 suitability for public office,58 freedom from 
compelled religious exercise or disclosure,59 including oath-taking and 
use of an affirmation by citizens or the President taking office.60 Even 
less direct, but significant, protection is found in rights of parents to 
decide whether children receive religious instruction in state schools.61 
It should also be noted that the European Convention of Human Rights 
offers a more qualified guarantee of some of these rights.62 
V. CRUCIFIXES, CLOTHING, AND GERMAN CONSCIENCE
CASES 
A. The German Crucifix Cases
The display of crosses or crucifixes has been the subject of 
litigation in European courts at different times over the last few 
57. “No person shall be favoured or disfavoured because of sex, parentage, race, language, 
homeland and origin, faith or religious or political opinions. No person shall be disfavoured 
because of disability.” BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, May 23, 1949, 
art. 3(3). 
58. “Neither the enjoyment of civil and political rights nor eligibility for public office nor
rights acquired in the public service shall be dependent upon religious affiliation. No one may 
be disadvantaged by reason of adherence or non-adherence to a particular religious 
denomination or philosophical creed.” BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 
May 23, 1949, art 33(3). 
59. “No person shall be required to disclose his religious convictions. The authorities shall 
have the right to inquire into a person’s membership of a religious society only to the extent that 
rights or duties depend upon it or that a statistical survey mandated by a law so requires.” THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN REICH, Aug. 11, 1919, art 136(3) (incorporated by article 140 
of the Basic Law). 
60. Article 136(4) of the Weimer Constitution provides “No person may be compelled to
perform any religious act or ceremony, to participate in religious exercises or to take a religious 
form of oath.” After providing the form of the Oath of Office, the final sentence of Article 56 
provides: “The oath may also be taken without religious affirmation.” THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE GERMAN REICH, Aug. 11, 1919, art 136(4). See generally KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 538. 
61. “(1) The entire school system shall be under the supervision of the state. (2) Parents
and guardians shall have the right to decide whether children shall receive religious instruction. 
(3) Religious instruction shall form part of the regular curriculum in state schools, with the
exception of non-denominational schools. Without prejudice to the state’s right of supervision,
religious instruction shall be given in accordance with the tenets of the religious community
concerned. Teachers may not be obliged against their will to give religious instruction.” BASIC
LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, May 23, 1949, art. 7(1)-(3).
62. A. H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 144-47 (Manchester Uni. Press ed.,
Oceana Publications, 1963) (1964). 
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decades, most notably in Germany and Italy.63 The topic continues to 
generate controversy as evidenced by a 2018 Bavarian mandate to affix 
crucifixes in the entrances of public buildings.64 
In Germany, two major constitutional cases are essential to 
consider. First, in the 1973 Courtroom Crucifix Case,65 the question 
was whether a Düsseldorf Administrative Court may display a crucifix 
over the objections of a Jewish litigant.66 The result, on appeal to the 
Federal Constitutional Court, saw the crucifix taken down, but without 
a general prohibition on their placement in a courtroom.67 In doing so, 
the Court was careful to reiterate the principle of state neutrality.68 
In the second case, the Classroom Crucifix Case II (1995)69 the 
Federal Constitutional Court held that a Bavarian law requiring 
crucifixes be placed on the wall of state classrooms was a violation of 
the German Federal Constitution (Basic Law).70 This case, and its 
preceding litigation created a firestorm of public protest and 
                                                 
63. Aside from Germany, the Italian case of Lautsi v. Italy (2011) holding that an Italian 
law mandating the display of crucifixes in classrooms does not violate the European Convention 
on Human Rights. See generally Grégor Puppinck, The Case of Lautsi v. Italy: A Synthesis, 3 
BYU L. REV. 873 (2012). 
64. Guy Chazan, Bavaria Imposes Law on Displaying Cross in State Buildings, Financial 
Times (June 1, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/1e2bec76-6572-11e8-a39d-4df188287fff 
[https://perma.cc/NP6K-4LBT] (last visited Mar. 25, 2019). 
65. 35 BVerfGE [Federal Constitutional Court] 366 (1973). 
66. The court held that such a display was lawful and “the mere presence of a crucifix in 
a courtroom does not demand any identification with the ideas and institutions symbolically 
embodies therein or compel any specific behavior in accordance thereof.” Id. KOMMERS, supra 
note 10, at 545. 
67. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Private Religious Choice in German and American 
Constitutional Law: Government Funding and Government Religious Speech, 31 V AND J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1127, 1129 (1998). See also KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 545. 
68. 35 BVerfGE [Federal Constitutional Court] 366, 375 (1973). 
69. See KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 577-83. Note that the preceding case from 1991, 
known as Classroom Crucifix I Case, the Federal Constitutional Court considered—and 
rejected—a request for an injunction to take down the crucifix. See 85 BVerfGE 94 (1991). 
BVerfGE 93, 11 BVR 1087/91 Kruzifix-decision (“Classroom Crucifix Case”) (Ger.), May 12, 
1987, translated in https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-
translations/german/case.php?id=615#top [https://perma.cc/H78Y-XJNH]. Classroom Crucifix 
II went beyond the procedural issues associated with an injunction and dealt with the substantive 
arguments. 
70. BVerfGE 1987, 11 BvR 1087/91 (Ger.), May 12, 1987, translated in 
https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=615#top 
[https://perma.cc/H78Y-XJNH] (holding that “the affixation of a cross or crucifix in the 
classrooms of a State compulsory school that is not a denominational school infringes art. 4(1) 
of the Basic Law”). 
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discussion.71 Bavaria’s pragmatic response was to draft a new law (in 
1995), which was later confirmed as constitutional in Bavaria and 
Berlin in 1997.72 As summarized by Ingrid Brunk Weurth: 
The new [1995] law draws substantially from a report 
commissioned by the state of Bavaria and written by Peter Badura, 
former president of the Federal Constitutional Court. Like the old 
law, the new one provides for crosses in Bavarian classrooms. 
Under the new law, however, if parents object to the cross based 
on honest and “visible” or expressible principles of their faith or 
world view, then the school must seek a compromise. If it finds no 
compromise, then the school must create a rule for each individual 
case that respects the freedom of the complainant and the religious 
views of everyone in the class. In that decision the school must 
consider, to the greatest degree possible, the desires of the 
majority. The new law, according to Badura, stays within the 
“Spielraum” or “room for play” afforded to the states by the Basic 
Law and Constitutional Court’s 1995 decision (citations 
omitted).73 
The cultural impacts and debates were significant across Germany but 
more so in the south than in the north.74 Citizens of the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) were perhaps less interested in such 
disputes.75 Some commentators have criticized the final decision as one 
that generated more conflict than it resolved and that might lead to a 
legitimate “questioning of the constitutionalists monopoly of virtue.”76 
The nature of the alleged affront to the conscience of the litigant 
in the Courtroom Crucifix Case and to the child and parents in the 
Classroom Crucifix case(s) bears some discussion in the context of 
conscience protection in schools. Here, noticeable differences exist 
between the majority and dissenting judgments. After a discussion of 
the principle of tolerance, the minority decided that no unacceptable 
                                                 
71. Stephen Kinzer, Crucifix Ruling Angers Bavarians, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 1995), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/23/world/crucifix-ruling-angers-bavarians.html 
[https://perma.cc/FB6E-8A64].  
72. Inke Muehlhoff, Freedom of Religion in Public Schools in Germany and in the United 
States, 28 GA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 405, 491 (1999). See James Arthur, Learning under the 
Cross: Legal Challenges to ‘Cultural-Religious Symbolism’ in Public Schools, 20 EDUCATION 
& THE LAW 337, 341 (2008).  
73. Wuerth, supra note 67. 
74. See Peter C. Caldwell, The Crucifix and German Constitutional Culture, 11 CULT. 
ANTHROPOL. 259, 272 (1996). 
75. Id. 
76. Howard Cagill & Alan Scott, The Basic Law versus the Basic Norm? The Case of the 
Bavarian Crucifix Order, 44 POL. STUD. 413, 506-16 (1996).   
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burden was imposed on the conscience of students exposed to the 
classroom crucifix, nor by implication to their parents. They noted: 
In view of the cross’s symbolic character, non-Christian pupils and 
their parents are obligated to accept its presence in the classroom. 
The principal of tolerance requires as much, and the display of the 
cross does not constitute an unacceptable burden on the religious 
conscience of non-Christian pupils. 
The psychological effect that exposure to the cross has on non-
Christian pupils is relatively mild. The mental burden here is 
minimal, for pupils are not required to behave in a given way or to 
participate in religious practices before the cross. In contrast to 
compulsory school prayer, pupils are not forced to reveal the 
ideological or religious convictions through nonparticipation. This 
precludes any discrimination against them.77 
Terms such as “psychological effect” (upon students) or “mental 
burden” due to exposure to religious symbols are, the court appears to 
argue, a lesser form of interference with conscience than a requirement 
forcing one to act, behave, or participate in a religious ceremony or 
activity (e.g., prayer). This is in keeping with the earlier decision 
affirming positive religious freedom in cases concerning school prayer 
decided in 1979.78 
The majority dealt with the issue quite differently, finding that 
such a burden did exist and that the crucifix could not be left on the 
wall, but must be removed as constitutionally inappropriate. The court 
made a number of points in reaching this conclusion, the following of 
which touch directly or indirectly upon the question of the burdens of 
conscience: 
• In a society that tolerates a wide variety of faith commitments, 
the individual clearly has no right to be spared exposure to 
                                                 
77. KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 583. 
78. Id. at 567-71; Wuerth summarizes: “Rejecting the lower court’s conclusion that the 
prayers were coercive, the court reasoned that the right to not reveal one’s religious convictions 
did not take precedence over the rights of others to practice their religious beliefs. Moreover, the 
court pointed out, the Basic Law itself created situations, particularly the refusal to bear arms, 
in which those who seek exemptions must similarly reveal something of their religious 
convictions. The court went on to note that in exceptional cases particularly sensitive students 
in unsympathetic schools might mean that the school must forego the prayers, but this did not 
justify the lower court’s conclusion that any and all such prayers were unconstitutional. The 
court made clear that the positive freedoms involved did not compel schools to institute prayers.” 
Wuerth supra note 10, at 1180-81. 
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quaint religious manifestation, sectarian activities, or religious 
symbols.79 
• Given the context of compulsory education, the presence of
crosses in classrooms amounts to state-enforced “learning
under the cross,” with no possibility to avoid seeing the symbol.
This constitutes the critical difference between the display of
the cross in a classroom and the religious symbols people
frequently encounter in their daily lives.80
• The cross, now as before, represents a specific tenet of
Christianity; it constitutes its most significant faith symbol. It
symbolizes human redemption from original sin through
Christ’s sacrifice just as it represents Christ’s victory over
Satan and death and his power over the world. Accordingly, the
cross symbolizes both suffering and triumph . . . to this day, the
presence of a cross in a home or room is understood as an
expression of the dweller’s Christian faith.81
• On the other hand, because of the significance Christianity
attributes to the cross, non-Christians and atheists perceive it to
be the symbolic expression of certain faith convictions and a
symbol of missionary zeal. To see the cross as nothing more
than a cultural artifact of the Western tradition without any
particular religious meaning would amount to a profanation
contrary to the self-understanding of Christians and the
Christian church.82
• Coercion is to be reduced to an indispensable minimum. In
particular, the school must not proselytize on behalf of a
particular religious doctrine or actively promote the tenets of
the Christian faith.83
And finally: 
• Christianity’s influence on culture and education may be
affirmed and recognized, but not particular articles of faith.
Christianity as a cultural force incorporates in particular the
idea of tolerance toward people of different persuasions.
79. KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 578.
80. Id. at 579.
81. Id. at 579-80.
82. Id. at 580.
83. Id. at 581.
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Confrontation with a Christian worldview will not lead to 
discrimination or devaluation of a non-Christian ideology so 
long as the state does not impose the values of the Christian 
faith on non-Christians; indeed, the state must foster the 
autonomous thinking that Article 4 of the Basic Law secures 
within the religious and ideological realms.84 
 
While difficult to summarize, the above approach takes the claims 
of Christianity seriously (‘Christ’s victory’), and at the same time, takes 
a ‘hands-off’ approach to the imposition of values. This approach, 
arguably, is a strong endorsement of the freedom of conscience policy 
sought to be promoted by Article 4. On the other hand, the “mild 
psychological effect” of being required to study under the cross 
claimed by the dissenting judges would seem to agree in substance with 
the majority about protecting the individual’s conscience but differ on 
the degree of exposure that is burdensome. Unlike the majority, the 
dissent also makes clear that the cross does not “imply any kind of 
missionary activity.”85 Based on these arguments, the difference 
between the majority and minority opinions seems to be more one of 
degree than substance. 
B. Major German Headscarf Decisions 
The so-called headscarf debate (Kofptuchdebatte) in Germany has 
been raging for years and been the subject of multiple cases, including 
two at the level of the Federal Constitutional Court.86 Both of these 
cases related to headscarves worn by teachers in state schools, but 
headscarves in courtrooms have also been much-disputed, even  as 
                                                 
84. Id. at 581. 
85. Id. at 583. 
86. These cases were decided in 2003 and 2015. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 
[Federal Constitutional Court], 24, 2003, 2 BvR 1436/02 [hereinafter First Headscarf Decision]. 
While only the German version is authoritative, an English translation is available on the 
German Federal Constitutional Court website at 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2003/09/rs200309
24_2bvr143602en.html [https://perma.cc/7FFD-VNE7] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019); 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], January 27, 2015, 1 BvR 
471/10, (Ger.)  [hereafter Second Headscarf Decision]. See the copious references in Kerstin 
Braun, How Much Veil Is Too Much Veil: On the Constitutionality and Advisability of Face 
Bans for German Public School Students, 18 GERMAN L. J. 1331, 1331–58 (2017).  
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recently as 2013,87 and a 2019 Bavarian case confirming that 
headscarves are not to be worn by judges or prosecutors.88 
The link between conscience and the wearing of items of clothing 
deserves some preliminary discussion. By way of introduction, it is 
important to note that the headscarf debate covers a wide range of 
issues and is extremely complex, touching upon many questions, 
including intra-religious expression. These intra-religious expressions 
and expectations of dress codes are based on differing interpretations 
of the Qur’an,89 inter-religious relations and the singling-out of 
particular religions for special treatment,90 the equal treatment of men 
and women,91 psychological effects on students,92 parental rights, and 
workplace clothing codes and the associated labor laws, especially in 
public service.93 Further, the legal issues as they relate specifically to 
conscience protection are also complex. 
1. The First Headscarf Decision 
The First Headscarf Decision concerned a German citizen, who 
applied to teach in state primary and secondary schools,94 in the Land 
(Federal state) of Baden-Württemberg.95 In addition to implicating 
                                                 
87. See Joachim Wagner, Legal Limbo: Lawyers Seek Clarity on Headscarves in Court, 
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/muslim-
lawyers-seek-clarity-on-allowance-of-headscarf-in-court-a-922522.html 
[https://perma.cc/K43E-FCMA]. 
88. Germany: Bavarian Court Upholds Headscarf Ban for Judges, Prosecutors, DW 
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.dw.com/en/germany-bavarian-court-upholds-headscarf-ban-for-
judges-prosecutors/a-47960676 [https://perma.cc/3P5L-ZQYN]. 
89. See generally Heiner Bielefeldt, Zur aktuellen Kopftuchdebatte in Deutschland—
Anmerkungen aus der Perspektive der Menschenrechte [On the Current Headscarf Debate in 
Germany—Observation from the Human Rights Perspective], DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR 




91. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany art. 3(2) provides that “[m]en and 
women shall have equal rights.” 
92. Bielefeldt, supra note 89, at 5. 
93. See Achim Seifert, Religious Expression in the Workplace: The Case of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 529, 568 (2009). 
94. The Stuttgart Higher School Authority was responsible for teachers at both primary 
(Grundschule) and non-selective secondary (Hauptschule) schools. 
95. The main protagonist has since written a book on the case and other matters; see 
generally Fereshta Ludin, ENTHÜLLUNG DER FERESHTA LUDIN. DIE MIT DEM KOPFTUCH [THE 
UNVEILING OF FERESHTA LUDIN: THE ONE WITH THE HEADSCARF] (2015). 
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Article 4 of the Basic Law, the case also required analysis of Articles 
33(1) and 33(2), which guarantee equal political status in the areas of 
eligibility for and performance in public service.96 
The complainant’s application was progressively rejected by the 
Stuttgart Higher School Authority, the Stuttgart Administrative Court, 
the Stuttgart Administrative Court, the Baden-Wurttemberg Higher 
Administrative Court, and the Federal Administrative Court.97 The 
various stages of appeal allowed for  lengthy public as well as legal 
debates, and, as illustrated below, full consideration of the many 
arguments both for and against the state’s refusal to grant accreditation. 
These included discussions of religious identity;98 state neutrality in the 
presence of religious symbolism, as well as the various degrees of such 
symbolism;99 the extent of students’ rights to “negative religious 
freedom;”100 parents natural rights to the care and upbringing of 
children under Article 6.2 of the Basic Law;101 state neutrality;102 
students’ rights when confronted with an ongoing “expression of 
faith;”103 the effects of a teaching wearing a headscarf on “schoolgirls 
96. Article 33 provides, inter alia, (1) Every German shall have in every Land the same
political rights and duties. (2) Every German shall be equally eligible for any public office 
according to his aptitude, qualifications and professional achievements. (3) Neither the 
enjoyment of civil and political rights, nor eligibility for public office, nor rights acquired in the 
public service shall be dependent upon religious affiliation. No one may be disadvantaged by 
reason of adherence or non-adherence to a particular religious denomination or philosophical 
creed. 
97. First Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶¶ 1–15. For ease of reference, references
point to paragraph numbers found in the right-hand margin of the translation provided by the 
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), however, as noted above, only the 
German version is authoritative. 
98. Id. ¶ 4.
99. In the course of its discussion, the Federal Constitutional Court noted, “Unlike the
crucifix, the headscarf was a not [an inherent] symbol of religion.” Id. 
100. “Negative religious freedom” denotes the right to be free from any religious influence 
in a state context. See id. ¶ 4. For example, see the Interdenominational School Case of 1975 
(BVerfGE 41, BVerfGE 29) (upholding the constitutional validity of a Christian 
interdenominational school in Baden-Würtemberg in the face of the argument put by parents 
that their children should be protected from all religious influence at such a school. The courts 
noted that the legislature must “choose a type of school which, insofar as it can influence 
children’s decisions concerning faith and conscience, contains only a minimum of coercive 
elements”); at 575. 
102. Second Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶¶ 2–6.
103. Id.
2019] PROTECTING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 183 
of the Muslim faith;”104 the potential teacher’s “aptitude” for teaching 
under the relevant law;105 students’ inability to select teachers or to 
avoid exposure to religious symbols of their own accord;106 the state’s 
duty to provide education under Article 7(1) of the Basic Law;107 the 
need to balance the interests of teachers and students in a practical way 
(“practical concordance”);108 the importance of “respectful [state] 
neutrality;”109 the irrelevance of any teacher-declaration of the 
intention to avoid recruiting or proselytism;110 the inability of primary 
school pupils to “intellectually assimilate the religious motivation” of 
a teacher’s actions;111 and the role of the “class teacher” and the 
inability for students to easily change classes or schools.112 
After numerous preliminary appeals, the Federal Administrative 
Court decided,113 “[t]he teacher’s right to conduct herself in accordance 
with her religious conviction must have lower priority than the 
conflicting freedom of faith of the pupils and parents during 
                                                 
104. The Federal Constitution Court noted, “considerable pressure to conform might arise 
here; this would contradict the school’s pedagogical duty to work towards the integration of the 
Muslim pupils.” Id. ¶ 5. 
105. Specifically, §11.1 of the Baden-Württemberg Land Civil Service Act 
(Landesbeamtengesetz Baden-Württemberg–LBG). In discussing aptitude, the Federal 
Constitutional Court noted, “[t]he personal aptitude of teachers was in part to be determined on 
the basis of how far they were in the position to put into practice the educational objectives laid 
down under Article 7.1 of the Basic Law and to fulfill the state’s duty to provide education.” Id. 
Second Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶ 85. 
106. Id. ¶ 7. 
107. Article 7(1) of the Basic Law provides: “The entire school system shall be under the 
supervision of the state.” GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 7(1). 
108. Second Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶ 9. Practical concordance (praktische 
Konkordanz) represents a form of practical balancing when rights are in conflict. 
109. “The duty of neutrality in ideology and religion imposed on the state by the Basic Law 
was not a distancing and rejecting neutrality of the nature of laicist non-identification with 
religions and ideologies, but a respectful neutrality, taking precautions for the future, which 
imposed on the state a duty to safeguard a sphere of activity both for the individual and for 
religious and ideological communities.” Id. ¶ 10. The court goes on to discuss the role of 
“precautionary neutrality.” Id. ¶ 10. 
110. Id. ¶ 11. 
111. Id. 
112. “An acceptable pragmatic solution of the conflict that allowed the complainant’s 
freedom of belief to be taken more extensively into account was not possible in view of the 
principle of the class teacher, which was predominant at the primary school and the non-selective 
secondary school, and because of organisational difficulties with regard to moving from one 
school or class to another.” Id. ¶ 11. 
113. For instance, immediately prior to the appeal to and consideration by the Federal 
Constitutional Court. Id. ¶ 8. 
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lessons.”114 The court noted, “freedom of faith was not guaranteed 
without restriction”115 and held: 
In the context of secular compulsory schools, organized and 
structured by the state, Article 4.1 of the Basic Law as a guarantee 
of freedom benefited above all children required to attend school 
and their parents. Here, the state was also obliged to take account 
of the freedom of religion of the parents and the right of education 
guaranteed to them under Article 6.2 sentence 1 of the Basic Law. 
Children must be taught and educated in state compulsory schools 
without any partiality on the part of the state and of the teachers 
representing it in favor of Christian beliefs or of other religious 
and ideological convictions.116 
The Federal Administrative Court also noted a change in 
Germany’s religious and denominational landscape as follows: 
With growing cultural and religious variety, where a growing 
proportion of schoolchildren were uncommitted to any religious 
denomination, the requirement of neutrality was becoming more 
and more important, and it should not, for example, be relaxed on 
the basis that the cultural, ethnic and religious variety in Germany 
now characterized life at school too.117 
Both the Federal Government and the state of Baden-
Württemberg presented arguments. The former argued that there is no 
‘right’ to hold public office,118 and that decisions on employment were 
made on the basis of the requirements of the post and the personality 
of the applicant. In the case of a teacher, this included “the ability and 
the readiness of the teacher to comply with the official duties arising 
from the status of a civil servant under the concrete conditions of 
working at school.”119 In discussing this argument, the Court also noted 
Article 33(5) of the Basic Law, which allows for some limitations on 
basic rights of those who are engaged as civil servants, and in 
particular, that they carry out their duties neutrally and with 
114. Second Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶ 15.
115. Id. ¶ 13.
116. Id.
117. Federal Administrative Court as characterized by the Federal Constitutional Court in 
the Second Headscarf Decision. Id. ¶ 13. 
118. I.e., no right could be grounded on the wording of Article 33(2) of the Basic Law. Id.
¶ 21. 
119. Id.
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objectivity.120 The Federal Government also referred to the possibility 
that “the teacher’s conspicuous outer appearance might have a long-
term detrimental influence on the peace at the school.”121 This 
reasoning relied on the Crucifix Case  by contending that the ubiquity 
and longevity of the exposure to the symbolic headwear was a “decisive 
factor.”122 Like the crucifix, the headscarf could not be avoided and 
exposure to it was permanent and unavoidable. The complainant’s 
symbolic act (of wearing) was also to be attributed not only to her but 
to the state that she represented. The Federal Government was, 
however, careful to avoid a secular understanding of such a line of 
argument, insisting rather, “consideration was merely being given to 
the growing importance of state neutrality in view of an increasing 
number of religions in society.”123 
The arguments of the state of Baden-Württemberg centered on the 
non-arbitrary nature of the decision of the Federal Administrative 
Court. In doing so, they emphasized the rights of parents. Specifically: 
account had to be taken of the fact that schoolchildren’s 
personalities were not yet fully developed, and as a result school 
children were particularly open to mental influences by persons in 
authority, and in their developmental phase they learned in the first 
instance by imitating the behavior of adults. In addition, in 
particular in the case of children who have not reached the age at 
which they can decide on religious matters themselves, the 
parents’ right of education applies.124 
The court also drew on the concept of practical concordance 
between the state duty to provide education and the rights of parents. 
This, it was argued, is best achieved by “the state’s conducting itself 
                                                 
120. “The traditional fundamental principles of the permanent civil service laid down in 
Article 33.5 of the Basic Law, which restricted the fundamental rights of civil servants, included 
the obligation of teachers, who were civil servants, to carry out their duties objectively and 
neutrally. This official duty also comprised the duty to carry out one’s duties neutrally from the 
point of view of religion and ideology, respecting the viewpoints of pupils and parents.” Id. ¶ 
21. 
121. Id. ¶ 22. 
122. “Just as in the case of the crucifix in the classroom, the decisive factor with regard to 
the Muslim headscarf was the fact that because of compulsory school attendance for all 
children—unlike in the case of a brief encounter in everyday life—continuous confrontation 
with a religious symbol could not be avoided.” Id. ¶ 23. 
123. Id. ¶ 23. 
124. Id. ¶ 25. 
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neutrally in religious and ideological matters.”125 This “attained all the 
more importance the more diverse the religions in society,” and “[t]he 
state’s neutrality must be shown in the person of the teacher.”126 
Furthermore, “[t]he Federal Administrative Court had not introduced 
an altered concept of neutrality, but merely accorded a growing 
importance to the requirement of neutrality in a society that was 
pluralist from the point of view of religion.”127 
The Federal Constitutional Court took up the matter in 2003, 
deciding that the teacher’s “constitutional complaint is admissible and 
is well-founded.”128 In the course of the Court’s judgment, several 
important principles were stated: 
• Article 4 of the Basic Law “extends not only to the inner 
freedom to believe or not to believe but also to the outer 
freedom to express and disseminate the belief.”129 
• Such right “includes the individual’s right to orientate his or 
her whole conduct to the teachings of his or her faith and to act 
in accordance with his or her inner religious convictions.”130 
• Also, “[t]his relates not only to imperative religious doctrines, 
but also to religious convictions according to which a way of 
behavior is the correct one to deal with a situation in life.”131 
• In addition, “[t]he freedom of faith guaranteed in Article 4.1 
and 4.2 of the Basic Law is guaranteed unconditionally. 
Restrictions must therefore be contained in the constitution 
itself.”132 
The School Board’s decision to reject the complainant’s 
application to teach was held contrary to the Basic Law. 133 It was 
deemed unconstitutional. 134 In practical terms, however, her “success” 
was tempered by the reasoning that surrounded the state legislative 
powers over school clothing. Essentially, while the German states 
(Länder) have broad powers over schools, the state’s civil service law 
                                                 
125. Id. ¶ 26. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. ¶ 29. 
129. Id. ¶ 37. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. ¶ 38. 
133. BvR 1436/02, at 1. 
134. Id. 
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(Landesbeamtengesetz) contained no provision that could reasonably 
justify a ban on headscarves. This lacuna led to a rapid revision of state 
laws. By June 2006, eight of the sixteen German states had opened the 
way for an effective ban on wearing the headscarf in state schools.135 
Some commentators have noted that this was an effective transfer of 
the final decision from the judiciary to the legislature.136 
2. The Second Headscarf Decision
The Second Headscarf Decision extended the jurisprudence of the 
First Headscarf Decision. In the words of Matthias Mahlmann, “[i]t 
decided that an abstract ban on headscarves and other visible religious 
symbols for teachers at a state school is not compatible with the 
Constitution because it is disproportionate.”137 The Court left open the 
possibility of a ban in cases where there was a “sufficiently specific 
danger” to the peace of the school or the neutrality of the state.138 The 
Court also noted that such a ban was possible, saying, “over a region 
or possibly even over an entire Land (state) . . . with regard to 
interdenominational state schools, [but] only if there is a sufficiently 
specific danger to the aforementioned legal interests throughout the 
area to which the prohibition applies.”139 The case also raises serious 
issues of process, as well as questions about the rights of students as 
measured against those of teachers.140 
135. Some authors have divided this into three models: “exclusive Christian,” “strict
neutrality,” and “open neutrality.” See Christian Henkes & Sascha Kneip, Die Plenardebatten 
um das Kopftuch in den Deutschen Landesparlamenten [Plenary Debates in the German State 
Parliments], in DER STOFF AUS DEM KONFLIKTE SIND: DEBATTEN UM DAS KOPFTUCH IN 
DEUTSCHLAND, ÖSTERREICH UND DER SCHWEIZ [THE STUFF OF CONFLICT: HEADSCARF 
DEBATES IN GERMANY, AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND] 249–74 (Sabine Berghahn & Petra 
Rostock eds., 2015). See also the 2009 Bielefeldt Transcript, cited in Stephanie Sinclair, More 
Than Just a Piece of Cloth: The German “Headscarf” Debate, 16 IMPLICIT RELIGION 483, 486 
(2013). 
136. See Seyla Benhabib et al., The Return of Political Theology: The Scarf Affair in
Comparative Constitutional Perspective in France, Germany and Turkey, 36 PHIL. & SOC. 
CRITICISM 451, 460 (2010). 
137. Matthias Mahlmann, Religious Symbolism and the Resilience of Liberal
Constitutionalism: On the Federal German Constitutional Court’s Second Headscarf Decision, 
16 GERMAN L. J. 887, 891-92 (2015). 
138. Second Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶ 80.
139. Id.
140. G. Taylor, Teachers’ Religious Headscarves in German Constitutional Law, 6 OX. J. 
LAW RELIGION 10, 93 (2017) (arguing, inter alia, that “[m]uch more attention needed to be paid 
to the needs of the pupils in the specific context in which they find themselves: people in a very 
vulnerable stage of life compelled by law regularly to attend an institution which is crucial for 
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Seminal to the Second Headscarf Decision, the Federal 
Constitutional Court interpreted the right to religious freedom and 
conscience as follows: 
In its section 1, Art. 4 GG guarantees the freedom of faith and of 
conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or ideological 
belief; in section 2 it guarantees the right to the undisturbed 
practice of religion. The two sections of Art. 4 GG contain a single 
fundamental right that is to be understood as all-encompassing 
(citation omitted). It extends not only to the inner freedom to 
believe or not to believe—i.e., to have a faith, to keep it secret, to 
renounce a former faith, and to turn to a new one—but also the 
outer freedom to profess and disseminate one’s faith, to promote 
one’s faith and to proselytise (citation omitted). Therefore, it 
includes not only acts of worship and the practice and observance 
of religious customs, but also religious instruction and other forms 
of expression of religious and ideological life (citation omitted). 
This also includes the right of individuals to align their entire 
conduct with the teachings of their faith, and to act in accordance 
with this conviction, and thus to live a life guided by faith; and this 
applies to more than just imperative religious doctrines (citation 
omitted).”141 
This is a comprehensive definition, and notably includes a right 
for the religion/person to proselytize, and to align one’s “entire conduct 
with the teachings of their faith.” The court continues: 
When assessing what qualifies as an act of practising a religion or 
an ideological belief in a given case, one must not disregard what 
conception the religious or ideological communities concerned, 
and the individual holder of the fundamental right, have of 
themselves (citation omitted). However, this does not mean that 
all conduct by a person must be viewed as an expression of 
freedom of faith in the same way that the person views it 
subjectively. The authorities may analyse and decide whether it 
has been sufficiently substantiated, both in terms of its spiritual 
content and its outer appearance, that the conduct can in fact 
plausibly be attributed to the scope of application of Art. 4 GG; in 
other words, that it does in fact have a motivation that is to be 
                                                 
their personal and psychological as well as intellectual development. This is particularly so when 
we are talking about Muslim girls, who constitute a minority that faces challenges with adapting 
to its societal surroundings”). 
141.  Second Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶ 85. 
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viewed as religious. However, the state may not judge its citizens’ 
religious convictions, let alone designate them as “right” or 
“wrong.” This is especially the case when divergent views on such 
points are advanced within a religion (citation omitted).142 
The court noted that the female Muslim complainants in the case 
maintained a religious reason for wearing their headwear and 
concluded they were doing so as an “imperative religious duty, and as 
a fundamental component of an [Islamic] lifestyle.”143 This was held 
to be so despite the fact that “the exact content of the rules of female 
clothing is indeed in dispute among Islamic scholars.”144 The court next 
held that the prohibition on wearing headscarves was “a serious 
interference with [the complainants’] fundamental right of freedom of 
faith and freedom to profess a belief.”145 It also notes that a “headscarf, 
specifically, is not as such a religious symbol,”146 and goes on to make 
a comparison with the Christian cross, which is more inherently 
representative of Christianity than is the headscarf of Islam. It is useful 
to quote this section in its entirety: 
A headscarf, specifically, is not as such a religious symbol. It can 
exert a comparable effect only in combination with other factors 
(citation omitted) To that extent, for example, it differs from the 
Christian cross (citation omitted). Even if an Islamic headscarf 
serves only to fulfil a religious requirement and the wearer does 
not attribute symbolic character to it, and merely views it as an 
article of clothing prescribed by her religion, this does not change 
the fact that, depending on social context, it is widely interpreted 
as a reference to the wearer’s adherence to the Muslim faith. In 
that sense, it is an article of clothing with religious connotations. 
If it is understood as an outer indication of religious identity, it has 
the effect of an expression of a religious conviction without any 
need for a specific intent to make this known or any additional 
conduct to reinforce such an effect. The wearer of a headscarf tied 
in a typical way will usually also be aware of this. Depending on 
the circumstances of the individual case, this effect may also occur 
for other forms of coverings for the head and neck.147 
                                                 
142. Id. ¶ 86. 
143. Id. ¶ 88. 
144. Id. ¶ 89. 
145. Id. ¶ 90.  
146. Id. ¶ 94. 
147.  Id. 
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The unique nature of ‘symbolic meaning’ for the religious 
observer is well-highlighted in this passage. Such symbolic meanings 
are usually assumed to be protected in broad terms in some form of 
constitutional guarantee in most democracies. In Australia, this turns 
out to be much more honored in political rhetoric than in law. In the 
startling assessment of Paul Babie and James Krumrey-Quinn: 
In Australia, citizens may believe that they too enjoy limitations 
on the ability of government to infringe upon their exercise of 
religious autonomy or right to display symbols of those 
connections that matter deeply to them. Such a belief is erroneous. 
In fact, Australia remains the only western liberal democracy 
without a constitutional or legislative protection of fundamental 
rights and freedoms.148 
We now turn to these issues in more detail. It is convenient to 
begin with an overview of conscience protection afforded citizens in 
Australia. Thereafter follows an analysis of the laws surrounding 
crucifixes and religious clothing.  
VI. CONSCIENCE PROTECTION IN AUSTRALIA—SOME 
COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS 
According to Christopher Soper’s work on pluralism in six 
democracies,149 Germany is to be grouped with England as a country 
that applies an ‘establishment’ model to church-state relations.150 
Meanwhile, Australia is grouped with the Netherlands as applying a 
pluralist model, and the United States and France are held up as models 
of “separation.”151 Australia and the Netherlands are further divided on 
                                                 
148. Paul Babie & James Krumrey-Quinn, The Protection of Religious Freedom in 
Australia: A Comparative Assessment of Autonomy and Symbols, in REASONING RIGHTS: 
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT 259, 278 (Liora Lazarus et al. eds., 2014). Babie and 
Krumrey-Quinn do acknowledge, however, a “minimal patchwork of constitutional, legislative 
and common law provisions differing not only in their applications to the Commonwealth, State 
and Territory governments in the Australian federation, but also in the scope and strength of 
protection afforded,” at 259. 
149. MANSMA & SOPER, supra note 24. 
150. Id. Under Part III: Models of Establishment, Chapter 6 is devoted to England and 
Chapter 7 is devoted to Germany.   
151. Id. Under Part II: Models of Pluralism, Chapter 4 is devoted to the Netherlands and 
Chapter 5 is devoted to Australia. Under Part I: Models of Separation, Chapter 2 is devoted to 
the United States and chapter 3 is devoted to France. 
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the basis that the Netherlands brand of pluralism is “principled” and 
that of Australia is “pragmatic.”152 
As previously stated, Australia has more limited case law on the 
question of religious freedom, and likewise, on the more focused topic 
of conscience protection. Major cases decided at the highest level of 
consideration, the High Court of Australia, are rare. This is probably in 
keeping with the politically pragmatic approach to such issues,153 as 
well as a less active resort to rights protection via litigation,154 and the 
already narrow approach to section 116 of the Australian Constitution. 
Section 116 provides as follows: 
The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any 
religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for 
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test 
shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust 
under the Commonwealth.155 
The Ruddock Review notes the following limitations on this 
section: 
First, it is a limitation on the legislative power of the 
Commonwealth only. The States are not limited by its terms. 
Whether the Territories are restricted by section 116 has been 
considered by the High Court on a number of occasions but the 
position remains unclear. Second, section 116 is a limitation on 
Commonwealth legislative power; it does not create a ‘right’ for 
individuals to hold or manifest their faith. Nor does it create a 
positive obligation on the Commonwealth to do anything to ensure 
freedom of religion.156 
These limitations have been narrowly interpreted such that “[a] law will 
only fall foul of the ‘free exercise’ limb of section 116, for example, if 
its purpose is to restrict religious practice, even if its effect is to burden 
                                                 
152. Soper asserts, “the most important principles in church-state relations in Australia are 
pragmatism and tolerance.” He goes on to argue that this had changed over time, stating, 
“Australia has vacillated among four different church-state models in its two-hundred-year 
history: establishment, plural establishment, liberal separationism, and pragmatic pluralism.” Id. 
at 121. 
153. Id. 
154. The fewer constitutional rights available to litigate may mean few lawsuits but suits 
filed does not necessarily reflect the level of concern in the community, especially when the 
rights of minorities are in issue. 
155. Australian Constitution S 116. 
156. Ruddock Review, supra note 1, ¶ 1.90. 
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disproportionately the practices of a particular religion.”157 Only one 
Australian State Constitution–that of Tasmania–contains constitutional 
protection for religion and conscience,158 and this provision has also 
been narrowly construed.159 There is little else at the federal,160 and 
little at the constitutional level of any Australian State or Territory, that 
is protective of conscience or religion.161 There are, however, a large 
number of lower-level (i.e. ordinary) statutes which deal, in a 
fragmentary fashion, with vilification, discrimination, and in some 
                                                 
157. Id. at 1.91. 
158. See section 46 of the Constitution Act 1934 (Tasmania) which provides: “(1) Freedom of 
conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order and 
morality, guaranteed to every citizen. (2) No person shall be subject to any disability, or be 
required to take any oath on account of his religion or religious belief and no religious test shall 
be imposed in respect of the appointment to or holding of any public office.” 
159. Id. See Ruddock Review, supra note 1, ¶ 1.94-95 (noting that section 46 of the 
Constitutional Act 1934 (Tasmania) has not been subject of judicial consideration and that recent 
comments of Tracey J. in the case of Corneloup v Launceston City Council [2016] FCA 974 
suggest it section 46 may be of limited scope and “does not, in terms, confer any personal rights 
or freedoms on citizens.”  Corneloup v Launceston City Council [2016] FCA 974, 38. 
160. Defence Act 1903 s 61A provides that the following persons are exempt from service 
in the Defence Force in time of war: 
… 
 (d) ministers of religion; 
 (e) members of a religious order who devote the whole of their time to the duties of the 
order; 
 (f) persons who are students at a college maintained solely for training persons to become 
members of a religious order; 
 (g) persons who are students at a theological college as defined by the regulations or are 
theological students as prescribed; 
 (h) persons whose conscientious beliefs do not allow them to participate in war or warlike 
operations; 
(i) persons whose conscientious beliefs do not allow them to participate in a particular war 
or particular warlike operations; and 
(1A) Persons whose conscientious beliefs do not allow them to engage in duties of a 
combatant nature (either generally or during a particular war or particular warlike operations) 
are not exempt from liability to serve in the Defense Force in time of war but are exempt from 
such duties while members of the Defense Force as long as those beliefs continue. 
Defence Act 1903 s 61A, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/da190356/s61a.html [https://perma.cc/2EUJ-JZD3]. 
161. See, e.g., Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) as discussed in EVANS, supra note 26, at 98ff.  
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cases the education of children. 162 These statutes lie beyond the scope 
of this study.163 
A. Crucifix Laws in Australia 
Religious objects (e.g., a crucifix) are regularly placed in 
classrooms in religious schools in Australia.164 There is usually no such 
placement in government (public) schools, and to the author’s 
knowledge, there are no decided cases on the issue. 
In comparing the situation in Australia with that in Italy (as 
decided in the Lautsi decision),165 Babie and Krumrey-Quinn have 
argued and concluded that “[a]s in Lautsi, crucifixes would also be left 
to hang in Australian public schools.”166 As has been demonstrated, the 
situation in Germany is quite different and gives highlight to a number 
of comparative points. 
First, the German analysis relies on constitutionalized freedom of 
religion, for which there is no equivalent in Australia or at least none 
that has been interpreted in the same way as Germany’s. Second, the 
Australian courts may consider the hung crucifix as a religious custom 
(observance), thus falling directly within the scope of Section 116 of 
the Australian Constitution. This, however, is not irrefutably certain 
since, as Babie and Krumrey-Quinn also note: 
the mere presence of the students in the classroom is unlikely to 
constitute a religious observance carried out by the students as 
                                                 
162. See, e.g., Education Act 1990 (NSW) s 32 (“Section 32 Special religious education: 
(1) In every government school, time is to be allowed for the religious education of children of 
any religious persuasion, but the total number of hours so allowed in a year is not to exceed, for 
each child, the number of school weeks in the year”). According to s 32(2) special religious 
education “is to be given by a member of the clergy or other religious teacher of that persuasion 
authorised by the religious body to which the member of the clergy or other religious teacher 
belongs.” Education Act 1990 (NSW) s 32, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdoc/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ea1990104/s32.html [https://perma.cc/9J62-QKUT]. 
163. See the comprehensive lists in Appendix C of the Ruddock Review, supra note 1, at 
128-29. See generally chapters 6 and 7 of EVANS, supra note 26.  
164. See, e.g., Bishops of N.S.W. & the Austl. Cap. Terr., Catholic Schools at a 
Crossroads: Pastoral Letter of the Bishops of NSW and the ACT, CATHOLIC SCHOOLS NSW 10 
(Aug. 8, 2007), https://www.csnsw.catholic.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/catholic-
schools-at-a-crossroads.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TWY-B9M8] (affirming that Catholic schools 
“are places cultivating a Catholic imagination, where prayer and liturgy are supported by a 
Catholic visual culture, including crucifixes and pictures of Our Lady and the saints”). 
165. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 18, 63 (2011). 
166. Babie & Krumrey-Quinn, supra note 148, at 272. 
194 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:1 
there is no custom associated with this action. That there is, for 
example, no required veneration of the symbol by the members of 
the class upon entrance to the classroom, leaves application of the 
clause ambiguous.167 
In Germany, the (successful) arguments about “learning under the 
cross” are relevant here. Australian courtrooms do not contain 
crucifixes,168 although witnesses typically swear on a Bible, and oaths 
of affirmation are also legally available.169 Some aspects of the Bible 
oath are regulated in a positive and negative way (e.g., holding in the 
hand is required—if feasible—but kissing is not required).170 This 
includes the form of words used,171 and the placement of the swearing 
hand,172 amongst other things. 
There has been a recent call by a Magistrate in the State of 
Victoria for Bibles to be removed from all courtrooms in Victoria on 
the basis that they are “relics from another time and like the gavel, the 
wig, and the quill and ink, they belong in a museum, not a modern 
court.”173 Given Bibles may be, and often are used by witnesses in oath-
taking, it is not clear exactly what was being requested and the 
suggestion that they be entirely removed remains a curious one. 
Because the placing of crucifixes on walls of Australian public 
schools has never been a political issue, and those in religious schools 
                                                 
167. Id. 
168. The author has not been able to uncover any examples of this, although the written 
and pictorial record remains open. 
169. See, e.g., in the state of NSW, Oaths Act 1900 No 20 (NSW) s 11A. 
170. See id. Section 11A(1) provides, “Any person taking any oath on the Bible or on the 
New Testament, or the Old Testament, for any purpose whatsoever, whether in judicial 
proceedings or otherwise, shall, if physically capable of doing so, hold a copy of the Bible or 
Testament in his or her hand, but it shall not be necessary for the person to kiss such copy by 
way of assent.” Id.  
171. See id. Section 11A(2) provides, “The officer administering the oath may repeat the 
appropriate form of adjuration, and the person taking the oath shall thereupon, while holding in 
his or her hand a copy of the Bible, New Testament, or Old Testament, indicate his or her assent 
to the oath so administered by uttering the words ‘So help me, God[.]’” Id. Section 11A(3) 
provides, “The person taking the oath may, while holding in his or her hand a copy of the Bible, 
New Testament, or Old Testament, repeat the words of the oath as prescribed or allowed by 
law.” Id. 
172. See id. Section 11A(5) provides, “Provided that any witness in any judicial 
proceeding may swear with up-lifted hand in the following manner and form: The witness with 
uplifted hand says—I swear by Almighty God as I shall answer to God at the Great Day of 
Judgment that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” Id. 
173. See Genevieve Alison, Call to Cut Bibles Out of Court, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 
23, 2019, at 9. 
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are placed regularly and without comment, there would appear to be no 
case law that may offer a ready comparison with the German saga that 
has unfolded there in recent decades. Religious clothing in the 
Australian courtroom, however, is increasingly an issue and has been 
prominent in recent cases, to which we now turn. 
B. Religious Clothing in Australia 
Cases on wearing religious clothing in Australia, including 
schools and courtrooms, are rare. Several cases have been decided 
based on one-off regulations in schools as well as courtrooms.174 There 
has also been some confected controversy over the wearing of the 
Burka in the Federal Parliament,175 but this was resolved in favor of a 
“no dress code” approach.176 
In the school context, David Furse-Roberts has argued that any 
such regulation should take careful note of Australia’s common law 
traditions as well as international obligations, but that the most critical 
factor is the avoidance of “a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to both 
government and non-governments schools [which] could actually 
militate against religious freedom, particularly in circumstances where 
faith-based schools wish to enact their own uniform policies pursuant 
to their religious convictions.”177 An example of the legal problems 
raised by a one-size-fits-all approach occurred in a 2017 case from the 
                                                 
174. See Arora v. Melton Christian College (Human Rights) [2017] VCAT 1507. See also 
Elzahed v. State of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 103 (18 May 2018), both discussed below. 
175. See Avi Selk, An Australian Senator Wore a Burqa in Parliament—Then Called for 




176. See Guides to Senate Procedure, No. 23 - Provisions governing the conduct of 
senators in debate, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Brief_Guid
es_to_Senate_Procedure/No_23 [https://perma.cc/4MLJ-QDR4] (last visited Mar. 27, 2019) 
(“15. Dress. There are no formal dress rules in the standing orders and the matter of dress is left 
to the judgment of senators, subject to any ruling by the President. Advisers are also expected 
to maintain appropriate standards of dress, but a resolution of the Senate indicates that advisers 
and media representatives are no longer required to wear coats”). 
177. See David Furse-Roberts, Religious Freedom in the Playground: Public Policy and 
the Wearing of Religious Attire in Australian Schools, AUSTRALIAN POL’Y & HIST. (Nov. 12, 
2017), http://aph.org.au/religious-freedom-in-the-playground-public-policy-and-the-wearing-
of-religious-attire-in-australian-schools/ [https://perma.cc/2J6L-W8HB] (last visited Apr. 24, 
2019). 
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state of Victoria, which concerned the wearing of a patka178 by a Sikh 
boy.179 A Christian school banned the clothing on the basis of a 
declared uniform policy, which sought to promote, amongst other 
things, “uniformity, inclusivity, and protection from inadvertent 
discrimination.”180 This was held to be a breach of the state’s Equal 
Opportunity Act (2010).181 In commenting on the case, Barker has 
noted the similarity with the notable UK House of Lords decision of 
Begum, R (on the application of) v. Denbigh High School in 2006,182 
and “[t]he problem with neutrality is that it tends only to in fact be 
neutral for the majority. It is only those from minority groups that are 
asked to compromise. Equality does not always equal equity.”183 
At least one state government, New South Wales, (“NSW”) has 
indicated that students have positive rights to wear religious clothing 
and “ruled that students could not be suspended for doing so.”184 The 
fact that most Australian schools already regulate clothing in the form 
of an official ‘school uniform’ may weigh against any further 
legislation in this area.185 
                                                 
178. See generally Renae Barker, School Uniform Policies Need to Accommodate Students’ 
Cultural Practices, Topics, SBS NEWS: VOICES (July 27, 2017), 
https://www.sbs.com.au/topics/life/culture/article/2017/07/27/school-uniform-policies-need-
accommodate-students-cultural-practices [https://perma.cc/TJ5B-ZBTM] (“The patka is a 
smaller version of the turban, or dastar, worn by most Sikh men. It is an important article of 
faith. It therefore forms an important part of a Sikh child’s identity. It is not simply a piece of 
clothing”). 
179. Arora v Melton Christian College [2017] VCAT 1507 (Austl.). 
180. Id. at 59, 66, 84, 86, 97. 
181. Section 38(1), of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) (the “EO Act”) provides, “An 
educational authority must not discriminate against a person—(a) in deciding who should be 
admitted as a student; or (b) by refusing, or failing to accept, the person’s application for 
admission as a student; or (c) in the terms on which the authority admits the person as a student.” 
182. Begum, R (on the application of) v Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15 (appeal 
taken from EWCA Civ) (UK) (concerning alternative forms of dress available to female students 
in a Muslim school). 
183. Barker, supra note 178; see the suggestions of Benson, supra note 24, at 11 (referring 
to the need to focus on “unjust discrimination” not just “discrimination” together with “a 
presumption in favour of diversity”). 
184. David Furse-Roberts, Religious Freedom in the Playground: Public Policy and the 
Wearing of Religious Attire in Australian Schools, APH ESSAYS (NOV. 12, 2017),  
http://aph.org.au/religious-freedom-in-the-playground-public-policy-and-the-wearing-of-
religious-attire-in-australian-schools/ [https://perma.cc/MZE7-Y7K9]. 
185. This regulation derives its authority from the relevant State education department or–
in the case of a private school–the school itself. Consequences for failure to wear the required 
uniform vary. For a discussion of the recent history of uniforms, see William McKeith, School 
uniforms: who needs them?, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 13, 2017), 
2019] PROTECTING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 197 
In the area of general law enforcement, at least two Australian 
states have made changes to the laws of personal identification (mainly 
for the purposes of police patrols). Thus, in 2011, NSW introduced 
changes to the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 
2002, which made it easier for police to identify persons in, for 
example, routine traffic stops, or for the purpose of driver’s license 
production during a random breath test for alcohol.186 In a lengthy 
report given in August 2013 by the NSW Ombudsman,187 the changes 
were seen as mostly successful but with the recommendation that, in 
deference to cultural sensitivities, such identification would run more 
smoothly if female police officers were available for such activities.188 
Identification laws raise other issues, one of which is worth 
pursuing briefly here. The NSW law discussed above also stipulated 
that failing to comply with a request for identification carried possible 
                                                 
https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/the-case-for-dropping-school-uniforms-altogether-
20170913-gygmt8.html [https://perma.cc/PVC4-FAMF]. 
186. See Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) pt 3 div 4 
(Austl.) [hereinafter LEPRA]. 
187. A position authorized by Statute, the NSW Ombudsman describes his role as “to 
safeguard the community in their dealings with government and non-government agencies that 
fall within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. This is done in many ways—by responding to 
enquiries, investigating complaints, initiating investigations, monitoring compliance with the 
law, auditing administrative conduct, monitoring how organizations handle issues that have been 
notified or referred to the office, and promoting good administration, transparency, and 
responsive complaint handling. The Ombudsman is independent of the government agencies and 
persons it deals with and investigates.” Michael Barnes, Ombudsman’s Message, OMBUDSMAN 
NEW SOUTH WALES, https://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/what-we-do/about-us/ombudsmans-
message [https://perma.cc/F3LN-TZTZ] (last visited Apr. 27, 2019). 
188. Bruce Barbour & New South Wales Office of the Ombudsman, Review of Division 
4, Part 3, of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002: face coverings and 
identification, OBMUDSMAN NEW SOUTH WALES (Aug. 2013), 
http://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/11372/Review-of-Divison-4,-Part-
3-of-the-Law-Enforcement-Powers-and-Responsbilities-Act-2002-face-coverings-and-
identification.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9G2-5YCA]. In summary, the Ombudsman opined, “the 
recommendations we have made centre on making it a lawful requirement that a female officer 
be made available, only where requested and where practicable, to look at the face of any woman 
wearing a face covering for religious reasons. We also recommend that police be given further 
guidance to help them handle situations where they need to identify a person whose face is 
covered. In particular, practical information about how privacy can be afforded in the situations 
where the law is currently most commonly used—identifying female drivers in traffic matters—
would be most useful for traffic and general duties officers who patrol in key locations in 
metropolitan Sydney. Focusing on police officers is not enough, however, particularly as 
individual officers may only need to use the powers occasionally. It is also important that women 
who wear a niqab and the wider Muslim community have a greater understanding about the new 
law.” Id. at iii. 
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punishment, but this is itself fraught with the same identification 
problem. In the words of the NSW Ombudsman: 
[I]f the officer decides to penalise the person for committing the 
offence of refusing to comply with the requirement, the officer will 
then be faced with a somewhat circular dilemma, as they need to 
issue an infringement or court attendance notice but cannot 
confirm to whom they should address the notice. In practice, if the 
person has given them a driver licence, the officer could address 
the notice to the licence holder. However, this does carry the 
possibility that the penalty could be successfully challenged, on 
the basis that the person who committed the offence was not the 
licence holder . . . Because of this, the only option at this point may 
be to arrest the person, even though he or she may not have 
committed any other offence, or the other offence is minor (for 
example, to do with a traffic matter).189 
This issue would rarely arise. It does, however, show the 
complexities that can arise in identification scenarios where cultural 
expertise is deficient, and both sides are struggling to understand one 
another. In the end, the law must address such problems as best it 
can.190 
In the employment context, there is generally no specific law at 
federal or state levels dealing with religious clothing in the 
workplace.191 However, a variegated web of federal and state laws and 
regulations covers a range of potential conscience issues.192 There have 
                                                 
189. Id. at 33. 
190. For example, by additional warnings (although this may add even more impractical 
complication), education of the religious rights of those wearing religious clothing, and cultural 
education of law enforcement. The Ombudsman’s Report also discusses the question of 
perceived differences between a police officer viewing the picture of a face on a driver’s license, 
and viewing the face itself; see id. at 37. 
191. There is, however, a general provision in the laws of the state of South Australia 
which allows for an exemption to non-discrimination laws in circumstances where reasonable 
face recognition is required. “This Part does not apply to discrimination on the ground of 
religious appearance or dress if the discrimination arises as a consequence of a person refusing 
to reveal his or her face in circumstances in which the person has been requested to do so for the 
purpose of verifying the identity of the person, and the request was reasonable in the 
circumstances.” South Australia Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) s 85ZN (Austl.), available at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/EQUAL%20OPPORTUNITY%20ACT%201984/C
URRENT/1984.95.AUTH.PDF [https://perma.cc/5XAX-GXWY] (last visited Apr. 27, 2019). 
192. See Joan Squelch, Religious Symbols and Clothing in the Workplace: Balancing the 
Respective Rights of Employees and Employers, 20 MURDOCH U. L. REV. 38–57 (2013). 
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been two superior court cases, albeit none at the highest level,193 
dealing with religious clothing worn in an Australian courtroom, to 
which we now turn.194 
1. The Elzahed Case—The Case of the Plaintiff/Witness 
The highest-level reported case dealing with religious 
headscarves in Australia is the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
decision in Elzahed v. State of New South Wales.195 Despite its narrow 
focus, the decision is an interesting one and worth detailed 
consideration. 
Moutia Elzahed (“Elzahed)” was the subject of a police raid 
during 2014, in which she alleged assault and battery by the police.196 
This allegation resulted in a trial, in which Elzahed would only give 
evidence “with her entire face, other than her eyes, covered by a veil 
known as a niqab.”197 The decision on whether to permit evidence to 
be given in such a way was entirely a matter for the judge and was 
governed by the laws relating to judicial discretion under the well-
known case of House v. The King.198 The district court judge took the 
arguments of both sides into account and “accepted the need to take 
into account the appellant’s religious beliefs,” [and] stated, “[o]n the 
other hand, I must take into account whether I would be impeded in my 
ability to fully assess the reliability and credibility of the evidence . . . 
                                                 
193. The highest appellate court in Australia is the High Court of Australia. Australian 
Constitution s 71. 
194. While not specifically religious in nature, the case of Ellenbogen v. Cullen is worth 
noting in the context of courtroom clothing (where the court held that wearing a headband, which 
bore the colors of the Aboriginal flag, does not amount to contempt of court). Ellenbogen v 




195. Elzahed v State of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 103 (Austl.), available at 
https://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/decision/5afb85c7e4b074a7c6e1f411 
[https://perma.cc/PR5G-92ZC] [hereinafter Elzahed Appeal]. This case was an appeal from the 
decision of Balla DCJ in Moutia Elzahed & Ors v Commonwealth of Australia and State of New 
South Wales [2016] NSWSC 327; see also the decision of Moutia Elzahed & Ors v 
Commonwealth of Australia and State of NSW [2017] NSWDC 160 (dealing with the question 
of court costs). 
196. Elzahed Appeal, NSWCA 103 ¶ 10. 
197. Id. ¶ 1. 
198. House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40 (Austl.). 
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if I am not afforded the opportunity of being able to see her face when 
she gives evidence.”199 
The appeal court upheld the decision of the trial judge to refuse 
the giving of evidence wearing a full veil.200 In the course of the 
judgment, the court of appeal discussed an Explanatory Note on the 
Judicial Process and Participation of Muslims,201 which stated that “it 
is not contrary to Sharia law for a woman to uncover her face when 
giving evidence in court.”202 
Cases from other countries, in which the wearing of a niqab was 
considered and treated “a little differently,” were cited but not 
considered persuasive by NSW the appeals court.203 While Australia’s 
highest court had not considered this specific issue, it had issued clear 
statements about “witness demeanor” and in a 2003 decision had noted: 
[I]n recent years judges have become more aware of scientific
research that has cast doubt on the ability of judges (or anyone
else) to tell truth from falsehood accurately on the basis of
demeanor. Considerations such as these have encouraged judges,
both at trial and on appeal, to limit their reliance on the
appearances of witnesses and to reason to their conclusions, as far
as possible, on the basis of contemporary materials, objectively
established facts and the apparent logic of events. This does not
eliminate the “established principles about witness credibility”;
but it tends to reduce the occasions where those principles are seen
as critical.204
The “established principles about witness credibility” included, 
by implication, the ability to see the witness’ face free of clothing in 
the interests of trial that is fair to both parties. The Court of Appeal also 
made clear that in deciding to uphold the trial judge’s ruling on giving 
evidence with an uncovered face, they were not making a general ruling 
with “wider implications for a group of women in Australia of Islamic 
199. Elzahed Appeal, NSWCA 103, ¶ 32.
200. Id. ¶ 70.
201. Australian National Imams Council, Explanatory Note on the Judicial Process and
Participation of Muslims, DISPUTES CENTRE (Dec. 12, 2017), https://disputescentre.com.au/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/PUBLIC-STATEMENT-Explanatory-Note-on-the-Judicial-Process-
and-Participation-of-Muslims.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MNY-65ZA]. 
202. See Elzahed Appeal, NSWCA 103.
203. Id. ¶ 44. The cited cases were: Police v. Razamjoo [2005] DCR 408 (N.Z.); R v. NS
[2012] 3 SCR 726 (Can.) and The Queen v. D (R) [2013] EW Misc 13 (CC) (Eng.). 
204. Elzahed Appeal, NSWCA 103, ¶ 46 (citing the High Court of Australia (HCA) in Fox
v. Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118).
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faith.”205 The court also quoted with approval a recent article on this 
topic, which stated, “while . . . there are circumstances where a woman 
may appear in court with her face covered, in all of the cases considered 
in this article the witness has ultimately been ordered to remove her 
veil in order to give evidence.”206 Scholarly work covering five 
common law jurisdictions has confirmed this now appears to be the 
general approach.207 This is borne out somewhat in the next case. 
2. The Chaarani Case—The Case of the Courtroom Spectator 
The second case concerning courtroom clothing, The Queen v. 
Chaarani,208 was heard before a single judge in the Supreme Court of 
Victoria. That case concerned the trial of the husband of Aisha Al 
Qattan (hereafter “Ms. Al Qattan”) on charges related to the preparation 
of a terrorist attack. 209 Ms. Al Qattan wished to be present in the 
courtroom’s public gallery to support her husband and was required to 
remove her religious clothing, a nikab,210 for that purpose. The written 
judgment records nine arguments in favor of wearing the nikab in the 
gallery, all of which were rejected. 211 The first argument centered upon 
religious freedom asserting, “Ms. Al Qattan has a strong religious 
belief that she should wear the nikab in public. It is a ‘fundamental way 
in which she observes her faith.’”212 While conceding that Ms. Al 
Qattan’s beliefs were religious and were strongly held, the judge was 
persuaded that security concerns, including the possibility that a 
spectator might do (rare) or say (less rare) inappropriate things in the 
courtroom, should prevail.213 The possibility was also canvassed that 
                                                 
205. Id. ¶ 63. 
206. Id. ¶ 65 citing Renae Barker, Burqas and Niqabs in the Courtroom: Finding Practical 
Solutions, 91 AUSTRALIAN L. J. 225, 226 (2017). 
207. Barker, supra note 178, at 40 (on religious apparel and appearance in court in 
Australia).  See EVANS, supra note 26, at 202–08. 
208. The Queen v. Chaarani (Ruling 1) [2018] VSC 387 (Austl.), available at 
http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdoc/au/cases/vic/VSC/2018/387.html?context=1;query=chaarani;mask_path=au/cases
/vic/VSC [https://perma.cc/RS9Z-DDPW] (last visited Apr. 27, 2019). 
209. Id. ¶ 1. 
210. There was some discussion of the correct spelling of this term. The Judge commented 
on his use of the spelling as ‘nikab’ rather than ‘niqab’ as follows: “‘Nikab’ is sometimes spelt 
‘niqab.’ I have taken the former spelling from the Explanatory Note on the Judicial Process and 
Participation of Muslims.” Elzahed Appeal, NSWCA 103, ¶ 44. 
211. Id. ¶ 27. 
212. Chaarani, VSC 387, ¶ 3. 
213. Id.  
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more than one person could wear such clothing and that security 
officials would thereby find it harder to identify an individual in the 
gallery with multiple spectators, and to deter any possible future 
offense. His honor explained 
It is not good court management, in my view, to adopt a reactive 
approach, that is, to allow spectators to have their faces covered 
but eject them, and refuse them re-entry, if they are detected 
misbehaving. First, prevention is better than cure. Second, it is 
naïve to think that misbehavior will always be immediately 
detected by court security staff. A person to whom something 
improper is said or done may be too stunned or frightened to raise 
the alarm immediately, enabling the culprit to get away. Or there 
may not be sufficient court security staff on hand. Court security 
resources are limited and one cannot always predict which cases 
will generate problems in the public gallery.214 
The court also made several unambiguous references to religious 
freedom. These included the following: “Open justice, religious 
freedom and the right to participate in public life are fundamental 
values that must be accorded full respect in our society and in this court. 
But no one could sensibly claim that these principles and rights brook 
no limitations.”215 
The court also referred to the state Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (the “Charter”) which plainly recognizes the 
rights of persons216 to “religious freedom,”217 and to “participation in 
public life.”218 Even though no evidence was put forward by the 
214. Id. ¶ 23.
215. Id. ¶ 25.
216. “Person” is defined as “a human being.” See Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic.) s 3 (Austl.). 
217. Id. s 14 (Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief: (1) Every person has
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, including (a) the freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his or her choice; and (b) the freedom to demonstrate his 
or her religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching, either individually or as 
part of a community, in public or in private. (2) A person must not be coerced or restrained in a 
way that limits his or her freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice or teaching). 
218. Id. s 18 (Taking part in public life: (1) Every person in Victoria has the right, and is
to have the opportunity, without discrimination, to participate in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Every eligible person has the right, and is 
to have the opportunity, without discrimination—(a) to vote and be elected at periodic State and 
municipal elections that guarantee the free expression of the will of the electors; and (b) to have 
access, on general terms of equality, to the Victorian public service and public office). 
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lawyers for Ms. Al Qattan as to the religious motivations for her desire 
to wear the nikab,219 the court was prepared to assume this was the case. 
The judge declared: 
I have assumed for the purpose of this ruling that Ms. Al Qattan 
wants to wear the nikab in court for religious reasons, and that her 
religious beliefs are strongly held. In other words, I accept that the 
right of religious freedom is engaged. I also accept that it is a very 
important right, which may go to the core of a person’s identity. 
Likewise, I accept that the right to participate in public life is 
engaged and that it is an important right.220 
The law of courtroom behavior in Australia prohibits wearing 
anything that might indicate disrespect or offense towards the justice 
system,221 so the ruling was explicit in noting that this was not a factor 
in the outcome. The Judge confirmed this, asserting, “I do not consider 
the wearing of nikabs in court for religious reasons to be disrespectful, 
offensive or threatening, although, as I will explain shortly, I do 
consider it to be an impediment to the deterrence and punishment of 
misbehavior by spectators in the public gallery.”222 The desire to wear 
religious dress in court should, the court noted, be allowed “as much as 
possible” but not without limit: 
Australia is obviously a multicultural society and I agree that 
religious dress should be accommodated as much as possible, but 
the right of religious freedom and the right to participate in public 
life are not absolutes. As s[ection] 7 of the Charter recognizes, 
these rights may be subject to limitations which can be 
“demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom.223 
219. Chaarani, VSC 387, ¶ 5.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Court Etiquette, HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA,  
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/about/court-etiquette [https://perma.cc/62CZ-M6BG] (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2019)  (stating that “inappropriate clothing may not be worn" You should be adequately 
and neatly dressed, including footwear”). 
222. Chaarani, VSC 387, ¶ 6.
223. Id. ¶ 18; Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic.) s 7(2) (Austl.)
(“A human right may be subject under law only to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and 
taking into account all relevant factors including—(a)the nature of the right; (b) the importance 
of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relationship 
between the limitation and its purpose; (e) any less restrictive means reasonably available to 
achieve the purpose that the limitation seeks to achieve).  
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The question of modesty in appearance was also raised. The court 
quoted the following from an Explanatory Note issued by the 
Australian National Imams Council (“ANIC”): 
Muslim women commonly wear a headscarf referred to as a Hijab 
to cover their head and hair. On fewer occasions, women may wear 
a Burka or Nikab, which also covers their face. The Hijab and 
Burka or Nikab are seen as a sign of modesty, and a symbol of 
religious faith. [Italics added by the court].224 
The court responded in the following terms: 
A requirement that spectators have their faces uncovered is not to 
force anyone to act immodestly. First, the exposure of one’s face 
in a courtroom cannot reasonably be viewed as an immodest act: 
subjective views to the contrary cannot rule the day, or the 
management of a courtroom. Second, if someone feels strongly 
that it would be improper for them to uncover their face in court, 
they can choose not to attend. If that is Ms. Al Qattan’s choice, 
arrangements will be made for live streaming of the proceedings 
to a remote facility within the court building so that she can still 
view the trial.225 
It is not known whether the opportunity that Ms. Al Qattan might 
view the proceedings from a remote location was taken up. The 
Australian case of Elzahed was also cited as supporting Ms. Al Qattan’s 
argument in favor of wearing the nikab, as were three foreign-
jurisdiction cases: Police v. Razamjoo (New Zealand),226 R v. D 
(England),227 and NS v. The Queen (Canada).228 The submission was 
that all of these cases supported wearing the nikab in court in some 
circumstances and so should be extended to wearing them in all 
circumstances. 
224. Australian National Imams Council, supra note 202; see Court Etiquette, supra note 
222. Police v. Razamjoo, [2005] D.C.R. 408, 441.
225. Chaarani, VSC 387, ¶ 24
226. Police v. Razamjoo [2005] DCR 408, 441. For a valuable discussion of the case and
its surrounding issues, see Rex J. Ahdar, Religious Liberty in a Temperate Zone: A Report from 
New Zealand, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 205, 225-227 (2007). 
227. R v. D(R) [2013] UKSC (unreported, Crown Court at Blackfriars, Murphy J), Judge
Peter Murphy, 16 September 2013), available at https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/The+Queen+-v-+D+(R).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YD2M-TUTM]. 
228. NS v. The Queen [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726; [2012] SCC 72.
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In Razamjoo, two witnesses for the prosecution wanted to wear 
the nikab but were ultimately ordered to remove them while giving 
evidence.229 They were, however, allowed to give evidence from 
behind a screen thus limiting their exposure to women court officials, 
the judge, and counsel.230 In NS v. The Queen, the Supreme Court of 
Canada affirmed a lower court ruling requiring that a nikab be removed 
while evidence was given, but refused to make this an absolute rule.231 
In R v. D, a person charged with intimidating a witness requested to 
wear a nikab during their trial.232 This request was granted except for 
the times when the accused was giving evidence.233 While finding these 
cases somewhat persuasive, Beale J distinguished them because: 
these cases suggest that witnesses may wear a nikab if they are not 
giving contested evidence and that an accused, where identity is 
not in issue, may wear a nikab except when testifying. If 
participants in court proceedings may wear nikabs in certain 
circumstances, then it follows, so the argument goes, that 
spectators in the public gallery may do so. But there is at least one 
point of distinction. An accused is compelled to be present in court 
and, more often than not, witnesses for the prosecution are 
subpoenaed to attend court. Ms. Al Qattan is under no legal 
compulsion to attend court.234 
The case of R v. Chaarani has been criticized as disappointing for 
those desiring to exercise their right to religious freedom in the State of 
Victoria.235 Despite this criticism, the issue of court security, the 
                                                 
229. Police v. Razamjoo, [2005] D.C.R. 408 
230. Id. 
231. In Justice Beale’s summary, he noted, “McLachlin CJ, Deschamps, Fish and 
Cromwell JJ [of the Supreme Court of Canada] dismissed the complainant’s appeal but indicated 
that, what they called an extreme approach—never allowing a witness to testify in a nikab or 
always permitting it—was unsustainable and that it may be permissible for a witness to testify 
in a nikab if their evidence is uncontested. Le Bel and Rothstein JJ, who agreed in the result, 
preferred a clear rule that nikabs not be worn by witnesses at any stage of a criminal trial.” 
Chaarani, VSC 387, ¶ 14. 
232. R v. D(R) [2013] UKSC (unreported, Crown Court at Blackfriars, Murphy J). 
233. Id. 
234. The Queen v Chaarani (Ruling 1) [2018] VSC 387 (16 July 2018). 
235. Sarah Hort, Victorian Supreme Court Finds Charter Does Not Protect Right to Wear 
Nikab in Court, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CENTRE (July 16, 2018), https://www.hrlc.org.au/human-
rights-case-summaries/2018/12/17/victorian-supreme-court-finds-charter-does-not-protect-
right-to-wear-nikab-in-court [https://perma.cc/E8J8-ZVBL]. 
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possibility of a mistrial,236 and the proper ordering and regulation of 
witnesses seem to be entirely legitimate reasons for the limitation 
imposed in this case.237 The individual judge has power over the 
courtroom, and this extends, on the whole, not only to members of the 
public and the accused but also to the lawyers and other officials.238 
3. Lessons from Elzahed and Chaarani
These two cases (Elzahed v. NSW and R v. Chaarani) show 
Australian superior courts grappling with questions of evidence law, 
courtroom demeanor, and to some degree, conscience or religious-
based desires to dress in a certain way while participating in the court 
process. In neither case is the main protagonist a simple witness. In 
Elzahed, they are a plaintiff/witness, and in Chaarani, they are a mere 
courtroom spectator, albeit one tied closely to the defendant.239 
It would be a mistake to draw too many parallels between these 
cases and the major German constitutional cases already discussed. 
They are different in many significant ways: the courtroom is not the 
schoolroom, and the plaintiff/witness problems bear little resemblance 
to the teacher (or student) seeking to wear religious dress in the 
classroom or school, while in the employ of the government. 
Thus, it may be reasonably argued that while the Australian cases 
may be of mild interest to a German lawyer, and the German cases 
likewise for an Australian (or common) lawyer, they are vastly 
different and not comparable in any meaningful way, save for the fact 
that they involve the legal permission to wear (or not wear) female 
236. The judge noted, “In some cases, things said or done by spectators may necessitate
the discharge of a jury, which may cause great distress to participants in the trial, not to mention 
the cost to the community.” Chaarani, VSC 387, ¶ 21. 
237. “Deterrence, identification and proof are all served by a requirement that spectators
in the public gallery have their faces uncovered. The efficacy of an order for witnesses out of 
court is also facilitated by such a requirement.” Id. ¶ 19. The court provided a footnote 
explanation to this reasoning in the following terms: “To preserve the integrity of the court 
process, it is commonplace for witnesses to be ordered to remain out of court until they have 
given their evidence. But if spectators can wear face coverings in court, a witness may be able 
to circumvent such an order.” Id. ¶ 19 n.10. 
238. But see, for example, the Australian High Court case of MacGroarty v. Clauson
[1989] HCA 34, holding that a charge of contempt against a barrister was not sufficiently 
delineated by the judge in accordance with the relevant section of the District Courts Act (1967) 
(Qld), and so the conviction was overturned. 
239. See generally Moutia Elzahed & Anors v Commonwealth of Australia and State of
NSW [2016] NSWDC 353. See generally Queen v. Chaarani [2018] VSC 387. 
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headwear in both fact scenarios. Thus both engage primary human 
rights relating to religion. Moreover, the German cases concern 
headwear that still shows the full face whereas both Australian cases 
concern clothing that obscures the face almost entirely. There is one 
serious caveat to the above lessons, and this relates to the lack of 
comprehensive religious freedom laws in Australia discussed above. 
For as long as there is no such Australian guarantee of this fundamental 
right at a constitutional level, the Australian approach will remain 
piecemeal and potentially incoherent. 
VII. CONCLUSION
As Denise Meyerson has noted, “the formal protections afforded 
religious freedom under Australian law are relatively weak—
particularly when compared to many other liberal democracies.”240 By 
contrast, Germany has constitutionalized protections for religion and 
conscience, which have been litigated seriously and at length over 
many decades since the end of World War II and most recently in the 
crucifix and headscarf cases. The recent Australian court cases dealing 
with these issues are grounded in the law of process, evidence, and 
courtroom demeanor and are bubbling up toward an as yet non-existent 
all-encompassing set of principles, upon which coherent judicial norms 
for freedom of conscience at a constitutional - or at least a national - 
level can be based. These principles will not appear out of thin air but 
must be deliberated and decided in the light of present irregularities. 
The German constitutional guarantees, together with their judicial 
interpretations, provide a valuable model for this and will repay 
thoughtful and disciplined consideration by Australian policymakers 
and judges alike. 
240. Meyerson, supra note 22, at 552.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Filling out a form may not seem like much to ask. . . . But that 
depends on the form: ask anyone who has signed a mortgage 
application, a wedding license, a tax return, or a death warrant. 
—Eternal Word Television Network 1 
In Arthur Miller’s 1953 play, The Crucible, the character, John Proctor, 
under pressure, admits guilt when he should not have, after which he is 
asked to sign his name to a written statement of his false confession. He 
refuses. The impending publication of false guilt is, for him, a step too far 
and triggers his now famous declaration of disgust against his own false 
confession. Why can he admit guilt under pressure but not sign his name to 
the statement? The very thought of signing his name triggered an existential 
crisis: 
Because it is my name! Because I cannot have another in my life! 
Because I lie and sign myself to lies! Because I am not worth the 
dust on the feet of them that hang! How may I live without my 
name? I have given you my soul; leave me my name!  
Such reactions to the publication of “signed confessions,” which 
have been made under compulsion, are not uncommon. A signature seems 
to carry some psychological weight that an unadorned, oral assertion does 
not. In the legal context, signatures figure highly in an evidential setting, for 
example, in the signing of a will, or the execution of a bill of exchange.  
In the context of the recent Tenth Circuit religious freedom case of 
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sylvia Burwell (2015),2 the 
requirement of a representative’s signature on behalf of a group of 
professed Roman Catholic Sisters on a US government form (Form 700)3 If 
1 Brief amicus curiae of Eternal Word Television Network (EWTN), Zubik v. Burwell, 578 
U.S._(2016) [hereinafter EWTN Brief].
2 Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colorado v. Sylvia Matthews
Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, at 1163 (2015) [hereinafter Little Sisters].
3 Employee Benefits Security Administration’s (EBSA) Form 700 was issued by the
Department of Labor. According to the Tenth Circuit Court (see Appendix herein). “The
Form notifies the health insurance issuer or TPA (Third Party Insurer) that the organization
self-certifies as exempt from the [contraceptive] Mandate because it has a religious
objection to providing coverage for some or all contraceptive services to its employees, and
identifies the relevant federal regulations under which the organization is permitted to opt
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signed, that Form, reproduced in the Appendix, would become the 
government-inspired means by which the Sisters could remove themselves 
from the process of providing access by their employees to various forms of 
contraception. The Sisters refused to sign on the grounds of conscience and 
that refusal became the subject of legal scrutiny, public commentary, and 
much  debate.  
 As late as June 2019, a number of US States Attorneys General had 
sued to remove religious exceptions, which were seen by many as a way 
around the impasse caused by the issues surrounding an unwillingness to 
merely “sign a form” on the grounds of religious conscience. Later, the US 
Supreme Court consolidated a number of cases, including that of the Little 
Sisters in Zubik v. Burwell (2016),4 and sent them back to various Courts of 
Appeal for reexamination. Commentators and amici have said much about 
these cases, all of which have convoluted histories,5 and about the 
originating cases of Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius (2013) and Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby (2014), which began the entire saga.6 
Sitting behind these cases and the surrounding discussion, there 
exists an unresolved and difficult question as to the scope of the reigning 
“sincerity test” for religious claim under the First Amendment. The 
Supreme Court itself opened this discussion when it cited a well-known 
moral philosopher, David S. Oderberg (Oderberg), who is an expert in the 
ethics of what amounts to cooperation in the action of another.7 In the cases 
mentioned here, the cooperation was that of the signing of a Form by the 
sisters, and whether they could, or could not, as a matter of conscience, 
perform that act of signing. For the sisters to sign would, as a religious 
matter, be the wrong thing to do and so they objected. For the court, the 
out of that obligation”; see Little Sisters, supra note 2, at 1163. The Form had to be signed 
by the Sisters and delivered to the relevant authority. 
4 Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. (2016) [hereinafter Zubik]. 
5 In the words of one commentator, “the first thing to know about these cases is that they 
are incredibly complicated. The Court granted cert in seven different cases related to this 
topic, which means they’ve agreed to hear the questions in those seven cases. All of them 
have come through different circuit courts in the past months, where they’ve mostly lost. 
But, these cases are a big deal: They are the latest in a long series of challenges to this 
portion of the law, the most notable of which was last summer’s Hobby Lobby case, which 
involved for-profit employers”; see Emma Green, The Little Sisters of the Poor Are 
Headed to the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/the-little-sisters-of-the-poor-are-
headed-to-the-supreme-court/414729. 
6 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (Tenth Cir. 2013) [hereinafter 
Hobby Lobby (10th Cir.)] was subsequently decided in the US Supreme Court; see Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 574 U.S. (2014) [hereinafter Hobby Lobby (SC)].
7 “The Ethics of Co-operation in Wrongdoing,” MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 203–228 (A.
O’Hear ed. 2004).
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issue was whether it would simply take the sisters word for it, or whether 
they would weigh in on that issue, and make a judgment about the sisters 
own (avowedly religious) claim about cooperation. The Court declined and 
the world moved on. But the difficult question remains: What is the scope 
of a religious objection when the claim is made that the analysis of 
“cooperation” is itself a religious question? Is this asking a court to abandon 
its wits and go along with any religious accommodation claim whatsoever? 
Or is there a safe course that saves the court from having to make “religious 
judgments” that are fraught with difficulty and open to the accusation that 
the court is “playing theologian” and should back off? This Article will 
grapple with these issues. In doing so, I shall explore a number of related 
questions about “triggers” and “opt-outs,” about different kinds of analysis 
of what amounts to “cooperation” in law and cooperation according to 
moral philosophers, about the way theologians (who file amicus briefs) 
analyse these issues, about the significance of signatures (as opposed to 
other types of consent), and about the problems that may arise in a thought 
experiment where a court encounters a hypothetical religious tradition 
which has “insincerity” at its core. All of these factors make for a strong 
brew of contested topics so I will try to narrow these as far as possible 
without sacrificing any essential detail.  
For those purposes, I note that an important difference between the 
Hobby Lobby cases and the later cases has to do with the difference between 
what has been called, on the one hand, an “opt-out”8 and on the other hand, 
a causal “trigger”9 as identified by Oderberg, who, to give him his proper 
title, is a professional moral philosopher and whose “The Ethics of Co-
operation in Wrongdoing” 10 was cited in Hobby Lobby (SC) and who has, 
in clear and interesting ways, responded in writing to the problems raised by 
that difference. 
Indeed, Oderberg’s own short analysis will serve well to help us 
come to grips with the major points at stake. After a discussion of the Little 
Sisters case, he elaborates the following key distinction: 
8 For the sake of clarity in terminology, according to the NEW OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY (NOAD) (Angus Stevenson, Christine A Lindberg, eds., 3 ed. 2010) “opt” is a 
verb [which takes no object] meaning to “make a choice from a range of possibilities.” The 
associated phrasal verb is “opt out,” meaning to “choose not to participate in or carry on 
with something.” These originate from the late nineteenth century French opter, and from 
Latin optar “to choose; to wish.” “Opt-out” is also listed in the NOAD as a noun meaning 
“an instance of choosing not to participate in something” as in “opt-outs from key parts of 
the treaty.” 
9 “Trigger” here means an action that causes or permits another event to occur. In the cases 
under discussion the signing of the Form (the triggering action) was what allegedly gave 
access to morally objectionable abortion or contraceptive services. 
10 In MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 203–228 (A. O’Hear ed. 2004). 
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The difference [between Hobby Lobby and the situation in the Little 
Sisters/Zubik cases] however, is crucial: in Hobby Lobby, the 
Supreme Court held that the objectors (owners of closely held, for-
profit corporations) were entitled to what they requested, namely the 
same accommodation granted to religious non-profits, allowing 
them to opt out of providing the relevant insurance coverage. The 
objectors in Little Sisters of the Poor and then in Zubik, however, 
objected to the very accommodation itself. 
The accommodation provided by the government required a 
conscientious objector to notify either the government or the 
objector’s insurance company (we can leave aside the complexities) 
that they opted out of the mandate and would not provide 
contraceptive coverage. It was then up to the government or the 
insurance company to step in and fill the gap. But the objectors in 
Little Sisters and related cases, and then in Zubik, considered the 
very act of opting out to be illicit cooperation, relying precisely on 
Hobby Lobby for their argument.11 
This difference will figure heavily in the following discussions and, in 
particular, the consideration of some aspects of how moral philosophy 
interacts with the law. Thus, Part III examines the unusual situation in 
which a court refers to moral philosophy and so points to larger issues lying 
beneath the surface of the case. 
Part IV unpacks these problems further by noting first that 
cooperation claims in law can occur before or after the actus reus,12 but that 
in cases of conscience, the claim to exemption must always come prior in 
time to that act. I go on to consider types of cooperation and explain the 
different kinds of cooperation and introduce Oderberg’s borrowed 
“principles of cooperation” as well as their application in hard cases.  
Part V then narrows the focus to the significance of the required 
signature in these cases, while Part VI will reflect on problems raised by the 
Supreme Court’s sincerity test when it is tested against a religion that has 
insincerity at its core. 
The Article concludes by offering a possible solution to an apparent 
impasse in analysis. Before considering these deeper issues, I will set out 
the background needed to position the arguments in relation the sincerity 
test. 
11 DAVID S. ODERBERG, OPTING OUT: CONSCIENCE AND COOPERATION IN A PLURALISTIC
SOCIETY (2018) (emphasis in the original) [hereinafter Opting Out]. 
12 I use the term broadly to refer to the act at the center of the dispute.  
6 My opt-out your trigger [15-Jan-20 
II. SINCERITY: ONE TEST TO RULE THEM ALL
The role of the sincerity test requires some explanation. For those 
unfamiliar with the prior Supreme Court jurisprudence, the sincerity test 
outlined by US Supreme Court Justice Alito in Hobby Lobby (SC) drew 
careful attention to the claim by the Little Sisters of the Poor that signing 
form 700 (an opt-out) actually amounted to an opt-in, but that he was not in 
a position to pronounce whether that was, in fact, the case. Alito asserted:  
The Hahns and Greens and their companies sincerely believe that 
providing the insurance coverage demanded by the HHS regulations 
lies on the forbidden side of the line, and it is not for us to say that 
their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. Instead, our 
“narrow function . . . in this context is to determine” whether the 
line drawn reflects “an honest conviction,” . . . , and there is no 
dispute that it does.13 
Thus, for the US Supreme Court, sincerity ruled the day. To sharpen 
his point of engagement with Justice Alito, Oderberg drew attention to the 
formulation of this test as previously expressed by Justice Gorsuch, who 
while sitting on the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, opined in 
Hobby Lobby (10th Cir.): “As [the company owners] understand it, ordering 
their companies to provide insurance coverage for drugs or devices whose 
use is inconsistent with their faith itself violates their faith, representing a 
degree of complicity their religion disallows.”14 
For Oderberg, the problem with the approach taken by Justices 
Gorsuch and Alito is that “[Gorsuch for the Tenth Circuit] treated—as did 
the Supreme Court [Alito]—the very question of whether the plaintiffs were 
illicit cooperators as itself purely a matter of religious faith.”15 Oderberg 
goes on to ask (rhetorically) why this is important and answers as follows:  
The problem derives from the fact that American courts, as with 
most Western courts, do not as a matter of legal principle question 
the religious beliefs of a litigant seeking to protect their religious 
freedom (see, for example, Thomas 1981; Hernandez 1989). That is, 
13 Hobby Lobby (SC), supra note 6, at 37, citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana 
Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981) 716. 
14, Opinion written by Gorsuch joined by Senior Judge Paul Joseph Kelly Jr. and Judge 
Timothy M. Tymkovich of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurring, in Hobby Lobby 
(10th Cir.), supra note 6, at 1152. 
15 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 71 (emphasis in original). 
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they do not look behind the sincerity of the belief to question its 
reasonableness. This means that if a plaintiff complains that a 
certain law or regulation makes them a cooperator in wrongdoing, 
the court does not question whether this belief is reasonable or not. 
The only question, for American courts, is whether the law or 
regulation violates RFRA16 by imposing a substantial burden” on 
religious freedom.17  
Thus, sincerity is the only governing factor for the court and will 
block the way to any examination of the reasonableness of the (religious) 
belief. For a philosopher, as for others, this is understandably a problem 
deserving serious attention.  
By contrast, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued forcefully for 
“keeping the courts ‘out of the business of evaluating’. . . the sincerity with 
which an asserted religious belief is held.”18 These differences, amongst 
others, will be taken up again in Part V.  
While the US Supreme Court needs little introduction, the reader 
deserves some introduction to Oderberg’s works. As outlined above, in both 
books19 and articles,20 Oderberg has argued generally that mere sincerity is 
not enough to ground a claim for a religious freedom exemption. His recent 
work comments in particular on health care ethics and runs across range of 
jurisdictions including in particular the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Canada. As discussed above, he was cited by Justice Alito (for the 
majority) in footnote thirty-four of Hobby Lobby (SC). Philosophy texts are 
not often cited in the Supreme Court, a topic to which I now turn. 
III. SCOTUS CITES A PHILOSOPHER
Courts—and especially Courts of Appeal—sometimes make use of non-
legal materials in their public reasons for their decisions. All the world of 
learning and literature is available to the Supreme Court at any time.21 Yet, 
16 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 
1488, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb through 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4, is United States 
federal law that “ensures that interests in religious freedom are protected.” 
17 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 71–72 (emphasis in original). 
18 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), quoting United States v. Lee, 
455 US 252, 263 n2 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
19 Opting Out, supra note 11, at note 5. 
20 David S. Oderberg, Co-Operation in the Age of Hobby Lobby: When Sincerity is Not 
Enough, 11 EXPOSITIONS: INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES IN THE HUMANITIES 15–30 (2017). 
21 Like juries, however, courts are not supposed to go off on a frolic of their own to
conduct experiments or independent investigations outside of the court setting. As to juries 
see, for example, the jury instructions in Kathy Tooze-Aguirre v. Rachel Roxanne Wilks, 
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such reliance is not their stock-in-trade. Lawyers and courts are practical 
problem solvers and their primary materials are the laws and regulations of 
the jurisdiction in which they operate.22 
Thus, the citation of philosophical work in a court decision full of 
case law and judicial reasoning comes as somewhat of a surprise. It “draws 
the eye,” as they say. In Hobby Lobby (SC), the Court’s mention of several 
moral philosophers has focused attention on a kind of philosophical 
reasoning that can lie beneath the law, which in turn has opened a wider 
range of public arguments, and which may serve justice and the 
advancement of “reasons for decision” that are part of the democratic (i.e. 
open to the demos) court system.23 Such public (philosophical) reasons are 
arguably “prior to” the law and yet form part of its footings and 
groundworks. In the alternative, such influences can be seen as mere 
“policy arguments.” Either way, when they form part of the court’s 
reasoning, they are worthy of pursuit and examination. In the body of the 
opinion, Alito wrote:  
The Hahns and Greens believe that providing the coverage 
demanded by the HHS regulations is connected to the destruction of 
an embryo in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to 
provide the coverage. This belief implicates a difficult and important 
question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the 
circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act 
2006 WL 814731 (D.Hawai'i) United States District Court, D. Hawai'i, which stated in 
Instruction No 6 “You must not use any source outside the courtroom to assist you in 
deciding any question of fact. This means that you must not make an independent 
investigation of the facts or the law. For example, you must not visit the scene on your 
own, conduct experiments, or consult dictionaries, encyclopedias, textbooks, or other 
reference materials for additional information." 
22 As expressed by Justice Posner in University of Notre Dame v. Kathleen Sibelius 743 
F.3d 547 at 566 (7th Cir.) "Yet we are judges, not moral philosophers or theologians; this is
not a question of legal causation but of religious faith. Notre Dame tells us that Catholic
doctrine prohibits the action that the government requires it to take. So long as that belief is
sincerely held, I believe we should defer to Notre Dame's understanding."
23 "While tenure and pay for judges are often said to preserve judicial independence, the
more directly effective feature of court practice that maintains independence is the constant
duty of the judge to give reasons for decisions. This restrains arbitrary decisions and those
motivated by improper reasons. Decisions must be made to appear as an application of the
law, properly identified, and using legal reasoning where appropriate, to the true facts of a
case. Of course, the artful judge can make a decision appear a legally compelled one when
in reality it was not, and hidden motivations might apply. But this can only go so far; legal
reasoning is not nearly so radically indeterminate as has been claimed. Close analysis by
outsiders, as will be suggested, can cut through spurious window dressing in judgments."
David Prendergast, The Judicial Role in Protecting Democracy from Populism, 20
GERMAN L.J. 245, 258 (2019).
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that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or 
facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another.24 
Alito affixed a footnote (n34) to this passage, which reads: 
See, e.g., Oderberg, The Ethics of Co-operation in Wrongdoing, in 
Modern Moral Philosophy 203–228 (A. O’Hear ed. 2004); T. 
Higgins, Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics 353, 355 
(1949) (“The general principles governing cooperation” in 
wrongdoing—i.e., “physical activity (or its omission) by which a 
person assists in the evil act of another who is the principal agent”—
“present troublesome difficulties in application”); H. Davis, Moral 
and Pastoral Theology 341 (1935) (Cooperation occurs “when A 
helps B to accomplish an external act by an act that is not sinful, and 
without approving of what B does”).25 
The three named authors (Oderberg, Higgins, Davis), wrote in the 
years 2004, 1949, and 1935 respectively. Nevertheless, their approaches are 
consistent and form a discernable line of reasoning. For now, we will note 
that the footnoted quotation from Higgins and Davis each present a one-
line, and necessarily incomplete, introduction to the classical principals 
regulating personal “cooperation in wrongful actions” taken from Catholic 
moral theology,26 and that Oderberg himself takes up the argument in favor 
of this theory and its potential for assisting in judicial reasoning in his 2018 
book Opting Out.27 
The principles of cooperation will be further discussed in Part IV 
below. Before doing so, a number of considerations should be borne in 
mind. First, the law already employs its own methods for connecting (and—
importantly—disconnecting) actors with (and from) their actions.28 Thus, in 
the law of torts, for example, specifically in the law of negligence, there is 
24 Hobby Lobby (SC), supra note 6, at 724n19. 
25 Emphasis added. 
26 To debate whether there is a pertinent difference between moral theory and moral 
theology inside the Catholic Tradition is beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of 
moral theology, see Lehmkuhl, Augustinus, “Moral Theology” in THE CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA, vol. 14. (New York: Appleton 
1912), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14601a.htm. 
27 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 43.  
28 Moral philosophers may tend to use the word “agent” and “agency” more frequently 
when discussing persons who “act with moral intent,” but since the word “agent” has quite 
a separate meaning – for example, in the realm of commercial law (i.e. one who acts in a 
legal way to bind another person - usually named a principal - in contractual and 
sometimes other situations) I have chosen to use the word “actor.” 
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case law dealing with issues of “proximate causation.”29 Also, in the 
criminal law, there are acute questions raised by the law of the 
“accomplice” or the “accessory,” who assists someone in the process of 
committing a crime.30 Second, these pre-established methods of measuring 
culpability are, to some degree, already doing the job of the proposed 
principles of cooperation championed by Oderberg. Finally, and 
importantly, the principles of cooperation, while in one sense “obvious” in 
the general law and already in use to some degree, are at the same time 
ignored or neglected in the very context in which they appear most needed: 
the laws surrounding conscience protection. The reasons for this neglect 
will be reflected upon in Part IV’s discussion of triggers and optouts, to 
which I now turn. 
IV. WHOSE TRIGGER? WHICH OPT-OUT?
In this Part, I will delve more deeply into the issues of triggers as compared 
with opt-outs, as well as Oderberg’s advocacy for classical cooperation 
principles. Bridging the gap between philosophy and law is never easy. The 
language in each discipline is specialized, despite much overlap, and 
lawyers are more inclined to the practical art of peacemaking31 rather than 
the science of speculation. Before outlining the principles of moral 
cooperation in detail, one strange but often overlooked factor should be 
considered: any objection to cooperation, whether grounded in conscience 
or something else, must, of necessity, be expressed prior to the (wrongful) 
act itself. Anything occurring after the wrongful act is best described as 
history and cannot form the basis of a conscience claim. To this, we now 
turn with the assistance of some examples suggested by a moral philosopher 
other than Oderberg. 
A. Brief Excursus on Timing
29 For example, "[In Washington State,] proximate causation has two elements: cause-in-
fact and legal causation .. . Cause-in-fact “refers to the ‘but for’ consequences of an act—
the physical connection between an act and an injury.” . . . Legal causation depends on 
“policy determinations as to how far the consequences of a defendant's acts should extend.” 
City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2017)(citations 
omitted). 
30 See, e.g. discussion in United States v. Dinkins, 928 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2019). 
31 MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 103 (1994). Noting that lawyers
need “practise in discerning the precise issues in controversy, whether the disagreement is 
about means or about ends themselves. A trained eye for the issue enables lawyers to 
constructively disagree with their own clients as well as to narrow the scope of conflict 
between antagonists.” 
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The principles of moral culpability are regularly debated among moral 
philosophers.32 To illustrate the concept, for the next few paragraphs, I will 
take up the work of another moral philosopher, George Sher, who sets up a 
number of fact scenarios in his work exploring ideas in moral responsibility, 
particularly, its epistemic preconditions.33 For ease of reference, two of 
these scenarios are set out below. Their significance lies in helping the 
reader to consider who should be culpable in the situations outlined, and 
how (and why or whether) liability should be measured and doled out. 
Lawyers would consider such scenarios in their everyday practice and arrive 
at conclusions based on the law in their jurisdiction. It is not a leap to 
suggest that some lawyers in the world of common law would consider a 
tort, contract or criminal law theory “solution” for these scenarios but for 
our purposes this is not critical.34  
The scenarios not only explore the degree to which main 
protagonists are responsible for their actions, but also what reasoning might 
be used to justify conclusions of responsibility.35 In the case where 
responsibility is certain, the reader may be invited to prescribe a 
punishment, if any.  
The first two of Sher’s disarming scenarios are as follows: 
Children at their primary school. As usual, Alessandra is 
accompanied by the family’s border collie, Bathsheba, who rides in 
the back of the van. Although it is very hot, the pick-up has never 
taken long, so Alessandra leaves Sheba in the van while she goes to 
gather her children. This time, however, Alessandra is greeted by a 
tangled tale of misbehavior, ill-considered punishment, and 
administrative bungling which requires several hours of indignant 
sorting out. During that time, Sheba languishes, forgotten, in the 
locked car. When Alessandra and her children finally make it to the 
parking lot, they find Sheba unconscious from heat prostration.36 
On the Rocks. Julian, a ferry pilot, is nearing the end of a forty-
minute trip that he has made hundreds of times before. The only 
challenge in this segment of the trip is to avoid some submerged 
rocks that jut out irregularly from the mainland. However, just 
32 Lawyers are, of course, equally engaged in the quest, but from their own perspective. 
33 GEORGE SHER, WHO KNEW? RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT AWARENESS 1 (2009); 
[hereinafter Who Knew?]. 
34 Various statutory duties would also likely play a role. 
35 In most common law jurisdictions, judges must issue reasons for their decision. 
Unsurprisingly, these are typically called “reasons for decision.”  
36 Who Knew?, at 24. 
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because the trip is so routine, Julian’s thoughts have wandered to the 
previous evening’s pleasant romantic encounter. Too late, he 
realizes that he no longer has time to maneuver the ferry.37 
Other scenarios include Caught off Guard (in which a soldier on 
guard duty in a combat zone falls asleep), Home for the Holidays (in which 
a woman shoots her son having mistaken him for a burglar), Colicky Baby 
(in which an inexperienced baby-sitter uses alcohol to calm a distressed 
baby, and finally Bad Joke (in which a self-absorbed but non-malicious 
person tells jokes in poor taste thus causing unnecessary offense.38 Sher 
argues 39: 
An agent’s responsibility extends only as far as his awareness of 
what he is doing. He is responsible only for those acts he 
consciously chooses to perform, only for those omissions he 
consciously chooses to allow, and only for those outcomes he 
consciously chooses to bring about.40 
The point of the above brief foray into a world of moral theory is to 
pull back the curtain on the kinds of reasoning discussions that philosophers 
regularly use to explore the trickier issues of moral responsibility. For our 
purposes, it serves to unlock a realm of philosophical scrutiny of human 
actions that are the regular grist for the  philosophers’ (and lawyers’) mill.  
These scenarios also point to a very important differences between 
the problem of morally culpable causation and the “opt-out” problems that 
are the main subject matter of this article and which we will consider below. 
The differences are these: In the first place, opt-outs are claimed and 
debated (and sought by a conscientious objector) only  prior to the 
objectionable event/action in question. In contrast, causation is generally 
argued about (and decided upon) only after the damage has been done. This 
is a serious temporal difference and may well explain why lawyers appear 
to be missing the necessary toolbox of concepts to deal the problems on 
conscientious objection and opting out. Lawyers seem to be good at arguing 
about causation (they do it every day) but much less familiar with problems 
related to a prior request to opt out of cooperation with a particular action. 
The cooperation principles below, it is argued, are designed to fill this gap. 
In the second place, Sher’s focus on culpability being linked to the 
37 Id., at 24. 
38 For the full list of intriguing scenarios see Who Knew?, supra note 33, at 24–28. 
39 His book-length argument is not easily summarized and the full argument is beyond the 
scope of this discussion. 
40 Id., supra note 33, at 4. 
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moral agent’s awareness of what they are doing is also significant. Such 
awareness must be present in the case of a conscientious objection 
otherwise the objection is meaningless: One simply cannot argue a 
conscientious objection on the basis of something that one is unaware of 
being wrong in the first place. A conscientious objector “knows that X is 
wrong” and that knowing is critical.41 
B. The Cooperation Principles Considered
In acknowledging that the US Supreme Court took notice of his research 
work in the area of the “ethics of cooperation in wrongdoing,”42 Oderberg 
referred to an area of Catholic moral theology that had been around for a 
long time and yet remains relatively unknown outside the circles of 
theologians and philosophers. In his words:  
My [Opting Out] drew on a tradition of Catholic moral theology in 
which theologians—acting more as philosophers than as spokesmen 
for the Catholic religion—have developed a theory of the ethics of 
cooperation that is plausible in its own right and can be applied 
fruitfully to difficult cases. The theory itself has nothing particularly 
religious about it: it stands as a piece of moral philosophy.43 
Oderberg’s thoughts on the use of the ethics of cooperation are 
developed further in a full chapter of his book, Opting Out, which runs to 
nearly thirty pages of text.44 The Chapter is entitled: “Law Needs 
Philosophy: Principles of Cooperation.”45 The list of possibilities for 
cooperation apart from direct participation can be summarized as follows: 
• By advising (the wrongful act)
• By ordering (the wrongful act)
• By agreeing (to the wrongful act)
• By provoking (the wrongful act)
• By silence (in face of the wrongful act)
41 The objector could, of course, be wrong about whether the action in question is, in fact 
wrong – for example by holding a mistaken view about a moral principle – but that is not 
fatal to the argument being made.  
42 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 10–11. 
43 Id., at 11. 
44 Id., at 40–68. 
45 The disquieting subtitle is: HOW MIGHT YOU ACT WRONGLY? LET ME COUNT THE
WAYS. 
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• By defending the wrong done46
All of these acts, to some degree, compound47 the primary act of 
wrongdoing by adding yet another wrongful act into the mix. They are an 
additional wrong and they all implicate a person “in another person’s (or 
you own) wrongful primary act.”48 Such lists can, on the one hand, lead to 
scruples and over-thinking,49 and on the other hand, to appropriate caution 
and the possible avoidance of serious harm.50 
Cooperating in perfectly licit acts is not problematic. But once one 
crosses the line into morally questionable acts, any person who assists is 
implicated as well and this can lead not only to joint responsibility but also 
to requests to opt out. In a pluralistic society, the opportunities for conflict 
are many. 
1. Different Kinds of Cooperation
Oderberg’s first distinction is between different kinds of cooperation and 
centers upon the distinction between what is known as “formal and material 
cooperation.” Formal cooperation, in its essence, involves a shared intention 
between the primary actor and the (willing) assistant.51 Material 
46 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 40. For an example of a similar and relatively recent list in 
a Catholic pastoral context, see the JAMES D. WATKINS, MANUAL OF PRAYERS 48 (3 ed., 
1998): “Nine Ways of Assisting in Another’s Sin: By counsel, By command, By consent, 
By provocation, By praise or flattery, By concealment, By partaking, By silence, By 
defense of the ill done.” Many of these, for example, flattery, are the subject of 
considerable (but nowadays neglected) moral and theological reflection, which lies beyond 
the scope of this article. 
47 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 40–41 (emphasis in original). 
48 Id., at 40. 
49 Scrupulosity is a well-known spiritual/psychological disposition; see DERMOT CASEY, 
THE NATURE AND TREATMENT OF SCRUPLES (1950). For more recent work, see J. 
ABRAMOWITZ, D. MCKAY, & S. TAYLOR, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF OBSESSIVE-
COMPULSIVE DISORDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS (2007). 
50 “Scruples” can cut both ways. One may think, for example, of the caution displayed by 
the lone juror in the play Twelve Angry Men (Reginald Rose, 1954) where a single juror 
rightfully holds out for a verdict of “not guilty” in the light of overwhelming pressure to 
convict. The single juror’s scruples turn out to be the source of justice for an innocent 
accused. 
51 Oderberg notes, “formal cooperation involves a clear (explicit or maybe implicit) intent 
to share in the responsibility (or guilt) of the primary agent—the person whose initial act is 
the one with which cooperation can occur. If you assist someone to rob a bank with the 
intention that the bank be robbed, you are a formal cooperator. We should agree that this 
kind of purposive cooperation in wrongdoing is morally wrong and, when the primary act 
is criminal, it is usually an illegal act of aiding and abetting”; Opting Out, supra note 11, at 
44.
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cooperation, on the other hand, involves a situation where the assistant is 
induced into helping the principal actor, but such assistant does not share 
their intention(s) or will to perform the act. Once the assistant begins 
objecting to the course of action, they immediately move from being merely 
“unwilling cooperators” into the realm of the “conscientious objector.” 
Formal cooperators are not objecting (they are intending the same as the 
principal actor) and so, we leave them to one side.  
In the case of material cooperators, another question immediately 
presents itself: how will material cooperators know whether their actions 
are morally permissible? If we assume that the principal act is wrong, how 
can we tell if the “assisting actions” (the cooperator’s “means of helping”) 
are also wrong? One way to find out is to ask whether their actions are 
“morally neutral” or “indifferent.”52 If so, then it could be (impermissible) 
material cooperation.53 But this is not the end of the matter. Another critical 
challenge is to decide whether the help offered is “mediate or immediate.” 
As Oderberg notes, this can be a subtle issue. He notes:  
What needs to be ascertained is whether the cooperator is sharing in 
the primary act as if they were an accomplice without being an 
accomplice. In other words, had the cooperator not been unwilling, 
would their act have been one of joint participation, whether in 
whole or in part, with the primary act? Helping someone carry away 
stolen goods is therefore immediate cooperation, whereas locating 
the target or driving the getaway care is mediate cooperation.54 
Obviously, the more immediate is the cooperation, the more moral 
guilt the actor will bear—despite any objection to participating in the first 
place or at all.55 
2. Layers of Analysis
Beyond immediacy (as against mediacy) lie yet further layers of analysis: 
(1) dispensability, (2) proximity, and (3) the “balancing [of] goods and
bads.”56 These classifications take up much space in Oderberg’s analysis, so
only a brief discussion is needed here. An overarching consideration is the
52 Id., at 45. 
53 Oderberg uses the example of handing over a set of keys: “Handing over one’s own keys 
is itself morally, so is passing on public information. If either act assists another to enter a 
house for the purpose of theft, it can be impermissible material cooperation”; id.  
54 Id., at 45–46. 
55 As we will see below, a higher level of objection may then become appropriate.  
56 Id., at 50. 
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fact that we cannot avoid all evil in this world. Regardless of what we do, 
we will, in some way, “participate” in others’ actions and some of those 
actions will be evil. Still, the more analytic tools that are available, the 
sharper our analysis can be in difficult cases. It is to the discussion of such 
extended tools that we now turn.  
1. Dispensability. In the case of dispensability versus indispensability, we
must ask about the dependency of the primary agent on the assistance of the
cooperator. This is a practical issue by which we learn whether “practically
speaking, [the primary act] cannot be performed . . . without . . .
cooperation.”57 For example, “[p]roviding a burglar with the code to a safe
that only you know is as indispensable as can be, assuming no other means
of success. Handing the burglar the keys to your car is dispensable,
assuming the burglar could threaten anyone else to do the same with their
car.”58
2. Proximity. In the case of proximity (as against remoteness) of the
assistance the question is to “measure” the distance between “the
cooperative act [and] . . . the primary act, primarily but not solely in space
and time.”59 This is a matter of investigating the cooperator’s causal role in
the primary act.60 By way of example, “we can see that selling petrol to a
driver on the way to a burglary, even if the seller knows what the driver is
up to, is quite remote. Giving specific directions to the house is more
proximate.” 61 Oderberg argues that we should ask, “how many key causal
steps were there from the assistance to the primary act? The more steps
involved, the more there is that can go wrong, or the more events can
intervene to prevent the assistance from being effective.”62
3. Balancing Goods and Bads. The issues of causation are now put to one
side and the focus is upon “what reasons the cooperator might have for
57 Id., at 47. 
58 Id. 
59 Id., at 48. 
60 Id. 
61 Id., at 48. The example continues: “It is a question of what we might call  
executive character”: is what the cooperator is doing so close, causally, to the primary act 
that it is a small step away from doing it themselves? Or, at the other extreme, is the 
cooperator so far removed from the main act that they are hardly more of an assistant than 
anyone else who is not involved at all? Between these extremes lies a broad spectrum, and 
it takes much subtlety of judgment and attention to detail—something at which judges are 
expert—to come to a reasonable conclusion about where a cooperator stands in the 
circumstances of the case”; id. 
62 Id., at 49. A longer discussion of proximity follows.  
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assisting the primary agent, and whether those reasons are sufficient to 
justify the particular kind of cooperation they perform.”63 This analysis 
seeks to balance “the badness of the act with which the person is 
cooperating against the bad outcome that they are seeking to avoid by 
cooperating.”64  
3. Refining “Reasonable Principles”
After considering the above three general principles, Oderberg segues into a 
discussion of their application and practical aspects of the above analytic 
tools. He also adds a number of refining “reasonable principles,” which we 
must we apply if we are to live without the constant worry of cooperating in 
the wrongs of others. After noting that conscientious objection cases 
involve establishing that the objector “sincerely believes the primary act, 
concerning which cooperation is an issue, is wrong on religious or broadly 
ethical grounds,”65 the following “reasonable principles” are suggested:  
• Formal cooperation and immediate material cooperation (mostly)
are morally off limits66
• Cooperation can involve omissions to act, as well as their
commission67
• A proportionality assessment is available in cases of mediate
cooperation.68
• The more serious the wrong with which you are potentially
cooperating, the greater must be the avoidance of loss that
cooperation procures.69
• Balancing “goods and bads” is not a mere mathematical exercise.
We have to look at the situation in front of us, the competing goods
and bads, their levels of seriousness or importance and come to
63 Id., at 50–51. 
64 Id., at 51. 
65 Id., at 52. 
66 In the case of the latter, this is because “this involves joint performance of all or part of 
the primary act, so it should be ruled out on conscience grounds—at least in situations 
where the act the cooperator is performing, by its very nature or its unavoidable 
circumstances, is also wrong”; id., at 53 (bottom). 
67 Id., at 54.  
68 Id., at 55. Examples given include the (moderate) pain caused by a dentist in treating a 
patient, or short car trips for minor reasons (e.g. milk purchase) which cause pollution but 
are not justified.  
69 Id. 
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reasonable judgments.70 
• Burdens imposed on those who object (e.g. those inflicted by
governments) should reasonably reflect the importance of the
objecting and not be a mere exercise in “compliance.”71 This should
minimize the extent to which [the government’s] promotion of the
[compelling] interest captures conscientious objectors within its
net.72
• [T]he more the cooperator is implicated in the primary act (using
proximity and dispensability as guides), and the more serious the
primary act itself, the more serious the reason they need in order to
be morally justified in cooperating.73
• The more indispensable the cooperation, the greater the reason must
be for assisting.74
• The more proximate the cooperation, the greater the reason
needed.75
• In general, highly proximate, indispensable cooperation in a very
serious wrong . . . could only ever be justified by a very grave risk to
the cooperator (e.g. a gun to the head)76
• If the cooperation is dispensable, or not highly proximate, the
justification bar is lowered; not mathematically but according to
reasonable judgment77
• When the seriousness of the wrong is decreased, the seriousness of
the reason is reduced as well.78
In closing the section, Oderberg argues that judges are typically very
good at dealing with these kinds and models of reasoning. Therefore, he 
advocates a common law approach. He asks, “[w]hy not allow, perhaps 
over a period of years or decades, a common law of cooperation to evolve in 
response to cases of conscience that come before the courts?”79 
The closing pages of Chapter Four of Opting Out ask Should you 
70Id., at 56. This involves a hierarchy: “Losses to life and limb are more important than 
financial losses; serious public harm is worse than serious private harm; certain harms are 
worse than merely probably or barely possible harms”; id.  
71 Id., at 57–58. Oderberg suggests using the “strict scrutiny” standard adopted in the US 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  
72 Id., at 57. 
73 Id., at 58. 
74 Id., at 61. 
75 Id. 
76 Id., at 62. 
77 Id., at 63. 
78 Id.  
79 Id., at 64 (emphasis in original). 
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sign? Oderberg’s answer is, “It depends.”80 For the sake of convenience, 
this will be considered in greater detail below in Part IV. Before that, the 
practical application of the “cooperation principles” to hard cases are 
deliberated upon in Chapter 5, to which we now turn. 
C. Cooperation Principles in “Hard Cases”
Oderberg considers a number of major cases from the United States and 
United Kingdom (principally Hobby Lobby, Zubik, Doogan and Wood),81 
including those generated by statutory rights in laws like the UK Equality 
Acts, to illustrate his position on the cooperation principles. In arguing for 
an “objective theory”82 of cooperation, he confronts the tendency in 
Western courts to avoid questions of the reasonableness of religious belief 
and to focus solely on the sincerity of that belief. This preference by courts 
lies at the heart of the argument in favor of using principles like those he 
advocates because the current tendency, he argues, wrongly considers “their 
belief about whether they are cooperating illicitly [in a wrongful action] as 
itself as matter of religion, when it is not.”83 
If I have understood the argument correctly, it is important here to 
draw a careful line about what Oderberg is not saying: he is not saying that 
all (or any) questions of religious belief are to be measured and judged by 
courts under the lens of “reasonableness.” Clearly, that would lie outside the 
area of expertise of the judiciary and is best left to theologians and 
philosophers. What he is saying, however, is that on the sole question of 
whether someone is cooperating with someone else in a wrongful act is a 
question that courts can and should deliberate and decide. We will return to 
the reasons for this below. 
Before doing so, it is prudent to take a short detour and to consider 
an important case in which a court has done the “right thing” by leaving 
religious questions to one side. The case—cited in passing by Oderberg84—
is that of Thomas (1981)85 and concerns a Jehovah’s Witness who refused 
to work on gun turrets but would, he averred, be happy to work in the 
foundry that made the steel which was used in making those same turrets. 
The Free Exercise claim in that case was based on the following (as 
explained by the US Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals): 
80 Id. 
81 Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board (2013) CSIH 36. 
82 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 71.  
83 Id., at 75 (emphasis in original). 
84 Id., at 71.  
85 Thomas v. Review Bd., supra note 68. 
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The [**55] plaintiff in Thomas was a Jehovah’s Witness who had 
worked for a company that owned both a foundry and factory. The 
foundry processed sheet steel for a variety of industrial purposes. 
The factory manufactured turrets for military tanks. The plaintiff 
started working at the foundry but was transferred to the factory. 
Although he had no objection to working in the foundry, he raised a 
religious objection to his factory job, claiming that “he could not 
work on weapons without violating the principles of his religion.” 
Thomas, 450 US at 710. He quit his job and was eventually denied 
unemployment benefits. He then challenged this decision as 
improperly burdening his right to exercise his religion, a claim 
which ultimately reached the Supreme Court.86 
 
For our purposes, and knowing what we now know about the principles of 
cooperation, this seems like a classic case just begging for the court to apply 
them to resolve the issue. In this case, it was a clear question of proximity to 
the weapons for war and the distinction between making guns and making 
steel was the relevant difference. But the Supreme Court did not see it that 
way. Instead, the Court kept away from such issues and stated instead 
(again I am using the Tenth Circuit Court’s analysis of the case): 
 
As to the distinction between factory and foundry work, the Court 
reasoned that “[the plaintiff’s] statements reveal no more than that 
he found work in the . . . foundry sufficiently insulated from 
producing [*1139] weapons of war. We see, therefore, that [the 
plaintiff] drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew 
was an unreasonable one.” Id. at 715. In other words, the distinction 
that the plaintiff drew was not as important as the fact that he made 
it based upon his religious beliefs. Once the plaintiff drew this line, 
it did not matter whether the line was “acceptable, logical, 
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First 
Amendment protection.87 
 
For the cooperation principles, such reasoning is a death knell. Courts 
must retreat from any analysis of the reasonableness of cooperation claims 
and take them at their face value. No doubt such an approach gives the court 
(any court) a chance to show clean hands in the light of bias allegations or 
the hint of interference with the work of the theologian or minister. The 
question is whether this abrogation is worth the result. 
Turning to practical application in the major cases mentioned above, 
 
86 Hobby Lobby (10th Cir.), supra note 6, at 1138. 
87 Id., at 1138–1139. 
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Oderberg’s analysis presents a serious challenge to the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Hobby Lobby (SC), and by extension, in Zubik. While the 
Court took notice of the cooperation principles in Hobby Lobby (SC) 
(hence, the footnote to the work of Oderberg and others),88 it refused to look 
at the reasonableness of the belief and so excluded any recourse to 
cooperation principles. In following up in Zubik, the Court effectively 
doubled-down on the alleged error, because in that case (so the argument 
goes), the Little Sisters of the Poor (who refused to sign the opt-out Form) 
mistakenly saw their opt-out as a trigger for cooperation. If the Court had 
employed cooperation principles in that case, then this supposed error 
would not have arisen. 
This is an especially interesting issue, since the amicus brief from 67 
Catholic theologians in Hobby Lobby (10th Cir.)89 also applied the 
cooperation principles and concluded that under those principles the 
Plaintiffs would in fact cooperating. In a later, and separate, amicus brief 
from 50 Catholic Theologians and Ethicists in Zubik, the same principles 
were again rehearsed. Critically, they concluded that even signing the “opt-
out” Form 700 would have involved cooperation and so was morally 
proscribed. Oderberg sees a serious problem with this approach when he 
states, “the objectors in Little Sisters of the Poor and then in Zubik, 
however, objected to the very accommodation itself. . . . The objectors . . . 
considered the very act of opting out to be illicit cooperation, relying 
precisely on Hobby Lobby for their argument.”90 
Whether this apparent contradiction creates a problem for those arguing 
for the use of cooperation principles is an interesting question. The 50 
theologians make numerous arguments and even go so far as to state that 
any signature on Form 700 would amount to formal cooperation. A fuller 
analysis of their brief and the earlier one (discussed immediately above) 
appears in the next section. 
D. The Theologians’ Briefs in Light of Oderberg’s
Analysis
At least two major amicus briefs were submitted to the US Supreme Court, 
both of which bore on the question of cooperation in the sense discussed by 
Oderberg. The first was given in Hobby Lobby (SC), signed by “67 Catholic 
Theologians and Ethicists” in support of the petitioners,91 and the second 
88 Hobby Lobby (SC), supra note 6, at n34. 
89 Brief for the 67 Catholic Theologians and Ethicists as Amicus Curiae, footnote, Hobby 
Lobby (10th Cir.) [hereinafter 67 Theologians]. 
90 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 73–74. 
91 67 Theologians, supra note 89, at 19. 
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was signed by “50 Catholic Theologians and Ethicists” given in Zubik.92 
There is considerable overlap in the identities and qualifications of those 
signing in both cases. 
4. The 67 Theologians
The 67 Theologians put forward at least six arguments against the Mandate, 
all of which claimed that to comply with it would make the petitioners 
“complicit in religiously forbidden actions.”93 In summary, these were: 
(1) The mandate forces employers to cooperate in at least two
distinct activities that are gravely objectionable under Catholic
doctrine viz: (i) The mandate requires employers to finance the use
of abortifacients, contraceptives, and sterilizations, which are
gravely objectionable to Catholics and (ii) The Mandate requires
employers to finance “education and counseling” that will instruct
and encourage persons to use abortifacients and contraceptives.94
Any increase in gravity (of the wrong) will result in a need to show
“more significant . . . good . . . to justify cooperation.”95 Any harm
to third parties, especially to the innocent is especially
problematic.96 Financing the use of use of abortifacients,
contraceptives, and sterilization is treated separately from the
financing of “education and counseling” on their use. Financing is
considered to be “very substantial and direct participation by
employers in actions forbidden by their religious principles.”97
Likewise “[t]he employers’ involvement in these objectionable
actions is triggered by only one intervening cause, namely the
decision of the employee who seeks the objectionable services.”98
92 Brief for the 50 Catholic Theologians and Ethicists as Amicus Curiae, p. 19, Zubik 
[hereinafter 50 Theologians]. 
93 67 Theologians, supra note 89, at 6. 
94 Id., at  9–14. 
95 Id., at 9, citing GARY ATKINSON ET AL., A MORAL EVALUATION OF CONTRACEPTION AND
STERILIZATION 79–80 (1979). This is not to be confused with Bentham’s well-known 
felicific calculus which seeks to balance pleasure against pain; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789).  
96 “the graver . . . the evil of the principal agent’s act in itself,” and “the graver . . . is the 
harm which may be causes to third parties, especially the innocent,” by the objectional 
action”; 67 Theologians, supra note 89, at 9, citing Anthony Fisher, Cooperation in Evil, in 
COOPERATION, COMPLICITY & CONSCIENCE 27, 54 (Helen Watt ed., 2005). 
97 67 Theologians, supra note 89, at 4. The brief continues by noting, “[the Mandate] 
requires them to finance a large proportion of the cost—both of the services themselves, 
and of the education and counseling designed to promote such services.” 
98 Id., at 4. 
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This is contrasted with the “casual contribution” a taxpayer an 
objectionable government program which is “less substantial and 
direct” form of cooperation.99 A significant problem with the 
“education and counseling” prohibition is that it causes scandal 
which is an independent wrong (sin) that encourages or exhorts 
another person to engage in wrongdoing.100 This is dealt with further 
below.  
(2) The mandate requires employers to make substantial and direct
contributions to morally objectionable actions.101There follows a
discussion of the “proximity vs. remoteness” criteria in the context
of cooperation.102 Here, use is made of the death penalty example
which poses the question of the taxpayer who “pays her federal
taxes, knowing that a portion . . . may ultimately be used . . . to
finance the federal death penalty.”103 The hypothetical taxpayer
would have few qualms making such payments but if the
government were to command here to “personally finance a large
portion of the cost of the drugs for a lethal injection, instead of
paying her taxes”104 she may well become very reluctant because
she would sense that her participation in the objected-to activity (the
imposition of the death penalty) had greatly increased. Her
participation would in the latter case be more substantial and more
direct. Analogies are then drawn with the worker in Thomas
(discussed above) who refused to work in a foundry that made
weapons but was able to help make steel that “might” be so used at a
later point in time.105 Proximity would also be increased because the
Mandate does not allow for costing sharing at the time of
purchase.106 This fact rounds out the death penalty example since the
employer contributions in the case of the Mandate would be “many
orders of magnitude greater than the contribution of an objecting
99 Id. 
100 Id., at 14.  
101 Id., at 15.  
102 Id., at 15–19. 
103 Id., at 16. 
104Id.  
105 Id., 16-17, citing Thomas v. Review Bd., supra note 68, at 711.  
106 67 Theologians, supra note 89, at 17, noting that under “42 USC. § 300gg-13(a), the 
proportion of the cost financed by the employer is the proportion of the insurance 
premiums paid by the employer—on average, 82 percent of the premiums for employees 
with individual coverage, and 72 percent of the premiums for employees with family 
coverage,” citing The Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health Benefits 2012 Annual 
Survey 1 (2012), https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/8345-employer-health-
benefits-annual-survey-full-report-0912.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2019). 
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Catholic taxpayer to any particular federal execution.”107 
(3) The mandate may require employers to become “necessary” or
“essential” causes of objectionable actions.108 In colloquial terms,
this is to ask whether the immoral action would have happened
anyway—with or without the helper’s cooperation. Again, there is a
graded approach since “[t]he more difficult it would be for the
principal agent to proceed without the cooperator’s involvement, the
more serious the justification required to cooperate.”109
(4) The mandate requires employers to provide funding earmarked
in advance to be used for objectionable purposes.110 Again this
highlights the “essential tie” between the employers actions and the
objectionable conduct with added emphasis on the provision by the
employer of a “certificate” which proves that link. The amici use a
“steakhouse example” which is worth quoting in full:
[P]aying a salary and providing insurance coverage for certain
services are far from equivalent. The difference is analogous to the
difference between giving cash to someone, and giving, say, a gift
certificate to a steakhouse. In the former case, the money you give
could be used to buy steak, but there is no essential tie between your
gift and that particular use of it. In the latter case, you are giving a
voucher for the procurement of a specific and limited range of goods
and services; there is an intelligible link between your gift and the
use to which the recipient might put it.”111
Thus, complicity112 is potentially greater in the case where there is 
provision of a “voucher” or “certificate” than when there is no such 
provision. This was a major issue for Catholics in the Federal Republic of 
Germany during the 1990s controversy over abortion counseling by 
Catholics—even requiring intervention by Pope (now Saint) John Paul II, 
who urged the cessation of such certification. Two other matters are 
relevant here: 
107 67 Theologians, supra note 89, at 17. 
108 Id., at 19–21. 
109 Id., at 19-20 citing Fisher, Cooperation in Evil, supra note 96, at 55. 
110 67 Theologians, supra note 89, at 21–24. 
111 Id., at 21–22, citing Melissa Moschella, The HHS Mandate and Judicial Theocracy, THE
PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Jan 3, 2013), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/01/7403/. 
112 I mean here moral complicity. From the standpoint of the laws of evidence, the presence 
of a signed form obviously increases legal complicity as well, or at the least it increases the 
potential for such complicity via court-presented evidence. 
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(1) Providing the objectionable insurance coverage would require
Catholic employers to disregard guidance of the Catholic Bishops.113
Such guidance is entitled to “deference, respect and obedience”114
and makes up a vital part of the process of conscience formation for
the faithful.115 Moreover, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops
(USCCB) has spoken directly on the precise issues in play.116
(2) One may reasonably conclude that no proportionate reason
justifies the substantial, direct, and necessary cooperation in grave
moral wrongs required by the mandate.117 Once again, the brief
refers to the situation in Germany (see below) and to Directives of
the USBBC forbidding “immediate material cooperation in abortion
procedures.”118
The 67 Theologians round off their arguments by noting that in 
consideration of all of the above, Catholic employers are confronted with “a 
perfect storm of moral complicity”119 and conclude that “the Mandate 
substantially burdens their religious freedom [and] reflects an eminently 
reasonable application of theological principles.”120 
5. The 50 Theologians
The 50 Theologians divide their arguments into three major sections: those 
implicating formal cooperation, those implicating unjustified material 
113 67 Theologians, supra note 89, at 24–25. 
114 Id., at 24.  
115 See generally Anthony Fisher, Conscience in Ethics and the Contemporary Crisis of 
Authority, in CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE 37–70 (E. 
Sgreccia and J. Laffitte eds., 2008).  
116 67 Theologians, supra note 89, at 24–25, citing United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops Ad Hoc Committee for Religious Liberty, Our First, Most Cherished 
Liberty: A Statement on Religious Liberty, USCB ISSUES AND ACTION (2019) 
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/our-first-most-cherished-
liberty.cfm and United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and 
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services at ¶45. An updated version 




117 67 Theologians, supra note 89, at 25–27. 
118 Id., at 26.  
119 Id.  
120 Id., at 27.  
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cooperation, and those related to scandal. The material cooperation 
arguments encompass a further four sub-arguments, which will be 
considered in more detail below. 
The arguments based on formal cooperation121 begin by outlining 
the following conscience-violating activities:  
• To arrange for or make payments for contraceptives,
sterilization, and abortifacients;
• To take action that triggers the provision of such coverage;
• To maintain a health plan or ongoing insurance relationship
through which the Government arranges to provide such
coverage;
• Or to participate in a scheme, the sole purpose of which is to
provide such products.122
To engage in any of these actions would amount to a grave violation 
in light of “a reasonable interpretation of the Catholic faith.”123 Moreover, 
such action may also amount to formal cooperation, which involves the 
sharing of an intention to commit the wrong action. The classic hypothetical 
case, which is discussed at length, is that of the servant who holds a ladder 
for their master who is determined to commit a burglary, or, on another 
scenario, adultery. A discussion of this hypothetical by the well-known 
twentieth-century philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe124 in the context of the 
morality of nuclear weapons is brought forward in support, as is her reliance 
upon a papal bull issued by Pope Innocent XI in 1679.125 Such acts of 
121 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 8–15. 
122 Id., at 9. 
123 Id. Note that the operative verbs are: to arrange, to take action (to act), to maintain, and 
to participate. 
124 Anscombe (1919–2001) is noted especially for her works INTENTION (1957) and 
MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1958). She was a student of Wittgenstein and was named as 
one of his literary executors after his death. Anscombe was a major intellectual opponent to 
the use of nuclear weapons and refused to participate in the 1956 Oxford ceremony to 
award an honorary degree to US President Harry Truman; see Michael Wee, The Catholic 
Philosopher Who Clashed with a US President Over Nuclear War, THE CATHOLIC HERALD 
(Aug. 17, 2017), https://catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2017/08/17/the-catholic-
philosopher-who-clashed-with-a-us-president-over-nuclear-war/. 
125 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 10, citing G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, WAR AND MURDER, IN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE 58 (Walter Stein ed. 1981). The 
papal bull is available in translation in Charles F. Capps, Formal and Material Cooperation 
with Evil, 89 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 681, 690 (2015), cited in 
50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 10. 
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cooperation are illicit even if (1) they are performed under duress126and (2) 
even if the “master” ultimately fails in their wicked scheme.127 
Applying this reasoning to the case at hand, the government is cast 
in the role of “criminous master”128 and the employers are seen as 
“servants” who are being forced to act against their wills. And since the 
government’s plan is clearly to “promote the availability and usage of 
contraceptives, abortifacients, and elective sterilization,”129 employers who 
participate would be engaged in formal cooperation with those ends.  
To round off this argument, the 50 Theologians reprise the well-
known “the end does not justify the means” argument by pointing out that 
even if the Petitioners were to act only to avoid “crippling financial 
penalties,” they would still be in breach of the moral norm of their faith.130 
In their own words, this is because, “compliance with the Mandate would 
involve choosing an objectively immoral means (formally cooperating with 
wrongdoing) to achieve an otherwise acceptable end (avoiding the Act’s 
financial penalties), which is never permissible under Catholic doctrine.”131 
The Petitioners actions would thus rise to the level of a “shared 
intention” because compliance “with knowledge” of the Government’s 
(published and publicly known) intention would mean that such an intention 
was undeniable.132  
The objectionable action required in this case was the submission of 
a Form 700 or of an “HHS Notice” both of which were “specifically 
designed to enable the Government to authorize or obligate others to engage 
in gravely wrongful actions, regardless of whether the others actually 
perform those actions.”133 The implications of a signature are dealt with 
below, as is the 50 Theologians’ reliance on the 1995 case of Pope John 
Paul II’s intervention in the German abortion counseling cases. Analogies 
with “a gift certificate for a specific product, a gadget designed for a unique 
126 For a discussion on the limits of duress, see ANTHONY FISHER, CATHOLIC BIOETHICS
FOR A NEW MILLENIUM (2012), at 75–76. 
127 This is confirmed a little further on in the brief; see 50 Theologians, supra note 82, at 
12, citing Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York v. Sebelius, 987 F.Supp.2d 232, 243 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013): “This alleged spiritual complicity is independent of whether the scheme 
actually succeeds in providing contraceptive coverage.” 
128 Anscombe, supra note 113, at 58, cited in 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 10. 
129 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 10, citing US Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 
Health Resources and Services Administration, Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines. 
Updated version (Oct. 2017) available at https://www.hrsa.gov/womens-guidelines-
2016/index.html. 
130 Id., at 11.  
131 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 11–12, citing CATHOLIC CHURCH, CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶1753 (1994); [hereinafter Catechism].  
132 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 12.  
133 Id., at 13.  
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use, or a form that authorizes a specific act”134 will be addressed later in this 
discussion.  
The second set of considerations offered by the 50 Theologians 
relate to material (not formal) cooperation and comprise four main sub-
arguments:  
• Compliance with the Mandate requires cooperation in
actions that are gravely wrongful under Catholic doctrine
• Compliance with the Mandate could cause Petitioners to
become necessary or “but-for” causes of gravely wrongful
actions
• Petitioners can reasonably conclude that the Catholic bishops
have counseled against complying with the Mandate
• Petitioners may reasonably conclude that no proportionate
reason justifies material cooperation in grave wrongdoing,
including the taking of innocent human life.135
These will be dealt with in order. First, as to the question of gravity, 
the 50 Theologians emphasize that “the graver the wrongdoing, the more 
problematic is cooperation in that wrongdoing.”136 Accordingly, a greater 
justification is needed “the graver . . . the evil of the principal agent’s act in 
itself,” and “the graver . . . is the harm which may be caused to third parties, 
especially the innocent,” by the objectionable action.137 In other words, the 
wrong and its justification must bear some sort of proportionate 
relationship. Since abortion,138 contraception,139 and elective sterilization140 
are seriously wrong under Catholic teaching, any cooperation with the 
Mandate would be gravely wrongful. In none of these cases is there a 
relevant offsetting justification available.141 Since the Government was also 
requiring “patient education and counseling” in relation to the wrongful act, 
134 Id. 
135Id., at 17, 20, 22, and 24, respectively. 
136 Id., at 17. 
137 Id., citing Fisher, Cooperation in Evil, supra note 96, at 27, 54. 
138 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 17–18, citing Catechism, supra note 131, at ¶2270. 
139 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 18–19, citing Catechism, supra note 131, at ¶2370. 
140 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 19, citing Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the 




141 Full discussion of the pastoral, philosophical and theological intricacies of these 
positions is beyond the scope of this paper. See further, WHY HUMANAE VITAE IS STILL
RIGHT (Janet E. Smith ed., 2018) and JANET E. SMITH AND CHRISTOPHER KACZOR, LIFE
ISSUES, MEDICAL CHOICES (2016), and the works there cited. 
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such education and counseling would also be considered wrongful.142 Brief 
mention is made of the problems of scandal, as to which see Part VI. 
Second, the 50 Theologians consider the problem of “but-for” 
causation in any participation in the Mandate by the Petitioners. Causation 
is a known and much-discussed concept for lawyers,143 especially in areas 
such a tortious liability and damages but must here be considered in a more 
theological/philosophical sense. In their own words, “one considers whether 
the believer is a “necessary” or “essential” contributor to the objectionable 
action.”144 There are several factors to consider, including indispensability 
and foreseeability. Citing Benedict Ashley, indispensability is: 
 particularly problematic when one “participate[s] in the evil act by 
doing something necessary for the actual performance of the evil 
act,” such that “one’s action contributes to the active performance of 
the evil action so much so that the evil action could not be 
performed without the help of the cooperator.145 
As with formal cooperation discussed above, justification must be 
proportionate to the wrong contemplated, and stronger justification will be 
required “[i]forgoing the [cooperation] certainly or probably would prevent 
the wrongdoing or impede it and greatly mitigate its bad effects.”146 Put 
another way, ““the more difficult it would be for the principal agent to 
proceed without the cooperator’s involvement,” the more serious the 
justification required to cooperate.”147 
Reasonable foreseeability also plays a role here since if Petitioner’s 
choose to submit the relevant Form “it is reasonably foreseeable that their 
actions will contribute to the use of abortifacients, contraception, and 
142 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 19–20, noting, “In the report upon which the 
Mandate’s contraceptive requirements are based, the Institute of Medicine made clear that 
the intended purpose of the contraceptive education and counseling requirement is to 
increase the use of contraceptives, including those that function as abortifacients. . . . There 
can be no doubt that such “education and counseling” programs will instruct and encourage 
women to use abortifacients and contraceptives, and thus tend to increase such wrongful 
actions.” 
143 See Honoré, Antony, & Gardner, John “Causation in the law”, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed. Winter 2010), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-law/. 
144 Id., 20. 
145 Id., at 21, citing BENEDICT M. ASHLEY, JEAN BLOIS, & KEVIN D. O’ROURKE, HEALTH
CARE ETHICS 56 (5th ed. 2006). 
146  50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 21, citing GERMAIN GRISEZ, DIFFICULT MORAL
QUESTIONS, 882–883 (1997). 
147 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 51, citing Fisher, Cooperation in Evil, supra note 96, 
at 55. 
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sterilization that otherwise would not have happened.”148 This is confirmed 
by “the fact that the Government, by enforcing the Mandate, evidently 
intends to increase the incidence of the forbidden actions.”149 
But-for causation also raises issues surrounding the “trigger effect” 
of a signature, as to which see Part IV. 
The third sub-argument relates to the fact that the Catholic bishops 
have counseled against complying with the Mandate and this was well-
known to the Petitioners.150 The “deference, respect, and obedience” owed 
to the Bishops is grounded in the Catholic Catechism.151 The individual 
conscience must also take this into account.152 
The fourth sub-argument reiterates that there is no proportionate 
reason which would justify cooperation in such grave matters, including the 
taking of innocent human life.153 The arguments related to scandal are dealt 
with in detail in Part VI. 
To recap, The 50 Theologians three major sections: those 
implicating formal cooperation, those implicating unjustified material 
cooperation, and those related to scandal all prohibit Catholic employers 
from participation in the Mandate, all converge to a point where 
participation is morally fraught. As foreshadowed, the particular issues of 
signature and the associated trigger it provides will be discussed below.  
In terminology and reasoning, the reader will note the similarities 
between the briefs of the 67 Theologians, the 50 Theologians and that of 
Oderberg. There are also some significant similarities between these 
arguments and their concomitant reasoning about cooperation, and those put 
forward by Oderberg. Given their common origins, this should come as no 
surprise. The points of difference, however, invite some serious reflection 
and comparison: why does Oderberg consider the question of belief about 
cooperation differently from that of the Supreme Court, and by implication, 
from that of the 67 and the 50? Why does Oderberg not see signature of 
Form 700 as problematic, when the amici in both of those briefs are clearly 
are so trenchantly against such a signature? And, what are the implications 
for the use of the cooperation principles in the way Oderberg suggests as 
148 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 22.  
149 Id. 
150 Id., at 22–23. 
151 Id., at 22, noting, “[t]he bishops are viewed as “authentic teachers, that is, teachers 
endowed with the authority of Christ, who preach the faith to the people entrusted to them, 
the faith to be believed and put into practice.”; Catechism, supra note 131, at ¶2034.” 
152 50 Theologians, supra note 82, at 23, noting, “The Catholic’s individual conscience 
“should take account of … the authoritative teaching of the Magisterium on moral 
questions,” and “[p]ersonal conscience and reason should not be set in opposition to the 
moral law or the Magisterium of the Church.” Catechism, supra note 131, at ¶2039.” 
153 50 Theologians, supra note 82, at 24. 
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part of an “opting out” possibility which is enshrined by statute? Other 
questions of scandal and sincerity also flow out of these questions to which 
I now turn in greater detail. 
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FORM 700 SIGNATURE
A. Signatures as a Sign of Assent
According to Fuller’s classic exposition, a signature will normally indicate 
three important things:154 First, the assent of the signer to that which is 
signed. In a legal context, this satisfies the requirement of consent to, for 
example, a contract or a testamentary statement like a will. Consent is, of 
course, the bedrock concept of contract155 (and, to a lesser degree) tort 
theory in most western legal systems.156 Second, a signature affirms the 
identity of the person who is signing. In simplest terms, that identity is 
summarized via a unique human identifier—a person’s name—and it is 
“their name” that is here set out and also affirmed. Finally, a signature links 
a particular person (the signer) with the document that is signed. Lawyers 
will sometimes refer to this aspect as “attribution.” All three aspects 
normally occur simultaneously and are part of an entire process known 
collectively by terms such as legal attestation, autograph or simply 
“signature.”157 There are other variations and additions on this overall 
theme—such as witnessing, swearing, sealing and delivering—but these can 
be laid to one side for now. 
In lay terms, signing indicates the serious (legal) nature of what we 
are doing. Usually, the more serious the task, the more formalities the law 
will require. The purchase of a newspaper subscription (which may or may 
not need a signature) is not an especially formal transaction compared to, 
say, the purchase of a house, or the execution of a will. 
The quote from Miller’s play The Crucible at the beginning of this 
154 Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). For a recent 
reconsideration of Fuller in the context of the different theories of contractual liability see 
Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon 
Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2000). 
155 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (2019)(4th ed.) § 71:12. Loss of "free will" or similar
expressions—Coerced consent. 
156 See WARD FARNSWORTH, MARK F. GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS (2019), 14ff
(Consent and Its Limits). See also 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 767 American
Jurisprudence (2019) discussing the principle volenti non fit injuria, [which] “means that a 
person is not legally injured if he or she has consented to the act complained of or was 
willing that it should occur.” At § 767. 
157 Traditionally this is done by hand—a holographic signature. ‘Digital’ signatures are 
now also available. 
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Article indicates a human sensitivity to the issues of “signing away my 
name” in circumstances of extreme provocation or where judgments about 
guilt and innocence are hanging in the balance.  
In that context, it is appropriate to turn to the amicus brief of another 
Catholic interlocuter in the saga of the HSS Mandate, that of the Eternal 
Television Network in Zubik, which was quoted above. According to the 
amici:  
“For a Catholic organization like EWTN, it is ironic that its 
conscience hinges on its inability to sign a piece of paper. The best-
known Catholic martyr for conscience, St. Thomas More, “went to 
the scaffold rather than sign a little paper for the King.” ETBU II, 
807 F.3d at 635 (Jones, J., dissenting). Admittedly, the penalties for 
not signing the Oath of Supremacy were more stringent than those 
for not signing Form 700. See Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3 Stat. 5 
(Eng.) (prescribing hanging, drawing, and quartering). But the risk 
of signing—that is, the risk to one’s conscience of doing what one 
knows to be wrong—is the same. EWTN therefore cannot sign.”158 
These are high stakes, indeed, and which can be immediately 
contrasted with the views of Oderberg who, though advocating similar 
cooperation principles, sees this particular problem from a different angle. 
Under the heading, “Should I sign? It depends” he states:  
Signing a document looks like a trivial matter. In one sense it is—no 
effort required. But it can be momentous. It could be signing 
someone’s death warrant, signing away your lifesavings, authorizing 
a fraud, deceiving a law enforcement official, approving a dangerous 
or unethical experiment, and so on. The mere act of signing may or 
may not make you a cooperator. If committee members sign a policy 
paper advising the government to do such and such, they will not be 
actual assistants in the government’s execution of the policy.159 
This prompts us to ask when a signature will in fact amount to cooperation 
in the primary act. Oderberg opines:  
“Signing, in order to amount to cooperation, needs to supply means 
or conditions for the primary act to be performed. If Mike’s 
signature is required for the imprisonment of an innocent man 
unfairly convicted, his cooperation will be dispensable if any of a 
158 EWTN Brief, supra note 1, at 16. 
159 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 64–65. 
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number of people could have signed and Mike just happened to be 
the first available person. If he is the prison governor and only his 
signature will do, his cooperation is indispensable, and he is more 
closely implicated as a result. If no more hurdles have to be cleared 
between signing and incarceration, the governor’s cooperation is 
highly proximate.”160 
Thus, the dispensability of the signature becomes a point of 
contention, and one means by which the level of cooperation may be 
estimated. For EWTN, however, the signature in question was clearly a 
“trigger” rather than a mere contributing factor, and so impermissible: 
[W]hy must [EWTN] provide Form 700 to its administrator?
Because without the form, the administrator has no legal authority to
step into the shoes of the Network and provide contraceptive
coverage to the employees and beneficiaries of the Network.”
EWTN II, 756 F.3d at 1347 (Pryor, J., concurring) (citing 78 Fed.
Reg. at 39,879-80) (emphasis in original).161
The 67 Theologians appear to be of the same view on this question, 
although they frame it in terms of the provision of a “certificate” or 
“coupon”; the 67 Theologians saying, “[p]roviding another person with 
certificates or coupons to authorize the performance of a morally 
objectionable action typically makes one morally complicit in that 
action.”162 
Likewise, the 50 Theologians rely on various arguments, including 
their assertion that there is an “intelligible link” or “essential tie” between 
“the cooperator’s action and the wrongdoing.”163 They are thus of the view 
that there is: 
such an “essential tie” or “intelligible link” between complying with 
Mandate via the “accommodation” and the forbidden action, 
because the sole function of the required information in the 
Government’s regulatory scheme is to designate and authorize 
another to perform the forbidden action.164 
On this point, Oderberg seems to have a different opinion and 
160 Id., at 65. 
161 EWTN Brief, supra note 1, at 15. 
162 67 Theologians, supra note 89, at 5. 
163 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 15, relying upon Moschella, supra note 100. 
164 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 15. 
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diverges somewhat from the views set out above. He believes that Judge 
Baldock, in fact, “put his finger on the problem . . . without recognizing it 
as a problem.”165 Oderberg continues: 
Quoting Judge Kavanaugh in a similar case, Baldock said: ‘But what 
if the religious organizations are misguided in thinking that this 
scheme . . . makes them complicit in facilitating contraception or 
abortion? That is not our call to make under the first prong of 
RFRA’ (Priests for Life 2015: 8). Baldock added: ‘And Hobby 
Lobby supports this position well, as questioning a religious 
adherent’s understanding of the significance of a compelled action 
comes dangerously close to questioning “whether the religious 
belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable”—a “question that the 
federal courts have no business addressing.”.166 
Such “misguided thinking” about the scheme of cooperation—which 
one might label the mechanics of the process by which cooperation is 
achieved or not achieved—is a controversial and debatable area and will be 
so in every situation in which conscientious objection arises—possibly even 
more so when there is an active and extensive bureaucracy and associated 
paperwork involved in the process of opting out. The question, “what is a 
reasonable assessment of what amounts to cooperation?” will become 
critical. Oderberg is acutely alive to this problem and continues: 
Strictly, then, if a conscientious objector sincerely believes he is 
cooperating impermissibly, and if that belief is not subject to any 
test of reasonableness, it must be protected under law—no matter 
how unreasonable it is. All things being equal, to believe that opting 
out is just such a case of cooperation is unreasonable—as 
unreasonable as thinking that by running away from a riot you are 
cooperating with the rioters. Now, running away might in the 
circumstances be an act of cowardice, or in some other way 
undesirable. Similarly, one might protest against having to opt out of 
the contraceptive mandate because one objected to the entire 
Obamacare scheme, with its use of private insurers to carry out the 
government’s ‘dirty work’, as it were. But the way to combat that is 
not by preventing an objective assessment of whether one is 
cooperating illicitly. It is by the usual means for trying to overturn 
objectionable laws—the ballot box, parliamentary process, protest; 
165 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 75. 
166 Id., at 75–76, citing Little Sisters, supra note 2, at 111. 
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perhaps even civil disobedience.167 
Several problems emerge in light of this analysis. First, whether it is 
possible and if so, how to distinguish a sincerely held belief that one is 
cooperating with the primary act from  a religious belief, simpliciter. 
Second, the nature and scope of any reasonableness standard that might be 
employed as a solution to an impasse between a “sincerely held belief” and 
an objective “reasonable cooperation” standard. Third, the public policy and 
democratic implications of Oderberg’s other methods of protest against the 
alleged cooperation, including the issue of civil disobedience.  
The first issue has been considered somewhat tangentially but for 
our purposes in a useful manner by Adams and Barmore, who note the 
essential difference between “sincerity” (of belief) and “verity” (of 
belief).168 The former is always open to judicial assessment while the latter 
remains entirely exempt.169 While Oderberg may not use the same terms, he 
is at least opening a conversation along similar lines but with “cooperation” 
as the object of his attention and an argument that judicial utensils (like 
extrinsic evidence and objective facts) can and should be brought to bear on 
the question.170 Here we are looking at factors like non-religious self-
interest and whether the claimant’s actual behavior is congruent with the 
claimed belief.171 
167 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 76. 
168 Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts After
Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 59-60 find a way out: “Fortunately, courts
historically have demonstrated that they are able to ferret out insincere religious claims. 
There is a long tradition of courts competently scrutinizing asserted religious beliefs for 
sincerity without delving into their validity or verity.” They continue: “The difference is 
this: Suppose someone claims a religious objection to eating broccoli, but that same person 
knowingly eats broccoli each week. A court, without asking whether there is any moral 
truth behind a religious objection to broccoli consumption, may nonetheless ask whether 
the claimant actually holds that religious belief. The former, spiritual question is one no 
court should ever ask. The latter, factual inquiry into fraud is something courts are well 
equipped to do by examining objective criteria. As courts face future RFRA claims from 
for-profit corporate litigants, they can continue to use objective criteria to give teeth to 
RFRA’s “sincere belief” requirement.” Id. at 60. 
169 “While there is a risk that sincerity may be used as a proxy for verity, openly 
questioning the underlying truth of a religious claim surely would be worse. And were 
courts to examine the importance of an asserted belief, not only would they move closer to 
scriptural interpretation, but that test would run counter to Congress’s intent to protect 
religious beliefs regardless of their centrality to a religious system.” Id. at 64. 
170 Id., at 62, relying on Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 
430, 441 (2d Cir. 1981). 
171 Adams & Barmore, Questioning Sincerity, supra note 168, at 62–63, relying on cases 
like United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 718–719 10th Cir. (2010) and Dobkin v. 
District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657, 659 D.C. (1963). 
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The second issue—concerning the nature and scope of any 
reasonableness standard—is more nuanced. One difficulty here is that if, in 
the mind of the religious believer, “opting out is, in reality, opting in”172 
what should be the appropriate standard applied by the court in assessing 
such a claim? Should the standard be to “read outwards” from the believer’s 
understanding of their own creed? In other words, is it best to interpret the 
“words or actions of cooperation” in light of the believer’s stated religious 
belief? The danger here is that the court makes mistakes about what that 
belief really is. Or, alternatively, is the evaluation to be done in light of the 
court’s own interpretation of what is being said and done, yet still being 
careful not to read outwards from the court’s own beliefs about the 
meaning? One solution is to agree that the starting point for any evaluation 
of the “words or actions of cooperation” is always the mind of the 
conscientious objector (exegesis), rather than the mind of the court 
(eisegesis), but that thereafter the court should apply an “objective 
standard.” 
These are fine distinctions that will be considered further below in 
relation to the nominalist problem. There can be no doubt at this stage of the 
analysis, however, that the court will find itself in a strange, non-
mechanical and somewhat ethereal corner of the world of causation. 
Literature associated with the issues surrounding “cause-in-fact” and “legal 
causation” in torts claims may be somewhat helpful here, especially since 
they have been carefully thought through over many decades.173 But their 
application is also limited since the “damage” caused in a case of 
conscience is arguably entirely internal to the conscience of the believer 
afflicted: “If required to do this, I am, according to my beliefs, guilty, and 
will suffer consequent damage to my conscience because of it.” Such 
damage is very difficult to quantify, and the tort concepts may in the last 
analysis be ill-equipped to help in deciphering the cause of the claimed 
affliction. 
172 To be clear, I have in mind here the scenario where the conscientious objector is signing 
a piece of paper with “Opt-Out Form” or “Sign here to Opt Out” at the top or bottom of the 
page and yet is claiming this to be, in fact, an act of cooperation. This is discussed more 
thoroughly below. 
173 See the decades-long discussion begun in 1959 with the seminal H.L.A. HART & A.M. 
HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1st ed. 1959). An insightful window into subsequent 
developments is found in Jane Stapleton, Choosing what We Mean by “Causation in the 
Law,” 73 MO. L. REV. 433 (2008). Stapleton notes in her introduction that “[l]awyers have 
used the term [causation] to refer to more than one type of enquiry, and philosophers often 
do not specify an inquiry. The most useful inquiry for legal purposes is one that compares 
the actual world of a particular phenomenon with a hypothetical world and thereby 
determines, in the context of that comparison, the role that a specified factor played, if any, 
in the existence of the actual phenomenon,” at 433. 
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The third issue, civil disobedience, raises its own subset of 
problems. The deliberate violation of laws is a source of great stress on a 
democracy since it involves not only deliberate law-breaking, but also the 
flouting of associated laws such as trespass, traffic or civil order 
regulations.174 Those involved often acceptance of the likelihood of 
punishment from the very outset (ab initio) of their actions, and their 
disobedience can have multiple aims, including: 
to publicize an unjust law or a just cause, to appeal to the conscience 
of the public, to force negotiation with recalcitrant officials, to “clog 
the machine” (in Henry David Thoreau’s phrase) with political 
prisoners, to get into court where one can challenge the 
constitutionality of a law, to exculpate oneself or to put an end to 
one’s personal complicity in the injustice which flows from 
obedience to unjust law—or some combination of these.175 
Weighty threads of recent history support these purposes, including 
the contributions of Mohandas Gandhi,176 Martin Luther King,177 and the 
Nuremberg Principles.178 
Another consideration may be found in the work of J.L. Austin’s 
speech-act theory, popular during the 1960s.179 Austin makes the 
philosophical (epistemological) claim that we can usefully understand 
words and signs as “performative utterances” or “speech-acts” and that such 
things accomplish something in the real world (for example, a bet, a 
174 Such breaches were not uncommon during the protests surrounding the Vietnam War; 
see Frank Lawrence, Note, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political Protesters, 
40 HASTINGS L.J. 397 (1989). 
175 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA (Christopher B. Gray, ed. 1999), s. v. 
“Civil Disobedience.” 
176 MOHANDAS GANDHI, SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA (Valji Govindji Desai trans. 
1928). This book outlines Gandhi’s growth as an organizer over many years. See also the 
works of Paromita Goswami, who notes, “[p]erhaps the most fascinating aspect of the story 
of Satyagraha is Gandhiji’s success in creating an atmosphere where physical suffering is 
not just borne and overcome but actually welcomed and celebrated by the community. He 
describes the celebration of the first incarceration and the readiness of young and old to 
even die in prison for the cause. His ability to remove the fear of hardship, imprisonment 
and even death was the key to his leadership. This was the basis of his non-violence - 
overcoming the fear of violence and death thereby overcoming the fear of the “Other,” the 
“Enemy””; Paromita Goswami, A Re-Reading of Gandhi’s ‘Satyagraha in South Africa’ for 
Contemporary Community Organizing, 44 COM. DEV. J. 393, 401 (2009). 
177 MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 76–95 (1964). 
178 Frank Lawrence, Note, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political Protesters, 
40 HASTINGS L.J. 397 (1989). 
179 Flesch, W., J.L. Austin and Speech-Act Theory, in MODERN BRITISH AND IRISH
CRITICISM AND THEORY 61–67 (Julian Wolfreys ed. 2006). 
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marriage, a naming ceremony, a testamentary gift).180 If that is so, then a 
signature or an affirmation can amount to an “act of cooperation” in the 
context of something like the Hobby Lobby and Zubik controversies, and 
many other scenarios besides. This leads into a brief discussion of the legal 
effects of a signature, followed by what we shall call “the nominalist 
problem.” 
B. Signatures: Legal Effects
Atkinson’s classically lucid Handbook of the Law of Wills181 describes the 
necessary procedures for signing a will.182 Variations on an unadorned 
signature, both small and large, seem to be quite acceptable. Thus, the law 
will accommodate illegibility, misspelling, nicknames, initials, pencils, 
rubber stamping, cutting and pasting, sealing, fingerprinting, typing, and 
crossing.183 The overarching issue is whether the signer intended to sign: 
“In order to have a valid signature the mark or other writing by the testator 
must have been intended as his signature, and moreover it must be the 
whole act which he contemplated.”184 Considered through the lens of moral 
philosophy, this necessary intentional aspect of affixing a signature aids us 
in understanding the idea of formal cooperation discussed above, 
specifically, that the cooperator wishes to align their will with the will of 
the principal actor. In other words, they intend what the principal actor 
intends—their two wills are aligned.  
Other legal inventions like mortgages, tax returns, and negotiable 
instruments (bills of exchange) often also have elaborate requirements for 
signature verification and validity, and they too all share, to greater and 
180 Id., at 63.  
181 THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS AND OTHER PRINCIPLES OF
SUCCESSION (2nd ed. 1953). 
182 Id., at 297 ff. In summary form: “64.1 A will must be signed by the testator, but he need 
not write his full or correct name, and even a mark or stamp is sufficient if that was the 
complete act with which testator intended to authenticate the instrument. 64.2 Most states 
permit the testator to sign by proxy, and if so, the testator’s name written by another at this 
direction and in his presence is sufficient signature. 64.3 Most states do not require that the 
will be signed at the end, so that the writing of the testator’s name anywhere on the 
instrument is sufficient if he intended it to operate as his signature. 63.4 The statutes in a 
number of jurisdictions require that the will be signed at the end or subscribed by the 
testator. In such case if any dispositive portion of the will is below or after the signature at 
the time of execution the entire will is invalid.” 
183 Id., at 298–299. 
184 Id., at  299. Thus, according to the case law cited by Atkinson, the scenario where the 
signer fails to complete a half-signature due to failing strength is excluded from being 
designated a proper “signature”; see Knapp v. Reilly, 3 Dem.(N.Y.) 427, 1885 (where the 
testator wrote only part of his name—“Pat”—but failed to complete “Patrick”). 
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lesser degrees, this same fundamental concern with intention.185 In the 
context of an administrative form (not given under oath), such a signature 
may indicate varying degrees of intention on the part of the signatory: from 
“mere formality” to “serious indication of assent.” It all depends on the 
words on the document that is being signed, and the surrounding 
circumstances. 
This takes us directly back to the discussions in Part III above, and 
Oderberg’s answer to the question, “Should you sign?” As discussed, the 
given answer is, “It depends.”186 But it is now important to distinguish legal 
and moral perspectives. While something may be legally binding, and the 
law has indeed worked out various rules for determining this, how are we to 
determine whether a signature is morally binding (on the signer) in the 
context of our discussion of cooperation in evil? Moreover, how might a 
court make such a determination for the purposes of deciding whether this 
alleged cooperation is capable of giving rise to a defensive conscientious 
objection? These questions can be brought closer to an answer, it is argued, 
by considering yet another aspect of the signature scenario; what I shall call 
the “nominalist problem.” 
C. The Nominalist Problem
The relevant part of Form 700 reads, “I certify the organization is an 
eligible organization . . . that has a religious objection to providing coverage 
for some or all of any contraceptive services that would otherwise be 
required to be covered.”187 This certification claims a “religious objection” 
and thereby paves the way for an opt-out of the system of coverage. 
Oderberg’s analysis188 considers various ways in which such an objection 
may be considered: it may be analogous to a conscientious objector in 
wartime, where names are taken and there may be a requirement to enroll 
for substitute service; or it may be analogous with the case of the 
185 See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code §3–204(a), which defines “indorsement” in terms 
of the “purpose” of the signature, including its ability to settle liability on the signatory: 
“§3–204(a) “Indorsement” means a signature, other than that of a signer as maker, drawer, 
or acceptor, that alone or accompanied by other words is made on an instrument for the 
purpose of (i) negotiating the instrument, (ii) restricting payment of the instrument, or (iii) 
incurring indorser’s liability on the instrument, but regardless of the intent of the signer, a 
signature and its accompanying words is an indorsement unless the accompanying words, 
terms of the instrument, place of the signature, or other circumstances unambiguously 
indicate that the signature was made for a purpose other than indorsement. For the purpose 
of determining whether a signature is made on an instrument, a paper affixed to the 
instrument is a part of the instrument.” 
186 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 64. 
187EBSA Form 700, supra note 3. 
188 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 65. 
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concentration camp prisoner, who refuses to work in the crematorium, and 
instead asks for assignment to the camp hospital; or (a variation) it may be 
like the Enrollment Act (also known as the Civil War Military Draft Act, 
1863)189 by which the objector either found a substitute soldier or paid the 
sum of $300 in lieu.190 In the latter case “[a]s a result of numerous abuses 
the three-hundred-dollar clause was limited to conscientious objectors in 
1864.”191 
While nominalism is a complex metaphysical problem, usually 
divided into two parts,192 for our purpose, a simple definition will suffice, 
namely, “nominalism” is “the proposition that there are no real entities or 
universals beyond the individual.”193 To take a simple example we may 
consider the following statement: “there are no Studebaker cars, there is 
only this Studebaker.” But what if a mechanic were to put a new Crosley 
Crosmobile badge on a Studebaker car bonnet and thus attempt to rename it 
a Crosmobile: would such an act make the car anything but a Studebaker? Is 
it possible to rename (rebadge) a thing and thereby change its fundamental 
character? Drawing this string along further into our domain of 
conscientious objection, we may ask whether it is possible for a 
bureaucratic form, which declares itself to be an instrument for “opting 
out,” to in fact become one that is doing the real work of “opting in”? 
Oderberg seems attuned to this problem when he writes about the 
unreasonableness of “thinking that by running away from a riot you are 
cooperating with the rioters.”194 He is seeking to preserve an area of 
objectivity surrounding the concept of cooperation, and advocates this as 
something that good judges should seek to do where possible. The 
consequences of not doing so are, he says, significant and are already being 
played out. He writes:  
189 Cited in Dr. James C. Dobson and Family Talk, Plaintiffs, v. Kathleen Sebelius, 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Certificate of Compliance Re: 
Consultation on Motion, 2014 WL 12771149 (USDC Colo.) , Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-
03326-REB-CBS, at 6. 
190 See EUGENE CONVERSE MURDOCK, PATRIOTISM LIMITED, 1862–1865: THE CIVIL WAR
DRAFT AND THE BOUNTY SYSTEM (1967). See also the insightful review of same by Basil 
Leo Lee in 74 THE AM. HIST. REV. 299, 299–300 (1968). 
191 Lee, AM. HIST. REV., supra note 191, at 299.  
192 Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo, “Nominalism in Metaphysics.” In Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta, ed.  Summer 2019), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/. 
193 Geoffrey P. Miller, The Glittering Eye of Law 84 MICH. L. REV. 880, 886–887 (1986) 
(A review of Joseph Vining, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986).) 
194 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 76. Of course, running away is not the very same action as 
signing, although it may arguable be the same kind of action. If they are completely 
different kinds of action, then his analogy would appear to fail.  
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By acknowledging the existence of a theory of cooperation, as the
Supreme Court did in Hobby Lobby, but refusing to use it in fear of
‘second-guessing’ the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, the court effectively
set the stage for a possible judicial backlash against the very
conscientious objectors they were trying to accommodate. In fact, the
Little Sisters case, along with related cases, made it to the Supreme
Court—only for the court to vacate all previous judgments, including
the fair and reasonable one discussed above, and send the whole issue
back to the parties and lower courts for yet further negotiation and
resolution.195
Allowing Oderberg to state his case in the fullest terms possible, he is
fearful that: 
the courts, worried that the ‘mere sincerity’ test of Hobby Lobby will 
open the floodgates to even the most far-fetched conscience cases, will 
find ways around that test and thereby undermine the very freedoms the 
test was supposed to protect. Adopting a plausible, relatively well 
worked-out theory of cooperation along the lines I have defended could 
prevent just such a backlash.”196 
Perhaps now that matters are restated in terms that are both 
philosophical as well as focused on potential legal consequences, we can 
see more clearly what is at stake. Such problems are not new and have been 
discussed in other jurisdictions such as Germany. Something akin to the 
Zubik “signature problem” arose in Germany in the area of counseling 
certificates for abortion services. Following debates in the German 
Bundestag (Parliament) in 1994–1995, the abortion laws were altered to 
allow abortion during the first trimester (the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy), provided there was mandatory counseling 
(Schwangerschaftskonfliktberatung)197 and a certificate of proof that this 
195 Id., at 76–77. 
196 Id., at 77. Oderberg notes later in his book that “Where sincerity is not enough, 
however, is in the determination of how involved a conscientious objector may be in the 
actions of others, given the objector’s sincere beliefs. This, I claim, is a matter for 
reasonable judgment using philosophical principles of cooperation. An objector’s mere 
claim that they are illicitly involved, or compromised, by assisting however remotely with 
some primary act to which they object cannot be taken at face value. This can no more be a 
matter of mere sincerity than a litigant’s belief that they were treated by some other party 
negligently, unjustly or unreasonably. These are matters for courts to determine, and 
involvement by cooperation is in the same category.” Opting out, supra note 11, at 126. 
197 Pregnancy-conflict counseling. The issue of counseling played an important role in the 
lengthy German political and legal debates. For a comparative assessment of the 
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had occurred (Beratungsschein).198 This certificate was to be provided 
through a government-approved agency 
(Schwangerschaftsberatungsstelle)199 and a number of Catholic dioceses 
provided this counseling on the basis that women might thereby be 
dissuaded from the procedure by attending a Catholic counselor.200 A four-
years-long discussion then took place between the German Bishops and the 
Vatican, resulting in a January 1998 letter from Pope John Paul II,201 which 
set out the dilemma of these certificates. The counseling certificate was a 
difficult issue, especially with regard to its legal meaning and implications. 
These issues are also considered in the briefs of the 67 Theologians202 
and of the 50 Theologians.203 The EWTN brief went on to make a critical 
distinction between the intention and effect of what they were doing (at 
page 14):  
This analogous situation helped EWTN judge whether it could 
participate in the “accommodation” scheme. By signing the form, 
EWTN would not intend to facilitate immoral practices. Indeed, 
EWTN could simultaneously declare that it continues to object to 
each and every one of those practices. The overriding consideration, 
however, was the effect of EWTN’s actions in executing the form, 
and that effect was plain: EWTN would thereby authorize and 
incentivize a third party to provide the same objectionable 
services—and not just any third party, but the party selected and 
retained by EWTN to administer EWTN’s plan. By this action, 
EWTN would become “guilty of immoral cooperation with evil.” 
development of the law regulating abortion in Germany, including the importance of 
counseling and waiting periods in overcoming differences between East Germany (former 
DDR) and West Germany (FRG), see Richard E. Levy and Alexander Somek, Paradoxical 
Parallels in the American and German Abortion Decisions, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 109 
(2001). See also Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany: 
Should Americans Pay Attention?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (1994). 
198 Certificate of counseling. 
199 Pregnancy-counseling center. 
200 In commenting on these events, Fisher notes, “[i]n September . . . [1995] . . . the 
German Bishops’ Conference criticized the law but agreed to take part in Church-state 
abortion counseling boards. The bishops clearly believed that Church involvement would 
be at most material cooperation in the evil of abortion and that many women would be 
dissuaded from having an abortion by Church-sponsored counseling agencies”; see 
CATHOLIC BIOETHICS FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM 84 (2012). 
201 Letter of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to the Bishops of the German Episcopal 
Conference (Jan. 11, 1998), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/letters/1998/documents/hf_jp-ii_let_19980111_bishop-germany.html. 
202 67 Theologians, supra note 89, at 22–24. 
203 50 Theologians, supra note 92, at 13–15. 
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EWTN II, 756 F.3d at 1343 (Pryor, J., concurring).”204 
The question remains: Do the above arguments mean that the 
conscientious objectors (in this case, EWTN) are in fact “preventing an 
objective assessment of whether one is cooperating illicitly”?205 At the core 
of Oderberg’s concern, we must address what he sees as a fundamental 
mistake in EWTN’s argument. In his own words, this error is about the 
boundaries of religious belief. He asks, “[w]hy is this mistaken argument by 
the plaintiffs a problem? Because it treats their belief about whether they are 
cooperating illicitly as itself a matter of religion, when it is not.”206 
VI. THE PROBLEM OF THE ‘RELIGION OF INSINCERITY’
Finding ways out of the above conundrums is not an easy task. Hadley 
Arkes has asked a very simple question which may shed some light towards 
an exit: 
“Our friends on the courts and in law schools invoke the test of 
“sincerity” precisely for the purpose of avoiding any moral 
judgment on the substance of what a religion teaches. And yet, what 
is the test of “sincerity” other than a moral test? We could readily 
imagine the characters gathered in the Church of the Flying 
Spaghetti Monster asking, “Why is it necessary or legitimate to be 
‘sincere’? Why can’t we have, after all, a ‘Religion of Insincerity’?” 
To insist on “sincerity” is to make nothing less than a back-door 
moral judgment on what counts as legitimate or illegitimate 
religion.”207 
There is an echo of Oderberg’s approach here, since Oderberg’s problem 
arises when “sincerity is not enough”208 and then opens the door to a 
204 EWTN, supra note 1 (emphasis in original). 
205 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 76. 
206 Id., at 75. 
207 Hadley Arkes, Backing into Relativism, FIRST THINGS (June 2019), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2019/06/backing-into-relativism 
208 This has been discussed above. In Oderberg’s own words: “In a liberal, pluralistic 
society, courts do not second-guess religious or ethical beliefs. They do not subject them to 
a test of reasonableness. As long as a belief is sincerely held (rather than seeming to be 
held as a pretext for avoiding the force of some general law, or for some other ulterior 
motive), the courts take it at face value. This may have inherent problems of its own, since 
beliefs can be outlandish and risible by any reasonable standard, and they can have a direct 
impact on non-adherents to the particular code or system from which they derive. But that 
is a discussion for another occasion. Working within the framework we currently have in 
most Western countries for protecting religious freedom, we have to accept that sincerity is 
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“reasonable cooperation” test (outlined above) which, he claims, preserves 
more religious freedom because it will prevent, amongst other things, a 
judicial backlash and an unwise judicial submission to even the most bizarre 
religious claims. Arkes merely sharpens the point by imagining a religion 
that is itself devoted to ‘insincerity’ and so the problem can never be solved 
under the current jurisprudence. What then, is really needed? Do both of 
these exit doors open into the same space? The answer will undoubtedly lie 
in emerging case law in which the “religion of insincerity” or its equivalent 
is argued. Examples of an equivalent scenario will likely arise whenever 
there is a disagreement internal to a religious group about the meaning of 
that religion’s actual on a particular issue.  
Examples may include arguments over idiosyncratic interpretations 
of doctrine in any number of contexts: schools, non-religious workplaces, or 
any situation that calls for adjudication in relation to a conscientious 
objection. Novel technologies (e.g. involving supposedly autonomous 
technologies) may also raise these issues.  In each of these situations, all 
that is needed is for one party to frame the argument in terms of their 
“sincere” interpretation of an otherwise settled consensus on the 
implications of an article of faith or essential dogma. The danger, as Arkes 
indicates, is a reverse move into a cul-de-sac of relativism from which there 
is no exit. In such circumstances the attraction of Oderberg’s advocacy for 
“cooperation principles” is strong. Such an approach offers at least a partial 
brake on unlimited “sincerity” at the expense of any objective judicial 
restraint on such claims.  
VII. CONCLUSION
The implications surrounding who gets to decide between triggers and 
optouts are potentially profound. If courts are not able to make reasoned 
judgements about cooperation claims because any such claim can be 
shielded by being labelled a “religious belief,” then, as Oderberg predicts, 
the backlash could be severe.209 As he states: 
By acknowledging the existence of a theory of cooperation, as the 
Supreme Court did in Hobby Lobby, but refusing to use it in fear of 
‘second-guessing’ the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, the court effectively set 
the stage for a possible judicial backlash against the very conscientious 
objectors they were trying to accommodate.”210 
enough when it comes to religious and ethical beliefs.” Opting Out, supra note 11, at 125–
126. 
209 Opting Out, supra note 11, at 11, 76, 77. 
210 Id., at 76 (emphasis in original). 
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This Article has considered the sincerity test in light of the work of 
Professor Oderberg and suggests arguments favor of his “cooperation 
principles.” The strongest of these is that when judges vacate the field of 
rationality, they are refusing to do a job that they, of all arms of 
government, are best equipped to perform, namely, to make judgments 
about facts and to seek out and squash insincerity. To grant them this role is 
not to increase their power unnecessarily, rather it is to guarantee their 
ability to continue to allow the flourishing a religious freedom within the 
relatively large confines of “sincerity” that would remain after adoption of 
Oderberg’s approach. 
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OMB Control No. 1210-0150 
Expiration Date: 11/30/2021 
EBSA FORM 700-- CERTIFICATION 
(revised September 2017) 
Public Health Service Act section 2713 requires, among other things, that certain group health 
plans and issuers provide benefits for women’s preventive services without cost sharing as 
provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources Services 
Administration (HRSA). The HRSA Guidelines provide an exemption for group health plans and 
student health insurance coverage established or maintained by entities that object to providing 
coverage for all or a subset of contraceptive services based on religious beliefs or moral 
convictions. However, an optional accommodation process is available for objecting entities that are 
exempt but choose to shift the otherwise applicable obligation to provide benefits for contraceptive 
services to its issuer or third party administrator. Objecting entities should note that if their issuer 
has their own religious or moral objection to providing contraception services, an issuer may also 
avail themselves of the exemption. Separately, third party administrators with an objection may also 
decline to enter or continue contracts as a third party administrator of the plan. 
This form may, but is not required to, be used by an objecting entity to provide notice to its issuer 
or third party administrator that that the objecting entity has a sincerely held religious or moral 
objection to coverage of all or a subset of contraceptive services, pursuant to 26 CFR 54.9815- 
2713A, 29 CFR 2590.715-2713A, and 45 CFR 147.131. Alternatively, an objecting entity may 
also provide notice to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. A model notice is available at 
- http://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/Regulations-and-Guida nce/index.html#Prevention.
An organization may revoke its use of the accommodation process at a later date if it chooses to do 
so provided that written notice of any such revocation is given to participants and beneficiaries 
consistent with guidance issued by the Secretaries of Labor and Health and Human Services. 
If you intend to utilize the optional accommodation process, please fill out this form completely 
and provide it to your plan’s health insurance issuers (for insured coverage) or third party 
administrators (for self-insured coverage). This form should be made available for examination 
upon request and maintained on file for at least 6 years following the end of the last applicable 
plan year. 
Name of the objecting entity 
Name and title of the individual who 
is authorized to make, and makes, 
this certification on behalf of the 
entity 
Mailing and email addresses and 
phone number for the individual 
listed above 
I certify the organization is an objecting entity (as described in 26 CFR 54.9815-2713A(a), 29 
CFR 2590.715-2713A(a); 45 CFR 147.131(c)) that has a sincerely held religious or moral 
objection to providing coverage for some or all of any contraceptive services. 
I declare that I have made this certification, and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true 
and correct. I also declare that this certification is complete. 
Signature of the individual listed above 
Date 
Notice to Third Party Administrators of Self-Insured Health Plans 
In the case of a group health plan that provides benefits on a self-insured basis, the provision 
of this certification to a third party administrator for the plan that will process claims for 
contraceptive coverage required under 26 CFR 54.9815-2713(a)(1)(iv) or 29 CFR 2590.715- 
2713(a)(1)(iv) constitutes notice to the third party administrator that the eligible organization: 
(1) Will not act as the plan administrator or claims administrator with respect to claims for
contraceptive services, or contribute to the funding of contraceptive services; and
(2) The obligations of the third party administrator are set forth in 26 CFR 54.9815-2713A, 29 CFR
2510.3-16, and 29 CFR 2590.715-2713A.
This form or a notice to the Secretary is an instrument under which the plan is operated. 
PRA Disclosure Statement 
According to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no persons are required to respond to a collection of 
information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. The valid OMB control number for this 
information collection is 1210-0150. The time required to complete this information collection is 
estimated to average 50 minutes per response, including the time to review instructions, search existing 
data resources, gather the data needed, and complete and review the information collection. If you have 
comments concerning the accuracy of the time estimate(s) or suggestions for improving this form, 
please write to: U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration, Office of 
Policy and Research, Attention: PRA Clearance Officer, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Room N- 
5718, Washington, DC 20210 or email ebsa.opr@dol.gov and reference the OMB Control Number 
1210-0150. 
PAPER FOUR: ‘JOSEF PIEPER: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO THE 
APOCALYPSE’ 
PAPER FOUR: STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP 
This paper has been submitted for publication with U.S. Law Reviews in 2020. The working title 
is Josef Pieper: A Lawyer’s Guide to the Apocalypse. 
This paper, of which I am the sole author, contains original research I conducted during the 
period of my Higher Degree by Research candidature. It is not subject to any obligations or 




Josef Pieper: A Lawyer’s Guide to the Apocalypse 
Patrick Quirk* 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 2 
II. APOCALYPTIC CLAIMS .................................................................. 7 
III. TAXONOMIES OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION .................... 9 
IV. PIEPER AS PHILOSOPHER OF THE APOCALYPSE ................ 10 
V. THE APOCALYPTIC IN PIEPER’S THE END OF TIME ............. 11 
A. Pieper Chapter One – Philosophy and History ............................................... 11 
B. Pieper Chapter Two - Nihilism ........................................................................ 20 
C. Pieper Chapter Three – The pseudo-order of the Antichrist .......................... 24 
VI. THE END OF HISTORY AND HOPE ........................................... 29 
A. The Hope in Chapter One .................................................................................. 31 
B. The Hope in Chapter Two .................................................................................. 32 
C. The Hope in Chapter Three ................................................................................ 32 
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 33 
*Patrick T. Quirk. Associate Professor of Law, St Thomas More Law School, Australian
Catholic University, and Scholar-in-Residence, St Mary’s College at The University of Mel-
bourne. BA, LLB (Qld), LLM (Tübingen). Thanks to Paul Babie, Howard Bromberg, David 
Morrison and Elizabeth D. Boepple for their assistance. All errors remain my own. 
2 A Lawyer’s Guide to the Apocalypse [15-Jan-20 
I. INTRODUCTION
History is always inwardly directed toward its end. This, of course, 
is inseparable from the revealed prophecy of the End: that it will 
happen not (or not exclusively) as a cosmic catastrophe, as the de-
struction of the . . .. Earth, but as an event historical in itself, engen-
dered by the historical process itself, in the accomplishment of his-
tory itself. If the End were exclusively a fact of the world of heav-
enly bodies, it could have no specific connection with history. . . . 
The object of the prophecy of the End is, however, explicitly and 
formally a historical event or, rather, a series of historical events. 
—Josef Pieper1 
This work considers the apocalyptic refrain that has overshadowed 
the world for the past few decades. As Steve Almond has noted, in movies 
and books, “the apocalypse market is booming.”2 Atomic war and post-war 
scenarios,3 alien invasions,4 climate change,5 the rise and decline of Islamic 
1 Josef Pieper, THE END OF TIME: A MEDITATION ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 50 
(1954/1999). References are to the Ignatius Press edition (San Francisco, 1999). Original 
German title: Uber das Ende der Zeit: Eine geschichts philosophische Betrachtung. [here-
inafter END OF TIME]. 
2 Steve Almond, The Apocalypse Market Is Booming, N.Y. TIMES, September 27, 
2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/magazine/the-apocalypse-market-is-boom-
ing.html. Almond notes that these forms of entertainment “allow us to safely fantasize 
about what might be required of us to survive,” and yet we must be cautious about their 
consumption since a hard hitting movie (e.g., The Day After, 1983) also “confronts the 
viewer with far too authentic a portrayal of the sorrows that loom over us and [makes] far 
too explicit an appeal to our conscience.” Almond also observes the gradual transition to 
the main character “child hero”; e.g., Katniss Everdeen in The Hunger Games. 
3The list of books, movies, video games, and television shows is lengthy; see, e.g., the 
lists on the website of Paul Brians of Washington State University, https://bri-
ans.wsu.edu/nuclear-war-related-materials/. An early 20th century dystopian novel of note 
here is Robert Hugh Benson’s LORD OF THE WORLD (1907), which was cited by Pope Fran-
cis in a homily of November 18, 2013. According to the Vatican website, “The Pope 
opined that “Negotiating one’s fidelity to God is like negotiating one’s identity, . . .. He 
then made reference to the 20th century novel Lord of the World by Robert Hugh Benson, 
son of the Archbishop of Canterbury Edward White Benson, in which the author speaks of 
the spirit of the world that leads to apostasy “almost as though it were a prophecy, as 
though he envisioned what would happen.” Benson converted to Catholicism and was or-
dained a Catholic priest in 1904, before the novel was published,” http://w2.vatican.va/con-
tent/francesco/en/cotidie/2013/documents/papa-francesco-cotidie_20131118_fidelity-
god.html. 
4 See, e.g., the American science fiction blockbuster film series, Independence Day 
(1996, 2016). 
5 See, e.g., the climate-change apocalypse film, The Day after Tomorrow (2004 based 
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State (ISIS),6 and even Brexit,7 all appear as expressions of this obsession. 
Even “zombie lawyers” rate a mention.8 Apocalyptic books and novels are 
now often made into apocalyptic films or series for TV.9 For example, Cor-
mac McCarthy’s 2006 Pulitzer Prize winning post-apocalyptic novel, The 
Road was adapted into a film by the same title in 2009.10 The BBC even 
featured an “apocalypse week” on its website during 2017 to coincide with 
a solar eclipse.11 
Intriguingly, it would seem that an appeal to personal conscience12 is 
implied in at least some areas of this obsession—modify your choices or the 
result will be unbearable—both by way of externally imposed penalty 
and/or an unendurable internal guilt. This appeal to conscience raises the 
problem of individuals and their approach to ultimate questions of moral be-
havior, the meaning of life, and the ultimate purpose of human existence. It 
also has very practical consequences when considering either granting or 
denying conscience-based exemptions to rules of general applicability.13 
on Art Bell & Whitley Strieber’s THE COMING GLOBAL SUPERSTORM (2000). 
6 Also known as Daesh; see further, Ishaan Tharoor, ISIS or ISIL? The Debate over 
What to Call Iraq’s Terror Group, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 18, 2014, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/06/18/isis-or-isil-the-debate-
over-what-to-call-iraqs-terror-group/?arc404=true 
7 Isobel Thompson, Britain Begins Stockpiling for the Brexit Apocalypse, VANITY
FAIR, January 24, 2019, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/01/britain-begins-stockpil-
ing-for-the-brexit-apocalypse. 
8 See Peter H. Huang & Corie Rosen Felder, The Zombie Lawyer Apocalypse, 42 PEPP. 
L. REV. 727 (discussing “the near epidemic levels of depression, decision-making errors,
and professional dissatisfaction that studies have documented are prevalent among law stu-
dents and lawyers today.” The authors offer solutions based on the literature of “positive
psychology”).
9 According to one website "Netflix currently has 29 different post-apocalyptic 
TV shows you can watch right now on instant streaming." See The Top 10 Post-Apocalyptic 
TV Shows on Netflix – 2019 Edition, https://www.postapocalypticmedia.com/the-top-10-
post-apocalyptic-tv-shows-on-netflix-2019-edition/ 
10 Such adaptations are not always successful; see Stacey Peebles, On Being Between: 
Apocalypse, Adaptation, McCarthy, Special Issue of the European Journal of American 
Studies, Cormac McCarthy Between Worlds, http://journals.openedition.org/ejas/12283. 
11 See articles at https://www.bbc.com/future/columns/apocalypse-week. 
12 I will exclude the debate about conscience and religious freedom for groups (as op-
posed to individuals), as it is beyond the scope of this paper.  
13 Kent Greenawalt has suggested seven current ‘pressure points’ in the law of con-
science-based exemptions. These are: (1) If a claim for an exemption is to be granted, 
should it be limited to religious convictions or cast more broadly? (2) What degree of im-
pairment of conscience should be needed, and how can that be assessed? (3) Are others dis-
advantaged if one does not perform, and how much should that count? (4) What is the basis 
for one’s objection to helping others? (5) How direct is one’s involvement in the activity to 
which one objects? (6) What position does one occupy? (7) What is the strength of the 
competing public interest that could justify denial of an exemption?; see Kent Greenawalt, 
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The Apocalypse (also known as the Book of Revelation), which is 
the final book of the New Testament of the Bible, is one source of literature 
upon which the above trend has drawn.14 I will return to this in detail below. 
Extremist movements have also contributed to a wider discussion of the re-
lationship between the End Times and present legal and political problems, 
most notably in the Middle East. In such cases, the job of the law is first to 
fully apprehend the facts, and then act prudently, according to those same 
facts. But, as Ali Rod Khadem has argued, “inadequate comprehension of 
extremist doctrines undermines efforts in law and policy”15 and a failure to 
grasp what is really at stake can seriously undermine the law’s attempts at a 
response. This is true despite the fact that Islam’s interaction with the apoc-
alypse of the Qur’an has been ongoing for many centuries.16 
Khadem’s work focuses on the differences between al-Quaeda and 
ISIS and relative predictions about the literal apocalypse, according to vari-
ous religious understandings of that concept—when it will occur, and the 
effect that has on these movement’s activities, especially those designed to 
support a system of earthly governance. Khadem notes: 
Although ISIS governance practices have been partially exposed 
within Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, these findings have not 
yet been integrated within legal scholarship—a fact that is reflected 
Individual Conscience and How It Should Be Treated, 31 JOURNAL OF LAW AND RELIGION 
306, 306–320 (2016). 
14 References to The Apocalypse or apocalypse should be interpreted in context. Any 
reference to Revelation or The Book of Revelation will be taken to mean the last book of 
the New Testament. This book is “not an easy book to understand . . .. Its central message, 
however, is crystal clear: the Almighty reigns (19:6). Revelation reminds readers of God’s 
eternal sovereignty (4:2, 9–10); Christ’s eternal victory (1:5, 17–18); and the Spirit’s eter-
nal presence (1:10; 2:7; 22:17)”; see Raymond Brown, BIBLE GUIDE (1999), at 307. As-
pects of Revelation are foreshadowed in the Old Testament Books of Ezekiel and Daniel, 
amongst others.  
15 Ali Rod Khadem, Why Should Law and Policy Makers Understand Extremist Be-
liefs? The Islamic State (Isis) As A Case Study, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 10, 177 (2019) 
[hereinafter Khadem]. Arguing, “inadequate comprehension of extremist doctrines under-
mines efforts in law and policy.” The author discusses the phenomenon of “apocalyp-
ticism” and the key differences between ISIS and al-Quaeda. In simplest terms, the “doctri-
nal disagreement between al-Qaeda and ISIS concerns the question of imminence: how 
soon will this apocalypse occur?,” at 177. According to Khadem, for ISIS, the matter is one 
of urgency, whereas al-Quaeda takes a longer-term view.  
16 See The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, eds. Gerhard Bower-
ing, Devin J. Stewart, & Muhammad Qasim Zaman (2012), s.v. “apocalypse,” 38–39 [here-
inafter Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought]. The entry notes the groundbreaking 
work of Paul Casanova’s MOHAMMED ET LA FIN DU MONDE: ÉTUDE CRITIQUE SUR L’ISLAM
PRIMITIF (1911–24) [Mohammed and the End of the World: Critical Studies on Primitive 
Islam]. 
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in the dearth of literature on the movement’s practices within law re-
views and related domains of scholarship.17 
This article will suggest that there is a dearth of literature and dis-
cussion within the legal context on the concept of the apocalypse in the 
Judeo-Christian (Western) tradition, and that a better understanding of this 
tradition’s insights into the apocalypse will shed light on all claims of an 
apocalyptic nature, regardless of the source or the specific nature of their 
claim. A better understanding of such claims, it will be argued, is necessary 
for bolstering our understanding in many related areas including conscience 
claims generally,18 the laws of war,19 international law,20 and other related 
areas.21 To paraphrase Samuel Johnson, since all judgment is comparative,22 
we must be able to compare apocalyptic claims with other similar claims, 
and thereby refine our understanding of both.  
To achieve the goals of this work, I will present a clear philosophi-
cal (non-theological) exposition on the Christian Apocalypse found in the 
work of well-respected German philosopher, Josef Pieper (1904–1997). Pie-
per’s The End of Time is his most comprehensive consideration of the phi-
losophy of history. Little describes this area of philosophy as playing “a 
17 Khadem, at 108 
18 See David S. Oderberg’s discussion of the right to disassociation in OPTING OUT: 
CONSCIENCE AND COOPERATION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY (2018) [hereinafter Opting 
Out]. Oderberg notes, “[s]ecessionism, balkanization and similar quasi-apocalyptic ideas 
(at least in the eyes of some political theorists) are essentially group concepts, and they 
generally have geopolitical or interstate ramifications. They affect entire states, and as 
movements they can have motivations that are far removed from what usually moves indi-
viduals and groups seeking selective dissociation within a society,” at 15. 
19 See e.g., Michael P. Scharf, How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law, 
48 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2016) (discussing the 
various legal arguments used by the United States and other states (e.g., Russia) for using 
lethal force in combating ISIS). The author suggests that there has been an “evolution of 
the right to use force in self-defense against non-state actors and . . . that events in 2015 
triggered a “Grotian Moment”: a fundamental paradigm shift that will have broad implica-
tions for international law,” at 1. 
20 E.g., the integration of a state into the international order; see Khadem, 124. 
21 E.g., the constitutionality of US military action; see Khadem, 143.  
22 “To know anything . . . we must know its effects; to see men we must see their 
works that we may learn what reason has dictated, or passion has incited, and find what are 
the most powerful motives of action. To judge rightly of the present, we must oppose it to 
the past; for all judgment is comparative, and of the future nothing can be known. The truth 
is, that no mind is much employed upon the present: recollection and anticipation fill up al-
most all our moments. Our passions are joy and grief, love and hatred, hope and fear. Of 
joy and grief the past is the object, and the future hope and fear; even love and hatred re-
spect the past, for the cause must have been before the effect”; Samuel Johnson, THE HIS-
TORY OF RASSELAS, PRINCE OF ABYSSINIA(1759), in THE WORKS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, 
L.L.D., A NEW EDITION, (1825), at 2:27.
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fundamental role in human thought.”23 He notes: 
It invokes notions of human agency, change, the role of material cir-
cumstances in human affairs, and the putative meaning of historical 
events. It raises the possibility of “learning from history.” And it 
suggests the possibility of better understanding ourselves in the pre-
sent, by understanding the forces, choices, and circumstances that 
brought us to our current situation. . . . This [philosophical] work is 
heterogeneous, comprising analyses and arguments of idealists, pos-
itivists, logicians, theologians, and others, and moving back and 
forth over the divides between European and Anglo-American phi-
losophy, and between hermeneutics and positivism.24 
Having authored more than fifty books (with translations into at 
least fifteen languages), Pieper was best-known for his ever-popular Lei-
sure, the Basis of Culture.25 Writing soon after Pieper received the Ingersoll 
Prize for scholarly letters, David Heim noted the strength of Pieper’s de-
fense of the cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance) 
and likewise the theological one (faith, hope and love).26 Jon Vickery has 
convincingly rebutted the claim that Pieper made any peace with or sup-
ported National Socialism.27 Pieper is no stranger to the law reviews and 
journals of the United States, being cited in areas as diverse as the relation-
ship between justice and love,28 the dangers of flattery,29 love and the 
23 Daniel Little, “Philosophy of History,” THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/en-
tries/history/. 
24 Id. 
25 JOSEF PIEPER, LEISURE, THE BASIS OF CULTURE (New American Library 1963). This 
work is a philosophical defense of leisure—and often pounced upon by undergraduates 
who, after reading only the title, believe it will justify a lazy semester. How wrong they 
are! For a reflection on Pieper’s leisure in the context of sleep deprivation, see Alison 
McMorran Sulentic, Now I Lay me Down to Sleep: Work-Related Sleep Deficits and the 
Theology of Leisure, 20:2 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 749, 763–767. (2006) 
(Symposium on the American Worker). 
26 David Heim, Josef Pieper and the Pursuit of Virtue, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY
1076–1077 (December 2, 1987). 
27 Jon Vickery, Searching for Josef Pieper, 66:3 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 622, 623 
(2005). According to Vickery, “[u]p until this time historians have done Pieper a signifi-
cant injustice. It is my contention that he may be safely exonerated from the accusation of 
succumbing to the deceptive power of his age,” at 623. 
28 John A. Perricone, The Relation between Justice and Love in the Natural Order, 51 
J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 55, 56, 58–59, 69 (2012).
29 Mark DeForrest, Introducing Persuasive Legal Argument Via the Letter from a Bir-
mingham Jail, 15 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 109, 112, 131 (2009). De For-
rest cites Pieper’s short but powerful essay Abuse of Language, Abuse of Power (Lothar 
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economy,30 the right to housing,31 the takings power,32 legal theory,33 cor-
porate law,34 education,35 financial regulation,36 employment law,37 jury tri-
als,38 free speech,39 originalism,40 and criminal defense,41 to name only 
some. 
II. APOCALYPTIC CLAIMS
As foreshadowed above, apocalyptic claims can form part of a con-
science-based resistance to civil law or become joined to declarations of 
civil disobedience. Thus, the claims of those interrupting traffic to block the 
passage of nuclear material on a public road,42 a multiple-arrest plan of civil 
disobedience,43 or activist conflicts at military installations44 all integrate an 
Krauth trans., Ignatius Press 1992). 
30 John M. Breen, Love, Truth, and the Economy: A Reflection on Benedict XVI’s Cari-
tas in Veritate, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 987, 1007 (2010). 
31 Kristen David Adams, Do We Need a Right to Housing?, 9:2 NEV. L.J. 275, 285 
(2009) 
32 Caryn L. Beck-Dudley & James E. MacDonald, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, Taking, and the Search for the Common Good, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 153, 169 (1995). 
33 John M. Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and Catholic Social Thought, 32 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 513, 557 (2009). 
34 James V. Schall, The Corporation and the Human Person, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 
105, 111 (2006) 
35 George Charles Roche III, A View of Education in America, 1 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 27, 35 (1978). 
36 Oskari Juurikkala, The Behavioral Paradox: Why Investor Irrationality Calls for 
Lighter and Simpler Regulation, 18:1 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 33, 87 (2012). 
37 James A. Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance: Employer Regulation of Off-
Duty Behavior, 43 GA. L. REV. 133, 147 (2008). 
38 Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 101 
(1996). 
39 G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence 
of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 1091 (2002). 
40 Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within 
Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism Grounded in the Central Western Philosophical 
Tradition, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 909, 931 (2005). 
41 Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER L. 
REV. 443, 514 (1999). 
42 E.g., the 2008 disruption of the mass transport of nuclear waste in Germany; see The 
World from Berlin, The Renaissance of the Anti-Nuclear Movement, SPIEGEL ONLINE, No-
vember 10, 2008, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-the-
renaissance-of-the-anti-nuclear-movement-a-589456.html 
43 E.g., Jane Fonda’s series of arrests at The US Capitol as part of a climate protest 
known as “Fire Drill Fridays,” which, according to reports, were “inspired by the Swedish 
teenage climate activist Greta Thunberg’s cri de coeur, “Our house is on fire””; see Cara 
Buckley, Jane Fonda’s Arresting Development, N.Y. TIMES, November 4, 2019, C1. 
44 For example, activities of the Kings Bay Plowshares group; see Lindsey Ever, 
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element of “end times” necessity in their justifications. 
Even lawyers (and law students) have become involved in such ac-
tivities and are also subject to potentially more serious consequences for 
breaching the law in this way.45 Members of other professions (for example, 
medicine and related fields) are also very much alive to questions of consci-
entious objection.46 
Military personnel, it is often argued, also have a distinctive interest 
in claims to conscientious objection.47 The history of this right, as related by 
Kessler, outlines “the fraught relationship between international human 
rights law and national sovereignty.”48 The right is still in development and 
in some countries, for example, in Ireland, military personnel are still una-
ble to access a scheme of objection.49 
Activists Raid Nuclear Submarine Base with Hammers and “Baby Bottles of Their own 
Blood,” THE WASHINGTON POST, April 6, 2018, https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/04/05/activists-raid-nuclear-submarine-
base-with-hammers-and-baby-bottles-of-their-own-blood/. 
45 “As candidates for bar admission, law students who participate in nonviolent civil 
disobedience take on certain risks that members of the general public do not, including the 
possibility of an adverse character and fitness determination or delayed admission to the 
bar”; see Julia Morgan-Trostle, A Guide for Law Students Considering Nonviolent Civil 
Disobedience, 42 HARBINGER 21, 22 (2017). 
46 See book-length discussion in Opting Out. 
47 For an early discussion on conscientious objection to military service as an interna-
tional human right, see Matthew Lippman, The Recognition of Conscientious Objection to 
Military Service as an International Human Right, 21 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 31 (1990).  
48 Jeremy Kessler, The Invention of a Human Right: Conscientious Objection at the 
United Nations, 1947–2011, 44 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 753 (2013), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267462. Kessler relies on Samuel Moyn’s analysis in THE LAST
UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010); Imperialism, Self-Determination, and the Rise 
of Human Rights, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 159–
178 (Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, & William I. Hitchock eds., 2012). See also Kessler’s com-
prehensive review of the prior literature on this topic, at 754 of The Invention of a Human 
Right: Conscientious Objection at the United Nations, 1947–2011. 
49 The Irish defense personnel advocacy group Permanent Defense Forces Representa-
tive Association (PDFORRA) has recently sought more protection from the Council of Eu-
rope for military personnel who wish to register as conscientious objectors; see the Euro-
pean Committee of Social Rights Case Document No 4, Response from EUROMIL to the 
Government’s Submissions on the Merits, European Organisation of Military Associations 
(EUROMIL) v. Ireland, Complaint No. 164/2018 (May 3, 2019) (setting out EUROMIL’s 
response to a submission made by the Irish Government on February 13, 2019), 
https://rm.coe.int/cc164casedoc4-en/1680945111. See also Sean O’Riordan, PDFORRA 
Seeking Conscientious Objection Rights(commentary), IRISH EXAMINER (November 2, 
2019), https://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ireland/pdforra-seeking-conscien-
tious-objection-rights-961287.html. 
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III. TAXONOMIES OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
Like religious interests simpliciter,50 various taxonomies of consci-
entious objection have been developed over time. These taxonomies cross 
literary, social, and eschatological borders.51 One classification, which has 
proven useful, suggests breaking the collection into two parts: those which 
are “about war” and those that are “not about war.” Such classification also 
acknowledges that the latter grew out of the former, but is still distinct from 
it in important ways. Why this taxonomy? First, because the taxonomy bet-
ter reflects history. The objections “about war” are much older and more 
venerable. For example, some writers analyze the history of conscientious 
objection in terms of the three classical works in the area: the Hebrew 
Scriptures, Cicero, and St Paul.52 These are the urtexts and yet also reflect 
modern experience of total war as it has appeared in the twentieth century. 
As Richard A. Glenn has noted, “with the enormous impact of war on the 
modern world and the widespread government practice of military conscrip-
tion, conscientious objection is usually understood to refer to [objection to] 
military service.”53 
Second, an analysis that takes account of these two categories will 
better explain the role of the apocalyptic, which invariably has a war-like 
tone and even makes predictions about it. 
Finally, there is an element of the apocalyptic that can only be per-
ceived from inside its own particular tradition and thus is a matter of faith. 
This is important because the spiritual path is so often compared to a war or 
to the engagement with some kind of ultimate battle against evil.54 While 
50 See discussion of religious interests taxonomy in PETER W. EDGE, RELIGION AND
LAW, 40 (2006). 
51 “Scholarship in religious studies over the last 50 years suggests that apocalypse is a 
complex literary and social historical phenomenon that comprises three separate categories 
intimately related in history and individual religious experience: eschatology, social move-
ment, and literary genre”; Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, 38. 
52 3 LINDSAY JONES, MIRCEA ELIADE, & CHARLES J. ADAMS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELI-
GION, (2nd ed. 2005), s.v. “conscience.” 
53 Richard A. Glenn, Conscientious Objection, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCY-
CLOPEDIA (Christopher B. Gray ed. 1999), at 146. 
54 These faith experiences are very difficult to communicate to others. As Pieper has 
noted: “there are experiences which can be repeated and so tested by others; and there are 
experiences which are not communicable in this sense; e.g., the experiences of the believer 
are altogether incommunicable to the unbeliever. It is of the essence faith that a complete 
identification takes place between the believer and the thing believed, so that the assump-
tion that the thing believed is not true cannot even be made in abstract and hypothetically. 
For the same reason, it is equally impossible for the unbeliever to assume, abstractly and, 
so to speak, “purely theoretically” that the thing believed is true (“let us assume Christians 
to be right, and let us see where this leads us”). [In other words,] faith is not like the experi-
ence gained from a lookout tower or a telescope, one that can be used by everyone in a 
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this taxonomy is not definitive, it will be useful as the arguments unfold be-
low. 
IV. PIEPER AS PHILOSOPHER OF THE APOCALYPSE
There are many Christian commentaries on the Apocalypse, as well
as any number of historical movements, grim predictions, and gloomy 
screeds, together with an equal number of disappointed believers down 
through the ages.55 However, few professional philosophers have turned 
their minds to the question of apocalypse, and equally few evince the vast 
range of expertise as that of Josef Pieper. Jude P. Dougherty’s memorial for 
Pieper praised his “rare ability to go immediately to the core of his subject 
matter, defining and distinguishing, while ever attentive to the essential 
structures controlling his inquiry.”56  
Pieper’s foray into the apocalyptic is, on its own terms, philosophi-
cal. It is his attempt to explore the limits of this concept within his own tra-
dition, and in doing so, he provides an original point of comparison with 
other versions of the idea of the end of the world. While the present work is 
unlike Nathanial A. Warne’s “applied exegesis of Pieper,”57 it is meant to 
be a helpful addition to the legal literature,  designed to bring Pieper’s phil-
osophical tradition to a wider audience. 
Thus, to reprise Johnson’s statement about comparative judgment: 
Pieper provides us with many useful comparative points of reference, not 
the least of which is his philosophical attitude, which allows the considera-
tion of serious matters stripped of their emotive and sometimes overwhelm-
ing force. If we can think calmly about the end of the world, and if we can 
even philosophize about it, there is much to be learned. Warne58 has made a 
somewhat similar use of Pieper’s work in his critique of modern education, 
and thereby mounted a convincing argument in favor of a more holistic ap-
proach. Whether a holistic approach to the apocalypse is possible is 
spirit of experiment. [On the contrary,] only he who believes, with complete existential ear-
nestness, is also able to perceive the right which falls from the believed truth upon reality”; 
END OF TIME, at 51. 
55 The list is very long; see, e.g., the story of Joanna Southcott (1750–1814) of Bed-
ford, England, who claimed to be pregnant with the Messiah and who predicted that the 
end of the world would occur in 2004; see https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/philoso-
phy-and-religion/protestant-christianity-biographies/joanna-southcott. 
56 Jude P. Dougherty, In Memoriam: Joseph Pieper (1904-1997), 51:2 THE REVIEW OF
METAPHYSICS, 491 (December 1997). 
57 Nathaniel A. Warne, Learning to See the World Again: Josef Pieper 
on Philosophy, Prudence, and the University, 47:3 JOURNAL OF MORAL EDUCATION 
289–303 (2018). 
58 Warne, supra note 54, at 291. 
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something the reader may care to contemplate as we move into the details 
of Pieper’s unique philosophical work, The End of Time. 
V. THE APOCALYPTIC IN PIEPER’S THE END OF TIME
Pieper’s epigraph in The End of Time contains quotes from two promi-
nent Germans: philosopher Johann Hamann (1730–1788)59 and journalist 
and critic Konrad Weiss (1880–1940).60 The quote from Weiss proposes the 
paradox of the “goal of the Incarnation” against the enduring peace so ear-
nestly desired during his era.61 Hamann, by contrast, is cited for the follow-
ing: “Who can hope to obtain proper concepts of the present, without know-
ing the future?” While this quote may at first may seem quite cryptic, it sets 
up apparently unanswerable questions about the end of the world. Some of 
Hamann’s writings relate to the apocalypse,62 while Weiss wrote religious 
and mystical poetry. Nevertheless, both quotes set the stage for Pieper’s 
dense and challenging volume to which we now turn in detail.  
A. Pieper Chapter One – Philosophy and History
Chapter One of Pieper’s essay considers the meaning and aims of a phi-
losophy of history, the complex relationships between philosophy and the-
ology, and the philosophical nature of prophecy. The chapter begins by not-
ing that the philosophy of history is not about “what actually happened,”63 
but will inevitably spill beyond that question in various ways, without ever 
59 Although Hamann never held a position as a philosopher, his work was respected at 
the time and is still of considerable interest today; see Gwen Griffith-Dickson, “Johann 
Georg Hamann,” THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 
Fall 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/hamann/. 
60 Henry Garland & Mary Garland eds., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO GERMAN LITER-
ATURE (3rd ed., Online ver. ,2005), s.v. Konrad Weiss, (Gaildorf, Württemberg, 1880–
1940, Munich), https://www.oxfordreference.com/search?q=Weiss%2C+Konrad. 
61 The full epigraphical quote from Hamann as it appears in Pieper’s END OF TIME is as 
follows: “The will, which is today growing even greater, to create a condition that shall 
hold within it an exemplarily complete essence of humanity and an enduring peace, is bur-
dened by the heavy paradox that it is not humanity which is the goal of the Incarnation.”  
62 See e.g., Kirby Don Richards, Johann Georg Hamanns Apocalyptic Rhetoric. Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Department of Theology, University of Virginia (1999). Also, as it relates to 
Hamann’s philosophy of language: “If only I was as eloquent as Demosthenes, I would 
have to do no more than repeat a single word three times. Reason is language—Logos; I 
gnaw on this marrowbone and will gnaw myself to death over it. It is still always dark over 
these depths for me: I am still always awaiting an apocalyptic angel with a key to this 
abyss. (ZH 5, 177:16–21),” supra note 58. Note: ZH refers to JOHANN GEORG HAMANN, 
BRIEFWECHSEL [Exchange of letters] (vols. 1–3, Walther Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel eds; 
vols. 4–8, Henkel ed.,1955–1975). 
63 Id. at 11. 
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entirely precluding consideration of what “takes place through time.”64 The 
task of philosophers is to consider historical events, and then to reveal their 
meaning as best they can. This meaning is especially important not only for 
understanding the past, but also for understanding what is happening in the 
present and what may (or will) happen in the future. In this way, Hamann’s 
enigmatic question begins to find an answer.  
Writing in 1954, Pieper was alert to the new and pressing problems 
of nuclear war and its potential devastating consequences, and so adverts to 
“particular forms of sectarian apocalyptic” that were being discussed at that 
time.65 He writes,“[e]veryone is aware of the extent to which the question of 
the end of history is today exercising the minds of men.”66 He is not, how-
ever, interested in overblown eschatological answers but wants to consider 
the question with a “high measure of sobriety and exactitude.”67 He natu-
rally renounces any possible answer to the actual issue of when an Apoca-
lypse will occur. Moving quickly beyond a temptation to leave the question 
alone altogether, Pieper proposes that post Christum natum (after the birth 
of Christ),68 the question of an Apocalypse will always be open for consid-
eration and that Aristotle’s opinion that history repeats itself indefinitely 
can no longer be taken seriously.69  
According to Pieper, the ideas of “beginning” and “ending” with re-
gard to time itself are now loose in the world, and older discourses preclud-
ing such events (i.e., definitive beginnings and endings) cannot continue to 
dominate.70 In fact, anyone who now uses terms like “historical develop-
ment” or “progress” is already buying into the idea that history has a course, 
which it will run, and which will, at some point, reach an end-state.71 Pieper 
argues that such phrases “contain the implication that history is leading up 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 12. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 The reader is presumed aware of Christ’s predictions about the end of time found in 
the Gospels (e.g., Chapter 21 of Luke, in which Jesus predicts the destruction of the temple, 
persecutions, signs in the heavens, distress of nations, etc.) as well as Revelation. The 
Christian Old Testament is also a source of such predictions, the Book of Daniel being 
most prominent.  
69 He refers to Aristotle’s Meteorologica, I, 3. Of course this does not render Aristotle 
obsolete, since Pieper makes use of him throughout his corpus of work.  
70 Pieper notes “We can “omit” neither the concept of the beginning, of the creation 
out of nothingness (nor this concept of nothingness itself, which is the truly radical one), 
nor the concept of the end. This, it seems to me, is to be numbered among the changes that 
entered into the world of man on the basis of the event “revelation in Christ””; END OF
TIME, at 13. 
71 END OF TIME, at 14.  
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to something . . . a particular state of perfection or impoverishment.”72 
Because other philosophical questions—for example, “What is cog-
nition?”—have never been answered with abiding philosophical precision, 
Pieper initially asks whether questions about the end of history are simply 
unanswerable and so best left alone. Moreover, even the difficult questions 
about cognition have some (immediately available) sensory data on which a 
philosopher might build, whereas the question, “What is history?,” philo-
sophically posed, appears to have no immediate “experiential foundation”73 
at all. This puts the question in a special situation “but does not consist in its 
being different in principle from that of anyone else who philosophizes,”74 
it merely means that “an element inherent in all philosophizing in general 
appears here with greater intensity.”75  
Pieper’s next move is to consider the relationship between philo-
sophic inquiry and theology. He is of the view that these two areas are con-
trapuntal,76 that is, “there is no philosophical question which, if it really 
wants to strike the ground intended by itself and in itself, does not come 
upon the primeval rock of theological pronouncements.”77 He returns to the 
question of cognition’s experimental basis, and, noting Heidegger’s ques-
tion78 about from where the exerciser of the cognitive faculty (call them 
“the cognizer”) receives their direction toward the existent, states that we 
can never really understand cognition until we have come to grips with this 
subterranean issue: “Whence does cognition derive its dependence upon the 
existent?”79 Such questions, he says, can only be answered by a theological 
pronouncement. Any attempt to do otherwise is bound to fail in one of two 
ways: either the philosopher stops asking the question for fear of a demarca-
tion dispute between theology and philosophy, or the philosopher stops ask-
ing because “philosophy deems itself one special science alongside others 
and confines itself to certain specialized questions (of a formal-logical na-
ture, for instance).”80 This latter move is not, according to Pieper, 
72 Id. at 14. 
73 Id. at 15. 
74 Id. at 15. 
75 Id. at 15. 
76 A term borrowed from the musical concept of counterpoint meaning “[t]he ability, 
unique to music, to say two or more things at once comprehensibly. The term derives from 
the expression punctus contra punctum [point against point or note against note]; see THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, (6th ed, 2012), s.v. “counterpoint.” 
77 END OF TIME, at 16. 
78 According to Pieper, Heidegger has formulated the question thus: “Whence does the 
assertion of representation derive the injunction to take its direction from the object and to 
accord with correctness?”, id. at 17, citing M. Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (Frank-
furt, 1943), at 13. 
79 END OF TIME, at 18. 
80 Id.  
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philosophy in “the sense of Plato and Aristotle and the great Western tradi-
tion.”81 
Thus, Pieper argues, philosophy must be “methodologically open”82 
to theology. Failure to do so is “simply unphilosophical.”83 This applies 
with even great force to questions about the end of time for the following 
three reasons. First, all ideas of beginning and end (of history) must be built 
on something “revealed” since there is, by definition, no form of human ex-
perience that can aid their comprehension. Second, the concept of the end of 
history concerns itself with “salvation and disaster”84 and such mysterious85 
things can only be understood on a revelational basis. Third, the philosopher 
who works in this theological/philosophical area is “[striking] the exact cen-
ter of a theological pronouncement, which is a pronouncement concerning 
the historical process of the ‘salvation of man’”86—not an ontological point, 
but a history of salvation. 
Pieper drives home the above by going on to claim that any philoso-
phy of history that ignores the above is merely pseudo-philosophy since “in-
sofar as it declines to refer back to theology, it does not descry its subject 
matter at all; it is altogether unable to obtain a serious view of the totality of 
history; from the outset it fails to live up to the claim made by its title.”87 In 
other words, his theological interest is not a matter of a “religious outlook,” 
because “otherwise the inquiry would lose its philosophical character and 
would therefore simply no longer be worthwhile.”88 In saying this, he does 
not define theology as the things that have “come down from a divine 
source”89—such pronouncements are presupposed by theology. Rather, the-
ology is “the [additional] human endeavor to interpret this body of tradition 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 19. The familiar version of this question and its associated discussion is “What 
does Athens have to do with Jerusalem?” 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 20. 
85 Here he is talking about mystery in “the strictest sense”; id at 22. Presumably this 
relates to things like the mystery of existence, of original sin, of salvation, of the Trinity, or 
even of iniquity (the latter being the “a religious deception offering men an apparent solution 
to their problems at the price of apostasy from the truth.” See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH, 675), and not “simple mysteries” such as what caused the defenestration of Frank 
Olsen (a scientist alleged to be part of the MKUltra Project and now dramatized in a TV 
series on Netflix) or who killed Somerton Man (the Tamám Shud case from South Australia). 
86 Id. at 23. 
87 Id. at 25. 
88 Id. at 29. 
89 Citing Plato, THE PHILEBOS (in English, Philebus), which discusses “the good hu-
man life and the claims of pleasure on the one hand and a cluster containing intelligence, 
wisdom, and right opinion on the other in connection with that life,” in  THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PLATO (2008), at 16. 
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out of itself, by ordering it and weighing it.”90 Thus we find ourselves in the 
presence of something very important that was “formerly self-evident not 
just to the Christian West but equally to Plato, Virgil, and Cicero”91 and 
also supports the venerable claim that “theology forms a part of general ed-
ucation.”92 
At this stage of his argument, Pieper cautions that this reliance on 
theology does not make the task of philosophizing any easier. In fact, quite 
the opposite occurs: a revealed truth (about which a theology then may ex-
ercise its reason) is more mysterious, since “the greater the extent to which 
knowledge discloses being, the more profoundly does the mystery of the ex-
istent unveil itself within it.”93  
The next major topic addressed is the Christian philosophy of his-
tory, which must deal with the revealed fact of original sin as the source of 
evil and suffering in the world.94 This pushes a new mystery on to the stage, 
which is “much more enigmatic and impenetrable than the empirically en-
counterable evil in the world,”95 namely, a mystery that is both an Apoca-
lypse (including an Antichrist figure), yet which, “nevertheless will not and 
cannot be a philosophy of despair.”96 
The concept of prophecy is then broached. Pieper lists the concepts 
associated with the essential nature of history as “freedom, decision, 
uniqueness, unrepeatability, uninterchangeability, unpredictable capacity for 
variation, [and] the individual solitary.”97 By employing these, he says, 
“historical happening is distinguished from the unhistorical happening of 
nature.”98 Prophecy, by way of contrast, has no “foothold in experience”99 
but lies beyond it. 100 Archetypical prophecies, such as the Messianic ones 
from the Old Testament, are the product of vision, a revelation, and are his-
torical in most central sense of that term. They are not a “result arising out 
90 END OF TIME, at 29. In the attached footnote, Pieper states, “In this connection it 
must be noted that theology in this sense is scarcely possible without a genuinely philo-
sophical attitude (and to some extent, also, without philosophical training.)” 
91 Id. at 30. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 31. 
94 Pieper mentions other possibilities in passing; e.g., that evil may derive from “an 
original evil principle operating alongside God, or from a tragic contradiction with God 
himself”; id. at 31. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 33. 
98 Id. Examples of this include events like “the flash of lightening, the fall of the stone, 
the flowing of water”; id. at 32. 
99 Id. at 34. 
100 Prophecy also leaves behind the concept of “prognosis” which also has “footholds” 
in the present and merely proceeds towards the “probable”; id. 
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of the interpretative penetration of what can be experienced, but something 
made known by revelation, a “vision”, the announcement of something per-
taining to the indeterminate future.”101 
Continuing with his investigation of the End, Pieper asserts that un-
fulfilled prophecies are among the most scandalous things human beings 
must confront. He draws several times on the work of controversialist reli-
gious figure John Henry Newman, who wrote about the attitudes of the 
Jews towards the Messianic prophesies.102 Pieper continues that “[i]t is of 
the essence of prophecy that it can be understood only to the extent to 
which it is being fulfilled—and even then only by the believer.”103 This, he 
describes, as a “great complication.”104 This complication works its way out 
at the end by the fact that “the predictive meaning of a prophecy becomes 
totally clear only to the man who looks back upon it from the vantage point 
of its historical fulfillment.”105 
To illustrate the relationship between the philosophy of history and 
theology generally, Pieper recounts a remarkable story about two Tibetan 
men found among a group of German soldiers in a POW camp in the United 
States after World War II. While not giving the story much credibility,106 he 
uses it to illustrate the advantages enjoyed by those with an inner conviction 
of their position and direction in a world that is in extremis, as was the case 
during that time. The two men were reported to be speaking a language that 
nobody understood. After being identified as Tibetan and provided with ap-
propriate interpreters, they related an amazing and arduous journey from a 
forced conscription into the Soviet army, to the Russian front, imprisonment 
by the Germans, a further “draft” into the auxiliary German Army, being 
taken prisoner by the Americans, and finally sent to a POW camp in the 
101 Id. at 35. In this section, Pieper gives a probing reference to BLAISE PASCAL (1623–
1662), PENSÉES (fragments published posthumously circa 1670), Art. 6, 38, which states, 
“Three hosts. Would he who had possessed the friendship of the King of England, the King 
of Poland, and the Queen of Sweden, have believed he would lack a refuge and shelter in 
the world?” (The University of Adelaide Library Kindle ed.) at 900–901. The point Pascal 
was making (circa 1656), and which is picked up by Pieper, is that all three had by then lost 
their crowns—an entirely “unpredictable” series of events which could never be foreseen 
merely through “prognostication.” 
102 Pieper quotes Newman’s GRAMMAR OF ASSENT (1870), at 446; see END OF TIME, at 
37. 
103 Id. at 38. 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 40, and referring again to Newman’s GRAMMAR OF ASSENT, at 446. 
106 He places it amongst some of the hardly credible “true stories” of the war. As I 
Please, by George Orwell, published in the TRIBUNE on October 13, 1944, related a similar 
(but not identical) story, see http://orwell.ru/library/articles/As_I_Please/english/eaip_03 
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United States.107 Despite having no clue about world affairs, or what the 
fighting was all about, these two exemplified:  
[T]he superiority of the man who believes (even if he does not
know) over the unbeliever (even if he knows) [and which can] be
very precisely identified, for instance in those extreme situations
which history again and again holds ready for man: a superiority ex-
pressed as inner inviolability, as the capacity, above all, not to des-
pair.108
For Pieper this “purely believing relation to history . . . is nonethe-
less most certainly directed upon that which really happens.”109 This leads 
to a reciprocity between theology and philosophy whereby: 
the inquirer in the philosophy of history gazes into the multiplicity 
of concrete happening, perceiving-examining-interpreting; this in 
turn makes possible a higher caliber theological interpretation of this 
believed revealed word of the Apocalypse; from the vantage point of 
such a formally more exact, contentually more profound theological 
interpretation, more comprehensive, more penetrating philosophical 
insight into history becomes possible in turn—and so on.110 
In the closing parts of Chapter One, Pieper harks back to his original 
question: Should we simply abandon the question of the End of Time, be-
cause it is unanswerable? In philosophical terms, Pieper asserts, “he who 
philosophizes looks primarily at things, at the being of the world which he 
can experience and which takes place day by day, and is not, like the theolo-
gian, looking at a body of pronouncements which he believes to be re-
vealed.”111 For a “purely immanent cultural sociology,” this would seem 
impossible, since it refuses to look back to any pre-philosophical tradition. 
But for anyone who “believingly accepts the Apocalyptic prophecy of the 
end of time,”112 there is, indeed, something to be gleaned. This person can 
“see more and, in addition, to see it in historical events and formations . . . 
107 The Orwellian version has them as prisoners of the British rather than the United 
States, via a different route, including North Africa. In a typical twist, Orwell suggests that 
“It would round the story off neatly if they were now conscripted into the British army and 
sent to fight the Japanese, ending up somewhere in Central Asia, quite close to their native 
village, but still very much puzzled as to what it is all about.” Orwell, supra, As I please.  
108 END OF TIME, at 45. 
109 END OF TIME, at 45–46 (emphasis in the original). 
110Id. at 47.  
111Id. at 48. 
112Id. at 49.  
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to perceive something about the events and formations that has an inner 
connection with the end of time.”113 
Pieper now breaks out into the quotation given at the very start of 
this article, which continues as follows: 
The object of the prophecy of the End is, however, explicitly and 
formally a historical event or, rather, a series of historical events. 
And theology has, since time immemorial, understood certain histor-
ical phenomena, such as persecutions and the figure of the tyrant, to 
be prefigurations and preliminary forms of the end-state.114 
By immediately answering the question “What does the believer see 
in the structure of reality?” Pieper makes his point clearer:  
[The believer sees] this arrow pointing toward the End, it is this 
character of being-directed-toward-the-End, which becomes discern-
ible in and about that which concretely happens, to the eye of him 
who has accepted the Apocalypse as revelation and bends his gaze 
upon concrete history from that vantage point.115 
These experiences are, however, not generally accessible to all. Only 
the believer can see them. As Pieper describes it:  
Faith is not like a lookout tower or a telescope that can be used by 
everyone in a spirit of experiment. Only he who believes, with com-
plete existential earnestness, is also able to perceive the light which 
falls from the believed truth upon reality.116  
By way of example, phenomena like the totalitarian work State, 
while appearing extreme from “the viewpoint of liberal thought” is some-
thing entirely recognizable by the believer who sees in it “a milder prelimi-
nary form of the State of the Antichrist.”117 This is a form of the process by 
which we better understanding what is “normal” by also considering its ex-
tremes and thereby gain a fresh outlook on the normal and so “understand it 
more profoundly in itself.”118 Historical events, Pieper argues, are also more 
easily understood in this way by contemplating them in light of “the 
113 Id. (emphasis in original). 
114 Id. at 50.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 51.  




Summarizing Chapter One, Pieper reflects again on the goal of phi-
losophy and reiterates that his focus is philosophy, not theology. Neverthe-
less, recalling the Augustinian touchstone credo utintelligam,120 there is an 
element of believing that underlies all acts of knowing. Like the moviegoer 
who sees a screen but only by power of the projector, which lies behind, the 
philosopher “sees” reality by the power of the Logos: every intelligere is 
grounded on a credere121 This insight was also present in both Plato122 and 
Aristotle,123 but began to wither away over the centuries until it was seen as 
a purely philosophical cognition. Pieper notes that Kant recognized this and 
gave it a special paragraph in the second edition of his Critique of Pure 
Reason, where he (Kant) conceded, “in modern times [these propositions 
have] been erected in metaphysics almost solely honoris causa.”124 Like an 
acid reaction, this corrosive effect on philosophy can start to play out apoca-
lyptic overtones; a world in which “the whole domain “roots of things” falls 
. . . wholly into darkness for natural, philosophizing Reason that it would re-
main enterable only to the believer, accessible solely through faith in the 
119 Pieper states that they (i.e., historical events) become “in themselves, more pro-
foundly apprehensible and understandable, if they are conceived sub specie of their, in the 
positive as well as the negative, extreme configurations, in which “normal history” presents 
itself to us in the visions of revealed mysteries.” He asks, “May it not be conceivable that, 
from Apocalyptic prophecy, a whole fund of such potential experiences has entered into the 
storehouse of the believer’s anamnesis, which are then, at the sight of historical phenom-
ena, and to that extent entirely as experiences, realized and read out from the kernel of his-
torical reality?”; id. at 53–54 (emphasis in original). Note: An “anamnesis” is a recollec-
tion, especially of a supposed previous existence. In Christian liturgical practices, it refers 
to that part of the Mass that memorializes Christ’s Passover; see CATECHISM OF THE CATH-
OLIC CHURCH 1362, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P41.HTM#BN.  
120 “I believe, in order that I might understand” [Credo ut intelligam] is a maxim of 
Anselm of Canterbury (see Proslogion 1 [Discourse on the Existence of God] [1077–
1078]), which is based on a maxim of Augustine, “Crede ut intellegas [believe so that you 
may understand]; In Evangelium Ioannis Tractutus Centum Viginti Quatuor, 29.6), 
https://www.augustinus.it/latino/commento_vsg/index2.htm. Pieper notes, “I am looking 
the things themselves in the face; the direction of my gaze is toward the reality before my 
eyes; but it is equally certain that I should not descry this innermost disposition of existent 
things if they did not lie in the light of the Logos, by which everything was made in the be-
ginning, which shines down, as it were, from behind my back, over my shoulder. Hence, 
what is involved here is certainly an intelligere [understanding], a perception in the en-
counter with things—but it is an intelligere grounded on a credere [belief];END OF TIME, at 
55. 
121 Pieper here uses Thomas Aquinas’s formulation “the reality of things is their light” 
(citing Aquinas’s COMMENTARY ON THE LIBER DE CAUSIS [Book of Causes], 2, 6 (1272).  
122 END OF TIME at55. Pieper does not give a direct source in Plato; an occurrence that 
is not rare in his philosophical writing.  
123 Citing WERNER JAEGER, ARISTOTELES (1923), at 404. 
124 END OF TIME, at 57. 
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Divine Logos.”125 
B. Pieper Chapter Two - Nihilism
Part Two of Pieper’s essay begins, uncannily, with the subtitle “The 
Grain of Truth in Nihilism.” By this, he adverts to the reduction of nothing-
ness implied in the idea of “an-nihil-ation,” first formulated by Nietsche.126 
This is an “end in the absolute sense, and, as formulated, a revocation of the 
beginning.127 This idea conforms to traditional theology in at least three 
ways: First, “every creature is . . . itself capable of being brought back into 
nothingness.”128 Second, the reduction of a creature into nothingness would 
not, of itself, be a malum and so not contrary to the all-good God.129 Third, 
sin itself might appear to be an act of “justice” since it had so disordered the 
universe. For Pieper, then, these are the grains of truth that are also con-
tained in nihilism.130 
In the context of the Apocalypse, the reduction into nothingness 
would not be a positive act.131 Citing the Book of Wisdom,132 Aquinas (and 
Pieper) assert that “there will be no annihilation at all, no End in the abso-
lute sense.”133 As well, such idea can only be found in “unreal thinking.”134 
In fact, “real reduction into nothingness is an attempt to withdraw into a fal-
lacious God-likeness.”135 This line of argument also has an impact on the 
way we think about technology and its many recent advances. If mankind is 
incapable of creating in the same way as the Creator, then it is also incapa-
ble of destruction in any absolute sense. As Pieper argues: 
[H]owever immense the advances made by the technological intelli-
gence in the perfection of the machinery of destruction, however
great the increase in “destructive efficiency” . . . however much, on
the other hand, the despair of the humanity that lives on this violated
earth may yearn for annihilatio as deliverance—it is not given to
125 END OF TIME, at 58.  
126 Id. at 60 
127 Id. at 59–60. 
128 Id. at 60–61. “omnis creatura vertilibis est in nihil—every creature is, of itself . . . 
incapable of persisting in being.” 
129 Citing THOMAS AQUINAS, QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE POTENTIA DEI Questions 
Concerning the Power of God], 5, 3 ad 1 (1265–1274). 
130 END OF TIME, at 61. 
131 Id. at 62 (citing Thomas Aquinas, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, III, 13, 2 [1265–1274]). 
132 Book of Wisdom 1:14. 
133 END OF TIME, at 63. 
134 Id. at 64.  
135 Id. 
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man “to make an end” in this absolute sense.136 
The end of history, then, must be conceived in a different way. 
Much more than the “dissolution of an empire” or “decline of the West” it 
is a period “after which there will no longer be time or history.”137 A post-
Enlightenment world which has grown accustomed to an extra-mundane 
God finds such statements difficult to comprehend since there is no longer 
any room for the idea that “maintenance in being” actually forms part of the 
creatio itself. 
Pieper next picks up a passage written by the young poet and philos-
opher Friedrich Hölderlin, who, in the immediate wake of the French Revo-
lution,138 looks ahead with extraordinary optimism to a world “in which 
everything is working toward better days.”139 Pieper observes that this un-
bridled optimism is now missing140 and prefers Dawson’s less enthusiastic 
appraisal: 
We have entered on a new phase of culture . . . in which the most 
amazing perfection of scientific technique is being devoted to purely 
ephemeral objects ... It is obvious that a civilization of this kind 
holds no promise for the future save that of social disintegration.141 
There follows a rather pessimistic list of those who foresaw similar decline: 
Donoso Cortes, Jacob Burckhardt, John Henry Newman, Vladimir Solo-
vyev, Theodor Haecker and Alfred Weber. The British Council of Churches 
sober assessment of the atomic age is also mentioned.142 Resisting the temp-
tation to despair, continues into a discussion of the inadequacy of the con-
cepts of pessimism and optimism.143 
For Pieper, a decaying Enlightenment forces consideration of the 
differences between the concepts of ends and goals. While these two ideas 
“inwardly cohere”144 they are not always the same, and their understanding 
136 Id. at 66. 
137 Id. at 67. 
138 Writing circa 1790.  
139 END OF TIME, at 73. Friedrich Hölderlin predicted, “These seeds of Enlightenment, 
these mute desires and aspiration of individuals for the improvement of the human race, 
will spread and grow strong and bear glorious fruit.” Pieper is quoting from Hölderlin’s 
correspondence in COLLECTED LETTERS (GesammelteBriefe) (Insel edition, Ernst Bertram 
ed.), at 88. 
140 The original edition of END OF TIME appeared mid-twentieth century (1954). 
141 Id. at 75.  
142 THE ERA OF ATOMIC POWER (1946) (Report commissioned by British Council of 
Churches). 
143 END OF TIME, at 79. 
144 Id. at 80. 
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is further complicated by the need to distinguish between “an intra-histori-
cal and an extra-temporal end of history.”145 Here, we see the terrible appar-
ent contradiction between a catastrophic End (an Apocalypse) and the 
reaching of the final destination outside of time. Inside a Christian-Western 
philosophy of history, then, the words optimism and pessimism cannot cap-
ture what is at stake in a framework of “New Heaven and New Earth.”146 
Various ancient and medieval chroniclers bore this out in their writings: Au-
gustine,147 Anselm of Havelberg,148 Otto of Friesing, and so too did the ac-
tivities of Charlemagne and Otto I, who built and founded ferociously de-
spite knowing that they lived in what some of their contemporaries consid-
ered the time immediately before the Antichrist. Pieper sees optimism and 
pessimism as too simple to apprehend “the many layers of this attitude to 
history.”149 This complex, multifaceted optimism can be compared with that 
of Renaissance Humanists who saw: 
The current present . . . [was] in no wise seen as the “last” epoch be-
fore the kingdom of the Antichrist; the present was rather seen as the 
latest phase in the approximation to perfection—conceived as occur-
ring entirely within history—as superior to the past and as preparing 
the way for a still happier future. ‘Happiness and salvation, said 
Francis Bacon, would be disseminated by the science renewed by 
himself, which he construed as wholly an instrument of progress 
within history.150 
Such ideas were promoted by philosophers of history such as Giam-
battista Vico,151 Isaak Iselin,152 and even Johann Gottfried von Herder, who, 
despite attacking Iselin, conceded that over time, “reason and equity must 
gain ground among men and foster an enduring humanity.”153 Later views, 
145 Id. at 81. 
146 Id. at 83. These arguments are complex and can be given only in bare outline here. 
147 Citing AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, bk 22, chap.30 (early 5th Century CE), 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120122.htm. This work divides the world into seven 
stages: “The sixth is now passing, and cannot be measured by any number of generations, 
as it has been said, ‘It is not for you to know he times, which the Father has put in His own 
power.’ Acts1:7”; see also 2 Philip Schaff, ed., A SELECT LIBRARY OF THE NICENE AND
POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH (First Series 1887).  
148 Citing HERBERT GRUNDMANN, Studien über Joachim von Floris [Studies on 
Joachim von Floris] (Liepzig, 1927), 92. 
149 END OF TIME, at 85.  
150 Id. at 88. 
151 Giambattista Vico, an Italian philosopher (1668–1744) 
152 A Swiss writer known for his work CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF MANKIND 
(1764). 
153 Id. at 89, citing Johann Gottfried Herder, IDEEN ZUR PHILOSOPHIE DER GESCHICHTE 
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like those of Freidrich Engels and Fedor Kalinin rest on “the dissolution of 
the Christian view of history, from which the element of the catastrophic 
end within history has been expunged.”154 The City of God155 is no longer 
sought outside of time but inside and through the efforts of humanity. This 
tendency, however, has also bred “a retaliatory pessimism which, having 
lost its illusions regarding real history, is preparing for a catastrophic End . . 
. beyond which no promise of deliverance is audible.”156 
In concluding chapter two, Pieper offers a lengthy commentary on 
Kant (in the area of the philosophy of progress) and some briefer thoughts 
on Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Novalis,157 and Johann Joseph von Görres. First 
considering Kant’s Ideal of a Universal History Based on the Principle of 
World-Citizenship,158 we learn about Kant’s unreserved belief that enlight-
enment will inexorably “mount little by little upon the thrones and even ex-
ercise an influence upon the principles by which they govern.”159  
Pieper argues this Enlightenment progress is built upon “a seculari-
zation of Christian theology,”160 which is the debasement and inversion of 
concepts borrowed from the New Testament.161 He also discusses Kant’s 
1798 essay, “Is the Human Race Continually Improving?.” 162  
Kant’s predictions that war will become more humane and violence 
will gradually decrease in favor of obedience to law receive, in the light of 
World War II and the atomic age, a serious rebuff from Pieper: “Kant could 
hardly have imagined how utterly ineffectual this argument would prove for 
our generation.”163 
DER MENSCHHEIT [Ideas on the Philosophy of History of Mankind] at 15. 
154 END OF TIME, at 91. 
155 Referring to Augustine’s THE CITY OF GOD, supra, note 142. 
156 Id. at 92. 
157 Novalis was the pseudonym of Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg 
(1772–1801), an early German Romantic philosopher, poet, and novelist. 
158 Appearing in 1784. 
159 END OF TIME, at 93–94. 
160 Id. at 95, citing Kant’s THE VICTORY OF THE GOOD PRINCIPLE OVER THE EVIL AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD ON EARTH (1792). 
161 END OF TIME, 96–97. Pieper’s point is worth quoting in full: “The establishment of 
the Kingdom of God on earth can, therefore, be put like this: ‘If only the principle of grad-
ual transition from ecclesiastical creed to the universal religion of Reason . . . has struck 
public root, in general or at some particular point, even though the real establishment of the 
same is still infinitely distant from us—this means: if the suppression of ecclesiastical 
creed by the religion of Reason has at some particular point, as for example, in Revolution-
ary France, acquired ‘public,’ that is to say, State or legal, recognition—then ‘it may be 
said with cause that ‘the Kingdom of God has come to us.’” Id. at 96. 
162 END OF TIME, at 97. See THE CONTEST OF FACULTIES (Der Streit der Fakultäten 
[1798]) in POLITICAL WRITINGS, eds. Donna M. Brinton & Janet M. Goodwin (1991). 
163 END OF TIME, at 101. 
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After a discussion of Kant’s “The End of All Things” (1794)164 Pie-
per concludes that despite Kant’s complexity of theory, the post-Kantian 
theorist vanish into “unhesitating constructivism.”165 
Fichte, Novalis, and Görres all offer accounts of history, which are 
critiqued by Pieper. Fichte’s notion of the end of history is “the epoch of the 
art of Reason; the era in which mankind builds itself up with a sure and un-
erring hand to an accurate impression of Reason; the estate of consummate 
justification and sanctity.”166 Thus, Fichte’s series of seventeen lectures on 
The Basic Features of the Present Era, are characterized by Pieper as 
slightly “frivolous.”167 Likewise Novalis, a disciple of Fichte, is criticized 
for imagining a “terrestrial-historical Christendom,” which, contra Augus-
tine, will arise once again after the “re-Christianization of Europe . . . [lead-
ing] to a new political and cultural glory.”168 Görres’s Munich lectures 
(1830)169 are characterized as equally arbitrary. 
Chapter two closes on a note of hope. Pieper paraphrases Juan 
Donoso Cortés to the effect that ages of uncertainty offer special opportuni-
ties “in which one experiences the greatest certainty of how one stands vis-
à-vis the world.”170 This seminal idea of “hope” will play out more in Part 
VI below, once we have looked carefully at Chapter Three.  
C. Pieper Chapter Three – The pseudo-order of the Antichrist
Part Three of Pieper’s essay considers the concept of the Antichrist which 
was, for Pieper, all the more urgent given his temporal proximity(1954) to 
totalitarianism, the recent ugliness of “total war,” and the impending threats 
of a nuclear conflict. He notes, first that, as with the ideas surrounding the 
End, there is much imprecision and confusion of the concept. He cites Johann 
J. Ignaz von Döllinger171 in connection with the belief that it would be prac-
tically impossible for a persecution of the Church to extend over the entire
earth, yet in Pieper’s own time, and due to the new “technologically
164 Can be found in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS, trans. Ed Humphrey (1983). 
165 Id. at 110. The arguments here have been given in truncated form. 
166 END OF TIME, at 112. 
167 END OF TIME, at 113. 
168 Id. at 113. Augustine was decidedly again the idea that if only Rome would “turn 
Christian” again, it would arise as a world dominating power. See also Id., in which Pieper 
refers to H. von Campenhausen, WELTGESCHICHTE UND GOTTESGERICHT [World History 
and God’s Court] (Stuttgart, 1947), at 11. 
169 JOSEF VON GÖRRES, THE FOUNDATION, SUBDIVISION, AND TEMPORAL SEQUENCE OF
WORLD HISTORY (1830); see END OF TIME, at 114. 
170 Id.at 117 (spelled “Donoso Cortes” in the text). 
171 J. Dollinger, CHRISTENTUM UND KIRCHE IN DER ZEIT DER GRUNDLEGUNG (Christi-
anity and Church in the Time of Foundation)(Regensburg, 1860), at 431. 
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registerable simultaneity all over the planet,”172 such persecution would now 
be obviously much easier to execute. Similarly, the medieval idea of the An-
tichrist bearing with him a “cremation furnace” is equally disturbing to con-
temporary minds.173 
A number of important theological doctrines are implied by the idea 
of the “Antichrist.” First, it presupposes demonic powers in history.174 Sec-
ond, the Antichrist is definitively not an angelic figure, but a human one, 
historically powerful, Prince of this World,175 and one who, in the words of 
Haecker, hastens the course of history.176 Second, the ideas of original and 
hereditary sin and its vanquishing by the “Logos become man”177 are criti-
cal, as is the view of the Antichrist as one who “despite all his power within 
history [is] one who is fundamentally already defeated.”178 Third, the con-
cepts of “martyr” and blood testimony are mentioned, together with an in-
teresting aside from E.R. Curtis who, in the context of Toynbee’s 1957 A 
Study of History,179 asks about the Christian Churches and whether their 
martyrdom “might save us from technocracy?”180 
Next, the actual dominion of the Antichrist receives attention. This 
struggle prescinds from Goethe’s amorphous struggle around mere “belief 
and unbelief”181 and focuses on the sole figure of Christ: without which An-
tichrist would make no sense. Contra Liberal Christianity of the nineteenth 
century, Pieper invokes Erik Peterson’s essay on eschatology to assert “that 
history does not take place in a neutral province of “culture” and what per-
tains to culture, and that “the “neutrality” of the liberal outlook upon Christ 
can never be more than a passing phase.”182 Additionally, since “martyr” is, 
172 END OF TIME, at 121. 
173 Pieper cites HANS PREUSS, DIE VORSTELLUNG VOM ANTICHRIST . . . [The Presenta-
tion of the Antichrist . . .] (1906), at 21. 
174 END OF TIME, at 122. 
175 Id. at 122, referring to 2 Corinthians 4:4. 
176 Id. at 123, citing THEODOR HAECKER, DER CHRIST UND DIE GESCHICHTE [Christ 
and History] (Leipzig, 1935), at 124. 
177 END OF TIME, at 124. 
178 Id. Following this, Pieper makes the slightly enigmatic comment that “We do not 
understand the Antichrist if we are not clear about the fact that the meaning of history is 
not ‘culture,’” id. at 124–125 
179 See ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY, abridgement by D.C. Somervell 
(1987). 
180 END OF TIME, at 125. While the reference to modern means of communication is 
obvious, Pieper is more concerned that this statement in fact shows a false understanding of 
the End because it refers to an abstract of technical things rather than a person.  
181 Id. at 126 (citing Israel in der Wüste [Israel in the Desert] Goethe, NOTEN UND AB-
HANDLUNGEN ZUM BESSEREN VERSTÄNDNIS DES WEST-ÖSTLICHEN DIVANS [Notes and Es-
says for a Better Understanding of the West-Eastern Divan] (1887). 
182 END OF TIME, at 126, quoting ERIK PETERSON, ZEUGE DER WAHRHEIT [Witness of 
Truth] (1937). 
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in one sense, a political term,183 so too is the Antichrist “a phenomenon of 
the political sphere.”184 Unlike a “heretic, the Antichrist is all about worldly 
power,185 in which “the End will be characterized by on single governmen-
tal structure equipped with prodigious power, which, however, fails to es-
tablish and genuine order.”186 A pseudo-order will ensue, however, bringing 
a successful illusion of order.187  
Pieper continues, “[this] purely organizational social integument, in 
which everything “technological”, from production of goods to hygiene, 
“functions smoothly” and which is nevertheless fundamentally a phenome-
non of disorder, is not very remote from contemporary experience.”188 
Thus, in sum, the Antichrist will be a political figure, with world power, 
who appears along with another “coordinate fact” of the Christian gospel 
reaching “the totality of the peoples of the earth.”189 Pieper is concerned 
here to remove, however, a misunderstanding: the traditional doctrines do 
not state that “only” the Antichrist can bring about a domination within a 
World State. Such a state is quite possible apart from the Antichrist and, he 
says, “may quite possibly be looked upon as a legitimate goal of political 
endeavor.”190 
Returning to the idea of tyranny, Pieper quotes numerous figures 
who offer insights as to its nature— Edward Gibbon, Kant,191 Lenin, and Ja-
cob Burckhardt.192 Gibbon’s astute contribution is that, within the Imperium 
Romanum, “freedom could have been torn up by the roots . . . because there 
was no possibility of flight . . . if dominium fell into the hands of one 
183 See NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003), s.v. “Theology of Martyrdom.” 
184 END OF TIME, at 127. 
185 Citing Thomas Aquinas, COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND EPISTLE TO THE THESSA-
LONIANS, chap. 2, lect. 2. 
186 END OF TIME, at 127 (emphasis in original).  
187 Pieper draws on author Ernst Jünger’s (1895-1998) comment that nihilism is unlike 
anarchism because it (nihilism) bears a certain “relationship to order”; Jünger, STRAH-
LUNGEN [Reflections] (Tübingen, 1949), at 469, cited in END OF TIME, at 128. Pieper states: 
“The description “pseudo-order” is also valid in the sense that the “illusion” is successful; 
it is an element in the prophecy of the End that the “desert of order” of the Antichrist will 
be regarded as a true and authentic order.”  
188 END OF TIME, at 128.  
189 Id. at 129. 
190 Id. 
191 Kant’s idea of the abolition of “External wars” is replaced with the idea of brutal 
internal “police actions.” 
192 END OF TIME, at 131 (citing Jacob Burckhardt’s letter of June 16, 1888 to Friedrich 
von Preen which declared, “the great future authority which nobody knows, and which 
does not yet know itself, but for which all-levelling radicalism is preparing the way”). Frie-
drich von Preen (1823–1894) was a civil servant in Baden. 
15-Jan-20] 27 
individual, the world became a safe prison from his adversaries.”193 Lenin’s 
visions that the whole world will become “one office, one factory”194 is also 
illustrative. 
The actual figure of the Antichrist is also determinative, appearing 
as a monstrous sea beast composed of many kinds of animals.195 Pieper 
notes that the “classical man” (he mentions Goethe) found such a thing to 
be “insulting to the imagination and grossly absurd.”196 Citing Huxley, Pie-
per sees elements of this monster in modern experiments with eugenics,197 
and himself opines on the inhumanity of some modern visual arts and po-
etry. He continues: 
Theological interpretation construes the pronouncement of the 
Apocalypse entirely after this manner: as a visualization of human 
apostasy, which also puts away from itself the natural likeness to 
God (“We do not wish to be what God has called Man”) as a charac-
terization and unmasking of the “cunning, coarse, all-devouring em-
pire, of the world power that is governed by bestial instincts and 
come to life in bestial shapes.198 
193 Id. at 130. Typical for Pieper, who had a vast memory for literature, the citation for 
this quotation is missing. Pieper was likely paraphrasing Edward Gibbon: “But the empire 
of the Romans filled the world, and when that empire fell into the hands of a single person, 
the world became a safe and dreary prison for his enemies. The slave of Imperial despot-
ism, whether he was condemned to drag his gilded chain in Rome and the senate, or to 
wear out a life of exile on the barren rock of Seriphus, or the frozen banks of the Danube, 
expected his fate in silent despair”; see THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
ROMAN EMPIRE, vol. 1, chap. 3, “Of the Constitution of the Roman Empire in the Age of 
Antonines,” at 111 
194 Citing Lenin, AUSGEWÄHLTE WERKE [Selected Works] (1946), 2:236. 
195 “And I saw a beast rising out of the sea, with ten horns and seven heads, with ten 
diadems upon its horns and a blasphemous name upon its heads. And the beast that I saw 
was like a leopard, its feet were like a bear’s, and its mouth was like a lion’s mouth”; Reve-
lation 13:1–2 (THE HOLY BIBLE CONTAINING THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS WITH THE
APOCRYPHAL Rev. Std. Ver., 1973). 
196 Citing Goethe’s letter to Lavater regarding Lavater’s book on the Apocalypse. Jo-
hann Caspar Lavater (1741–1801) was a beloved eighteenth-century literary figure known 
also as a hymn composer. 
197 Aldous Huxley, Gedanken über des Fortschritt (Thoughts about Progress), NEUE
SCHWEIZER RUNDSCHAU [New Swiss Review], (1948). The final result of this movement 
would be “the breeding of a race of hare-lipped, six-fingered idiots,” at 400.  
198 END OF TIME, at 135 (citing H. Schlier, VOM ANTICHRIST. THEOLOGISCHE
AUFSÄTZE ZUM 50. GEBURTSTAG VON KARL BARTH [From the Antichrist: Theological 
Courses on the 50th Birthday of Karl Barth] (1936) at 115. 
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The second beast,199 then appears and “bears the same relation to the 
first that propaganda does to the exercise of power”200 because it had “two 
horns like a lamb and [yet] it spoke like a dragon.”201 The first beast 
(Anitchrist) appears to be slain but is healed, thus perverting the Good Fri-
day narrative, as well as echoing the ancient cult of the fortuna impera-
toris.202 
According to Pieper, the tradition also speaks of the Antichrist as a 
Jew (resembling Christ), as does the Talmud203 and Thomas Aquinas.204 
Pieper makes various comments on this, including the proximate horror of 
World War II, the advent of the State of Israel, and even the possibility of a 
“legal review of the trial of Jesus.”205 In ending the chapter, Pieper averts to 
the relationship between Church and State by noting: 
The final form within history of the relationship between the State 
and the Church will not be ‘controversy,’ and not really ‘conflict,’ 
but persecution, that is to say, the combating of the powerless by 
power. The way in which victory will be won over the Antichrist, 
however, is by the blood-testimony.206 
In concluding his work, Pieper reiterates the ultimate defeat of the 
Antichrist, the definitive nature of the theological virtue of hope,207 and a 
mute readiness for the duties of the day. His final words urge the following 
self-described conclusion:  
Without a return to revealed truth, it is impossible not only to 
199 Revelation 13:11, supra note 189. 
200 END OF TIME, at 135; i.e., the first beast exercises raw power, the second uses the 
power of propaganda. Pieper has written famously on the abuse of the such power in 
ABUSE OF LANGUAGE, ABUSE OF POWER (1974). 
201 Revelation 13:11, supra note 189. 
202 The Emperor as the embodiment of success. For a brief discussion of the various 
forms of Fortuna, see TUOMAS M. S LEHTONEN, FORTUNA, MONEY, AND THE SUBLUNAR
WORLD: TWELFTH CENTURY ETHICAL POETICS AND THE SATIRICAL POETRY OF THE CAR-
MINA BURANA (1995), at 118. 
203 Hans Preuss, DER ANTICHRIST (2nd ed., 1909) at 41. Preuss (1876–1951) was a Lu-
theran theologian.  
204 Aquinas, COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND EPISTLE TO THE THESSALONIANS, chap. 2, 
lect. 1. 
205 END OF TIME at 137. There are numerous works on this topic; see e.g., Chaim 
Saiman, The Halakhah of Jesus’ Trial, FIRST THINGS (August 2013), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2013/08/the-halakhah-of-jesus-trial. 
206 END OF TIME at 143–144. 
207 The subject of yet another book-length treatment in Pieper, FAITH, HOPE, LOVE 
(1997). 
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philosophize about history but even to live in the area of real history 
as a spiritual being: that is to say, as a being who looks with open 
eyes upon what really happens in the real world, omitting nothing 
and glossing over nothing, but also abandoning and retracting noth-
ing of that upon which man, by his very nature, cannot cease to set 
his hopes.208 
The concept of hope, so important to Pieper, will help us to draw out 
the above into a more useable format. 
VI. THE END OF HISTORY AND HOPE
A book-length set of essays on Pieper appeared in 2009209 providing
a number of insights into Pieper’s philosophy in the context of modernity. 
First, it highlights the linear notions of time defended by Pieper. In Joseph 
J. Godfrey’s essay, The Future of Pieper’s Hope and History, we learn:
History, Pieper proposes, is not evolution. History stems from hu-
man freedom. While there can be possibilities delivered to humanity 
by past processes over which there has been no human control, his-
tory depends on whether humans take advantage of these possibili-
ties. Evolution delivers the possibilities; humans choose the future. 
What will happen is not decided on the field of evolution, but on the 
field of human choices—history. When self-determination obtains, 
evolution does not.210 
A little further on, Godfrey employs Johann Baptist Metz to highlight the 
reality of time’s end: 
But Metz contends that the world’s time is not to be decoupled from 
the time of the individual’s life. The shift from biblically understood 
bounded time to unbounded time under the pressure of evolutionary 
thinking, Metz proposes, is due to the influences not only in but also 
on the Enlightenment, even on Kant. A notion of cyclical time may 
have obtained in some cultures, but Christianity brought a notion of 
208 END OF TIME, at 152–153. 
209 Joseph J. Godfrey, The Future of Pieper’s Hope and History, in Bernard N. Schu-
macher, A COSMOPOLITAN HERMIT: MODERNITY AND TRADITION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
JOSEF PIEPER (2009), at 141. Godfrey’s essay is more focused on Pieper’s later work, HOPE
AND HISTORY: FIVE SALZBURG LECTURES [David Kipp trans., 1969/1994], but draws on 
important elements of END OF TIME.  
210 Id. at 144. 
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linear time; the modern period has recast linear time into endless du-
ration, and then recast endless duration as evolutionary.211 
Pieper would scarcely disagree, and may well strongly contend that 
modern apocalyptic mindsets discussed in Parts II and III above, and the 
liberal responses to them, are well off target. Godfrey once again:  
Scarce or perhaps completely missing from Fukuyama and Wright is 
the standpoint Pieper took in The End of Time: A Meditation on the 
Philosophy of History, that time, and human history, will have an 
end. Fukuyama has “the end of history” as the cessation of major 
changes in political forms of life as fact and ideal; once liberal de-
mocracy has appeared, human history has climbed its last plateau—
but the journey continues. Wright guesses that the future may bring 
more networks of cooperation and trust, but not that these relation-
ships will be Aufhebende, or transformed beyond time.212 
The second important aspect is the independence of hope from “hav-
ing” and its critical orientation towards “being”: 
Pieper reports findings of physician Herbert Plügge to the effect that 
only when standard hopes collapse can “fundamental hope [. . .] 
most convincingly be grasped.” Disappointment makes way for the 
“purging of all illusory hope.” “Out of the loss of common, every-
day hope arises authentic hope.” Pieper, drawing on a thesis of Mar-
cel, maintains that such fundamental hope, strictly speaking, cannot 
be disappointed, because it is just as unshakable as existence itself. 
Yet it cannot be fulfilled by anything a person can “have”; funda-
mental hope is oriented toward what a person “is,” toward his salva-
tion or self-realization in the future.213 
The long arms of the octopus of coincidence214 wrap themselves around 
these two ideas and show forth Pieper’s critical insight into the End of Time 
and its relationship with Eternity. Under pressure, real hope can be 
squeezed out of the two and form a basis for an approach to present prob-
lems.  
211 SCHUMACHER, A COSMOPOLITAN HERMIT, supra note 203, at 160 (citations omit-
ted).  
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 144. 
214 I have borrowed this from B. J. Whiting, Recent Historical Novels, 24:1 SPECULUM, 
106, 95–106 (January 1949). 
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A. The Hope in Chapter One
This Chapter of Pieper’s work has a direct bearing on a number of legal 
questions including conscience and the laws of war. In the former, the indi-
vidual confronts eternity over against a claim of the state. The false or con-
trived conscience claim, as might be seen in cases like United States v. 
Quaintance,215 is subject to additional scrutiny once, as argued by Pieper, it 
is made subject to the rigors of philosophy. Indeed, it will be refined and 
made more rational by any such exposure and thus surely made clearer, and 
open for judicial consideration. Judges may shy away from theology but 
must operate in an at least philosophically comprehensible world. Likewise, 
in legal education there are no generally named “legal theology” courses in 
law schools216 but “legal philosophy” is by no means passé.  
Second, Pieper’s analysis helps courts to draw clearer lines between 
the legal-philosophical and the theological. His does this by giving theology 
its proper place in the realm of public discussion and debate on the issues of 
the day. Following Cicero and Plato, such matters should be part of the gen-
eral education. 
Finally, like the two Tibetan men caught up in a world conflagra-
tion, Pieper’s analysis reminds us that the believer is a person and that be-
lief is ultimately a personal act, inaccessible to others in the same way. The 
justice of conscience claims must bear this in mind as courts attempt to nav-
igate claims that are comprehensible in different ways to people of differing 
histories (in the concrete sense), experiences and religions. 
Likewise, the laws of war can be better informed if theology is kept 
in play by allowing courts a way to access those rights (and duties) which 
remain constant even when the normal “rule of law” is disintegrating and 
the world is descending into chaos. In such circumstances, it is often only 
reliance on the transcendent which allows courts to take the practical steps 
needed to mitigate such deterioration of civilization. 
215 608 F.3d 717 (10th Cir. 2010). Where an attempt to avoid prosecution for drug pos-
session and intended distribution was dismissed despite the protagonists assertion that “they 
[we]re the founding members of the Church of Cognizance, which teaches that marijuana is 
a deity and sacrament.” Quaintance at 718. For further recent discussion, see Ben Adams & 
Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts After Hobby Lobby, 67 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE, 59 (2014). 
216 I leave to one side the specialist or introductory classes such a Canon Law or Jewish 
Law: The Rabbinic Idea of Law (offered at Harvard in 2017 by Professor Chaim Saiman) or 
Introduction to Islamic Law (likewise offered at Harvard by Professor Intisar Rabb in 2017). 
As to whether this is a good thing or not see Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of 
the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC., 247 (1977-1978). 
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B. The Hope in Chapter Two
Chapter Two deals generally with themes of nihilism, a world that is not 
subject to a complete annihilation, the inadequacy of common optimism and 
pessimism, and the limits of progress. These perspectives provide a concep-
tual brake on government action, and will force a court to consider the lim-
its of its own ability to make judgments about cause and effect. Environ-
mental crises, for example, may appear different in the light of a temporal 
or other (for example, moral) limits on technological progress, or may de-
mand diverse solutions in a context where the end of the world is not “noth-
ing” but “something” (even if that “something” remains unclear). The exer-
cise of power in international law would likewise take on a new perspective 
in such circumstances. 
What is more, the idea of “maintenance in being” - apart from the obvious 
religious implications217 - may provide a reminder that all kinds of civil order 
require constant maintenance and conservation. Without this awareness, the 
rule of law and other essential principles can disintegrate (dis-integrate)218 
under the weight of conflicts over resources, both natural and synthetic. If 
such (human) maintenance is seen inwardly as itself an act of creation, it is 
more likely to receive the attention and personal investment that are its due. 
Here we see Pieper’s anti-nihilism grabbing on to the extra-temporal end of 
history and using it to soak up the blackness of an unlimited “destructive ef-
ficiency”. 
C. The Hope in Chapter Three
Chapter three is more purely theological and so it may be more difficult 
to fit into the above categories. Nevertheless, it says a great deal about the 
potential misuse of world-encompassing technology, surveillance and the 
inherent power in something like the Imperium Romanum. Any such re-
minder is never lost in a world where totalitarian regimes are not yet a thing 
of the past. State-surveillance like that under the East German Stasi, or even 
some aspects of current bureaucratic regimes, must squirm at Pieper’s de-
scription of an apparent order which appears to “run smoothly” on the sur-
face, but is in reality a flurry of disorder and even lawless chaos. 
217 The essential idea here is that God constantly “thinks” of the world, and of each in-
dividual, thereby maintaining their existences. Scripture is replete with references to God 
not forgetting, but always remembering his people. For example, in Genesis 8:1 “But God 
remembered Noah and all the beasts and all the cattle that were with him in the ark.” RE-
VISED STANDARD VERSION (1946, 1952, 1971). 
218 In the sense of a falling apart of that which was formerly integrated and whole. 
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VII. CONCLUSION
Given that humans don’t know “when the play will end,” it does us
well to ponder the possibility that it might. Pieper’s lengthy and sophisti-
cated philosophical consideration of time, and its eventual ending, is an im-
portant off-set against the unruly apocalyptic claims which are beginning to 
encumber our culture and more indirectly our legal system. It is never too 
late to keep calm and carry on. 
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